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Behavioral antitrust-the application to antitrust analysis of empirical
evidence of robust behavioral deviations from strict rationality-is increasingly
popular and hotly debated by legal scholars and the enforcement agencies
alike. This Article shows, however, that both proponents and opponents of
behavioral antitrust frequently and fundamentally misconstrue its methodology,
treating concrete empirical phenomena as if they were broad hypothetical
assumptions. Because of this fundamental methodological error, scholars often
make three classes of mistakes in behavioral antitrust analyses: first, they fail
to appreciate the variability and heterogeneity of behavioral phenomena;
second, they disregard the concrete ways in which markets, firms, and other
institutions both facilitate and inhibit rational behavior by antitrust actors;
and, third, they erroneously equate all deviations from standard rationality
with harm to competition. After establishing the central role of rationality
assumptions in present-day antitrust and reviewing illustrative behavioral
analyses across the field-from horizontal and vertical restraints, through
monopolization, to merger enforcement practices-this Article examines the
three classes of mistakes, their manifestation, and their consequences in
antitrust scholarship. Besides providing guidance to future behavioral
antitrust scholarship, this Article concludes by discussing two sets of essential
lessons that the behavioral approach already can offer to advance antitrust law
and policy: one concerning the value of case-specific evidence in antitrust
adjudication and enforcement, the other showing how antitrust law can and
should account for systematic and predictable boundedly rational behavior that
is neither constant nor uniform.
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Introduction
The behavioral approach' to antitrust law draws on a large body of
empirical behavioral evidence to inform antitrust doctrine and
policymaking.2 In particular, behavioral antitrust focuses on findings that
1. For general reviews of the behavioral approach to law, see Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin
& Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law
and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1051 (2000); and Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. REv. 237 (2008) [hereinafter Tor, Behavioral
Methodology].
2. See, e.g., Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information
Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REv. 231 (2004); Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral
Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527 (2011); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate:
Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007) [hereinafter Stucke, At the
Gate]; Avishalom Tor, A Behavioural Approach to Antitrust Law and Economics, 14 CONSUMER
POL'Y REv. 18, 18-19 (2004) [hereinafter Tor, Behavioural Approach] (noting that this approach
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reveal how the judgment and decision behaviors of actual antitrust actors
are likely to systematically and predictably deviate from the strict
rationality that antitrust law currently assumes.
Perhaps due to the dominance in antitrust of rationality-based law and
economics 4 -from the field's jurisprudence and enforcement policies to its
legal and economic scholarship-behavioral findings took far longer to
garner broad attention in antitrust law than in many other legal fields. In
fact, until a few years ago, antitrust discourse largely neglected those
behaviorally informed analyses offered by a small number of legal
scholars.6
is "grounded in empirical observations of human behaviour" and "based on scientific findings
regarding actual human behaviour, which can often provide better descriptions of market
dynamics and thus more effective prescriptions for competition policy"); Avishalom Tor, The
Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV.
482 (2002) [hereinafter Tor, Entry]; Avishalom Tor, Illustrating a Behaviorally Informed
Approach to Antitrust Law: The Case of Predatory Pricing, ANTITRUST, Fall 2003, at 52
[hereinafter Tor, Predatory Pricing].
3. For discussion of the centrality of the rationality assumption in antitrust, see PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 1 ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION 13 (4th ed. 2013); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST
ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 134-36 (2005) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
ENTERPRISE]; KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW 226 (2003); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW vii-x (2d ed. 2001); and also see Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in
Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 261 (2010), in which Professor Leslie challenges the judicial use of
rationality theory in antitrust cases and argues that judges often employ an overly narrow
conception ofrationality.
4. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3 ("As a general proposition business firms
are (or must be assumed to be) profit maximizers, which means that they constructively 'intend' to
take the course of action that maximizes their returns, given the physical and legal environment in
which they find themselves . . . ."); Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 536-44 (discussing the
Chicago School's continuing influence on antitrust policy); Tor, Behavioural Approach, supra
note 2, at 18 (discussing the impact of the Chicago School on antitrust law and economics); Tor,
Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 52 ("One of the core assumptions of the traditional economic
approach to antitrust law is that competitors are perfectly rational, profit-maximizing, decision
makers.").
5. Compare, for instance, the statements offered already more than a decade ago with respect
to behavioral-legal applications more generally, such as Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral
Theories ofJudgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND.
L. REv. 1499 (1998), in which Professor Langevoort described, fifteen years ago, the many
applications of behavioral analysis to legal fields other than antitrust, and Cass R. Sunstein,
Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, I AM. L. & ECON. REv. 115, 115 (1999), in
which Professor Sunstein described a "flood" of behaviorally oriented legal research already in
1999, with recent statements about behavioral antitrust, such as Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2,
at 514, where Professor Stucke notes, quite colorfully, that "[w]hile tossed against the rocks
elsewhere, within the quiet waters of antitrust these rational choice theories stand largely
unchallenged," and Luca Arnaudo, The Quest for Behavioural Antitrust: Beyond the Label Battle,
Towards a Cognitive Approach, DOVENSCHMIDT Q., June 2013, at 77, 79 where Professor
Arnaudo states that "when considering the growing fortunes of [behavioral economics], the
process towards a [behavioral antitrust] could have been expected to occur much faster . . .
(footnote omitted).
6. See, e.g., Arnaudo, supra note 5 (noting that attempts by pioneering scholars in the '80s
and '90s to interject behavioral insights into the antitrust field "basically fell into the void" and
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Yet now behavioral antitrust clearly is in vogue: Numerous recent
articles by lawyers and economists debate the merits and demerits of
behavioral antitrust generally and its specific application to issues spanning
horizontal and vertical restraints, monopolization, mergers, and more. 7
that "it is only in the last few years that a massive behavioural takeover of antitrust studies has
been experienced"); Max Huffman, Neo-Behavioralism? 3 (Dec. 23, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1730365 ("Behavioral Antitrust has the feel of
being something quite new. The earliest article explicitly proposing a behavioral approach to
antitrust was written in 2002." (citing Tor, Entry, supra note 2)). Early antitrust scholarship
making use of behavioral evidence includes Aviram & Tor, supra note 2; Albert A. Foer, The
Third Leg of the Antitrust Stool: What the Business Schools Have to Offer to Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 21 (2003); Harry S. Gerla, A Micro-Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law:
Games Managers Play, 86 MICH. L. REV. 892 (1988); Harry S. Gerla, The Psychology of
Predatory Pricing: Why Predatory Pricing Pays, 39 Sw. L.J. 755 (1985); Tor, Behavioural
Approach, supra note 2; Tor, Entry, supra note 2; and Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2. For
an early discussion among prominent antitrust economists that briefly touches on the potential of
behavioral economics to inform antitrust law, see also Philip Nelson et al., Economists'
Roundtable, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 8, 15-16.
7. See, e.g., Matthew Bennett et al., What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition
Policy?, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 111, 120-32; James C. Cooper & William E.
Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 779 (2012); Eliana Garc6s, The Impact of Behavioral Economics on Consumer
and Competition Policies, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 145; Thomas J. Horton,
The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the Chicago School ofAntitrust:
Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 469 (2011); Max Huffman & Daniel Heidtke, Behavioral Exploitation Antitrust in Consumer
Subprime Mortgage Lending, 4 WM. & MARY POL'Y REV. 77 (2012); Max Huffman, Marrying
Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (2012) [hereinafter Huffman,
Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust]; Leslie, supra note 3; Amanda P. Reeves, Behavioral
Antitrust: Unanswered Questions on the Horizon, ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2010, art. 3, at 1,
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/antitrust_source/Jun 10
Reeves6 24f.authcheckdam.pdf; Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2; Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is
That What I Want?: Competition Policy and the Role ofBehavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 893 (2010); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Competition, 81 MISS. L.J. 107 (2011)
[hereinafter Stucke, Reconsidering]; Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism, GCP MAG., Jan.
2009 [hereinafter, Stucke, New Antitrust Realism]; Huffman, supra note 6; Nicolas Petit &
Norman Neyrinck, Behavioral Economics and Abuse of Dominance: A Fresh Look at the Article
102 TFEU Case-Law (May 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers
.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract -id=1641431; see also Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck,
Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010,
at 3; Douglas H. Ginsburg & Derek W. Moore, The Future of Behavioral Economics in Antitrust
Jurisprudence, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 89; Alison Oldale, Behavioral
Economics and Merger Analysis, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 139; Vivien Rose,
The Role of Behavioral Economics in Competition Law: A Judicial Perspective, COMPETITION
POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 103; Michael A. Salinger, Behavioral Economics, Consumer
Protection, and Antitrust, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 65; Maurice E. Stucke, Am
I a Price-Fixer? A Behavioural Economics Analysis of Cartels, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS:
CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT 263, 289 (Caron Beaton-
Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust and Monopolization,
8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 545 (2012) [hereinafter Stucke, Monopolization]; Maurice E.
Stucke, Greater International Convergence and the Behavioral Antitrust Gambit [hereinafter
Stucke, Gambit], in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 155 (Ariel
Ezrachi ed., 2012); Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 801 (2012);
Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule ofReason
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Antitrust journals dedicate issues to behavioral antitrust,8  and the
professional associations of practitioners and legal academics in the field
devote panels at their meetings to discussing it.9 Perhaps most telling, even
some enforcement agencies and officials now study and discuss the policy
implications of this new approach.10
After Leegin, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 805; Avishalom Tor, The Market, the Firm, and Behavioral
Antitrust, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Eyal Zamir
& Doron Teichman eds., forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Tor, The Market]; Gregory J. Werden et
al., Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 126
(2011); Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against
Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOzO L. REV. 1517 (2012).
8. See, e.g., ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2010, available at http://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/dam/aba/publishinglantitrust source/Junl0_FullSource6_24.authcheckdam.pdf; The Jevons
Colloquium: Behavioral Economics in Consumer Protection and Competition Law, COMPETITION
POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 89; A Symposium on Antitrust and Behavioral Economics,
COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 3.
9. See, e.g., Agenda, Am. Antitrust Inst., 9th Annual Conference: The Next Antitrust Agenda
(June 18, 2008), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/agenda2008-
062320081121.pdf; Brochure, Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Antitrust Law, Spring Meeting (Mar.
28-30, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dami/aba/events/antitrustlaw/
2012/03/spring-meeting/spring_2012_brochure.authcheckdam.pdf; Program, Ass'n Am. Law
Schs., AALS 2012 Annual Meeting: Academic Freedom and Academic Duty (Jan. 4-8, 2012),
http://www.aals.org/am20l2/2012program.pdf; Meeting Announcement, Brit. Inst. Int'l & Comp.
L., Competition Law Forum Meeting: Behavioural Economics (July 1, 2009),
http://www.biicl.org/events/view/-/id/401/. Moreover, at the Next Generation of Antitrust
Scholarship Conference held at the New York University School of Law in January 2010, three
out of the twelve papers applied behavioral economics to antitrust policy. Agenda, N.Y. Univ.
Sch. of Law, Next Generation of Antitrust Scholarship Conference (Jan. 29, 2010),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/conferences/nextgenantitrust/.
10. See, e.g., Amelia Fletcher, Chief Economist, U.K. Office of Fair Trading, Address at the
European Commission Consumer Affairs Conference: What Do Policy-Makers Need from
Behavioural Economists? (Nov. 28, 2008) (transcript available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
dyna/conference/programme-en.htm); Interview with Joseph Farrell, Dir. Bureau Econ., FTC, and
Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't Justice, Antitrust Div. (Jan.
22, 2010) [hereinafter Farrell & Shapiro Interview], available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/abalpublishing/antitrustsource/Febl0_FullSource2_25.authcheckdam.pdf; see also
OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, THE IMPACT OF PRICE FRAMES ON CONSUMER DECISION MAKING
(2010) (U.K.), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oftleconomic_research/OFTI226.pdf;
Bennett et al., supra note 7; Oldale, supra note 7; Press Release, Eur. Union Comm'n for
Consumers, Why Consumers Behave the Way They Do: Commissioner Kuneva Hosts High Level
Conference on Behavioural Economics (Nov. 28, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
releaseIP-08-1836_en.htm; J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, FTC, Remarks at the Vienna
Competition Conference: Behavioral Economics: Observations Regarding Issues that Lie Ahead
(June 9, 2010) [hereinafter Rosch, Issues that Lie Ahead] (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100609viennaremarks.pdf); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, FTC,
Remarks at the Conference on the Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: Managing
Irrationality: Some Observations on Behavioral Economics and the Creation of the Consumer
Financial Protection Agency (Jan. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Rosch, Managing Irrationality] (transcript
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100106financial-products.pdf). Similarly, in June
2012, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) held discussions
on competition and behavioral economics. Competition Issues Under Discussion, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/workinprogress.htm.
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Some particularly enthusiastic proponents of behavioral antitrust
depict it as an attractive wholesale alternative to the traditional economic
approach to antitrust law." Other supporters view the evidence on
systematic deviations from strict rationality marshaled by the behavioral
approach, at the very least, as confirming their longstanding suspicions of
the soundness of the rationality assumptions underlying the accepted
economic methodology in the field.12 At the same time, however, some
commentators have been quick to criticize behavioral antitrust on numerous
grounds, challenging the robustness and validity of its empirical evidence as
well as the clarity and coherence of its legal implications.13 In fact, certain
detractors have gone so far as to argue that behavioral antitrust cannot
possibly benefit the law.14
Nevertheless, a closer analysis reveals that both extreme positions in
the behavioral antitrust debate are mistaken. Proponents are correct in
holding that the behavioral approach can advance antitrust policy and
doctrine based on a better understanding of market behavior. Yet those
11. See Stucke, Gambit, supra note 7, at 180-81 (viewing behavioral antitrust as an
alternative to price theory and effects-based analysis); Rosch, Managing Irrationality, supra note
10, at 8-9. Commissioner Rosch stated:
By engaging in a fact-bound analysis of the conduct and its anticompetitive effect
rather than, as the Chicago School would have it, assuming that certain conduct is
inherently pro-competitive, I believe the Commission could incorporate insights from
the behavioral economics literature in a way that would still put firms on notice of the
type of conduct that is anticompetitive.
Id.; see also Horton, supra note 7, at 473-76 (criticizing traditional antitrust law and economics
from an evolutionary biology and behavioral perspective and making the far-reaching assertion
that "Homo economicus will become extinct [and as] Homo sapiens replaces Homo economicus in
antitrust analysis, the Chicago School's antitrust dominance will come to a timely end" (footnotes
omitted)); Werden et al., supra note 7, at 127 (claiming, while criticizing it, that the behavioral
approach questions "the assumption of profit maximization at the core of neoclassical economic
theory").
12. See, e.g., Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 513 (characterizing behavioral economics
as questioning "neoclassical economic theories' unrealistic and simplifying assumptions about
human nature"); Stucke, Reconsidering, supra note 7, at 109 ("Antitrust policy is built on a flawed
assumption of rationality.").
13. For example, in Werden et al., supra note 7, the authors discuss the limits of traditional
economics in the merger context and note that
To the extent such departures [from profit maximization] are mistakes, proponents of
behavioral antitrust propose to inject paternalism into competition policy, but that is
antithetical to the fundamental idea of competition policy. To the extent these
departures result from pursuit of non-profit objectives, proponents might identify
good reasons for concern about particular forms of anticompetitive conduct, but they
offer nothing to improve the identification ofanticompetitive conduct.
Id. at 138 (emphasis added); see also Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at 1553 (arguing that to fulfill
its promise, behavioral economics must provide "a more robust and accurate account of both firm
and consumer behavior" and concluding that "[u]ntil then, we must maintain our observation as to
the tentative irrelevance of behavioral economics in antitrust").
14. See, e.g., Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at 1526-27 (asserting their "behavioral
irrelevance theorem" according to which "behavioral economics ... fails to offer any clear policy
implications for antitrust law").
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who believe behavioral antitrust can or should provide a complete substitute
for the economic analysis of antitrust law are wrong. Instead, both the
nascent stage of behavioral antitrust and, more significantly, the very nature
of its methodology make it an extremely valuable complement to traditional
antitrust economics-capable of offering important refinements and
improvements-rather than its complete substitute. Similarly, detractors
correctly point out important limitations of behavioral antitrust but overstate
their case, failing to recognize the potential of this approach and the
essential lessons it already offers for antitrust doctrine and enforcement
policy.
This Article shows that many commentators, proponents and
opponents alike, reach their respective erroneous conclusions largely due to
a shared, fundamental misunderstanding when they treat concrete, empirical
behavioral phenomena as if they were instead broad hypothetical
assumptions.15  When this fundamental methodological error leads them
astray, scholars make three distinct classes of mistakes, each of which
generates its own faulty antitrust applications and policy conclusions.16
First, analysts fail to appreciate that human judgment and decision behavior
is neither constant nor uniform but rather variable and heterogeneous, the
evidence of systematic and predictable patterns at the overall population
15. Reeves, for example, mistakenly states that "[b]ehavioral economics attacks the rational
profit-maximizer assumption head on by assuming that humans have cognitive limitations that
prevent them from processing information perfectly and maximizing their utility." Reeves, supra
note 7, at 2 (emphasis added); see also Stucke, Reconsidering, supra note 7, at 121-22 (assuming,
in turn, that firms, consumers, and the government exhibit constant and homogenous bounded
rationality); Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at 1523, 1535-48 (arguing against what they perceive
as the "irrationality hypothesis" used by "modem behavioralists" and basing much of their
analysis on various hypothetical assumptions of deviations from rationality); cf Cooper &
Kovacic, supra note 7, at 780 (noting that behavioral antitrust scholars replace the "assumption of
rationality with one of 'bounded rationality'). But see Stucke, New Antitrust Realism, supra note
7, at 11 ("Behavioral economics at its core is empirical.").
16. Researchers also exhibit a fourth class of mistakes, common to behavioral-legal
applications outside antitrust, when they exaggerate the intractability and other limitations of the
behavioral evidence and thus understate its usefulness for antitrust analysis. Scholars who are
used to the generality and elegance of hypothetical rational-actor models expect in vain the same
"grand theory" attributes from behavioral antitrust. In addition, legal analysts sometimes are
dismayed by the large number of potentially relevant behavioral findings or find the challenge of
determining the ultimate effect of multiple, seemingly contradictory phenomena overwhehning.
These concerns largely stem from commentators' lack of a first-hand familiarity with behavioral
research. Otherwise sophisticated antitrust scholars fail to realize that the concrete, empirically
driven nature of behavioral analysis mostly is incompatible with a grand-theory approach. And
while concerns about multiple or conflicting phenomena do have merit, a careful study of the
evidence shows these conflicts sometimes are illusory or at least less significant than they initially
appear. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics,
Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 739, 745-52 (2000) (discussing methods
for addressing seemingly conflicting behavioral phenomena and detailing how its core ideas are
relevant to the law); Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 301-04 (considering methods




level notwithstanding. When mistakenly assuming constancy,
commentators ignore, for instance, the significance of boundary
conditions-the circumstances outside of which a specific empirical
regularity is not manifested1 7-and thus sometimes apply behavioral
phenomena to irrelevant antitrust settings.
Second, scholars often disregard the concrete ways in which
institutions-from markets and firms to enforcement agencies and courts-
variously facilitate and inhibit more rational behavior on the part of antitrust
actors. For example, behavioral antitrust detractors rightly cite competitive
discipline as a force that promotes rational behavior by market participants.
Yet these analysts neglect to examine further whether and how the
processes of competitive discipline vary in their efficacy and consequences
across different market conditions and behaviors. Behavioral antitrust
proponents, on the other hand, occasionally commit the mirror-image
mistake, failing to consider the rationality-facilitating force of markets and
thereby implicitly assuming that behavioral phenomena are always robust to
market discipline. In reality, however, markets differently facilitate and
inhibit rationality in different circumstances. Therefore, both commentators
who unquestioningly rely on markets to produce rational behavior and those
who neglect their powerful effects altogether will inevitably reach some
erroneous antitrust conclusions.
Third, analysts routinely and mistakenly equate deviations from strict
rationality with harm to their perpetrators, to efficiency, and to competition
that merits antitrust intervention. Consequently, they tend to embrace or
reject the behavioral approach based on their preexisting views regarding
the need for a more or less expansive antitrust policy instead of the merits
of the behavioral evidence. In fact, however, certain deviations from
standard rationality benefit rather than harm those actors exhibiting them.' 8
Other deviations may be costly to their perpetrators yet benefit other market
participants or society at large.19 Finally, only a subset of the remaining
deviations from strict rationality are comprised of behaviors that are both
inefficient and also properly of antitrust concern.2 0
After exploring the three categories of common mistakes and how they
can misdirect behavioral antitrust analyses, this Article discusses two
essential sets of lessons the behavioral approach already can offer antitrust
doctrine and enforcement policy, despite its nascent stage of development
17. See Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 292-300 (examining specific areas of
behavioral analysis where boundary conditions alter the effects of behavioral biases).
18. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 3, at 280-85 (noting that seemingly irrational behavior can
make economic sense in the context of antitrust conspiracies and predatory business practices).
19. See, e.g., Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 543-45 (showing that optimistically overconfident
entry can generate some social benefits even while harmfil to entrants).
20. See, e.g., Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 845-63 (explaining that even efficiency-reducing
resale price maintenance is only of antitrust concern under specific circumstances).
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and inherent limitations. One set of lessons concerns the value of case-
specific evidence for antitrust adjudication in both the courts-in contrast
with the doctrinal trends of recent decades-and in agency enforcement
actions-where such evidence is routinely evaluated, if sometimes based on
inappropriate assumptions of rationality. Another set of lessons shows how
antitrust doctrine can incorporate the evidence of behavioral regularities in
the market without falling prey to the fundamental methodological error of
treating these empirical patterns as if they were instead broad hypothetical
assumptions. All in all, this Article finds that both some detractors and
certain supporters overstate their respective cases: the behavioral approach
already offers valuable antitrust lessons but cannot and should not
altogether replace traditional antitrust law and economics.
Organizationally, Part I defines behavioral antitrust, highlighting the
basic features of the relevant empirical evidence and briefly reviewing
illustrative applications from the burgeoning literature in the field. This
exercise clarifies the boundaries of behavioral antitrust and reveals why
scholars' pervasive methodological error is indeed fundamental. Parts II-
IV study the three classes of mistakes that supporters and critics of
behavioral antitrust commonly make and the legal consequences of these
mistakes. Part V concludes by outlining the two essential sets of lessons
that the behavioral approach already offers antitrust doctrine and policy.
I. Foundations
The behavioral analysis of law has been popular among scholars for
more than fifteen years,21 providing an explicit account of legally relevant
behavior based on empirical behavioral evidence instead of either everyday
intuition-like traditional legal scholarship-or the theoretical rational-
actor construct of traditional law and economics. 22 In contrast to its swift
endorsement in most other legal fields, until a few years ago the behavioral
approach found little traction in antitrust.23 Yet, more recently, the field's
receptiveness to this approach evinced a dramatic change, with an outpour
of interest from scholars, practitioners, and even enforcement officials, who
all debate the merits and demerits of behavioral antitrust.24
This Part explains that neither the delayed reaction of antitrust
scholarship to the behavioral approach nor the intensity of the current
21. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 5 (reviewing the already numerous behavioral
applications in law approximately fifteen years ago); Sunstein, supra note 5 (same).
22. See generally Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1 (evaluating the
accomplishments, potential, challenges, and limitations of the behavioral analysis of law).
23. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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debate over it is mere happenstance.25 To appreciate the forces that shape
the antitrust community's reaction to behavioral antitrust, subpart I(A)
outlines the role of the rationality assumption in antitrust, highlighting some
of its concrete manifestations in legal doctrine and enforcement agency
policies. Subpart I(B) then defines the behavioral approach, focusing on the
empirical evidence of real human behavior that systematically differs from
models of strict rationality. The juxtaposition of these two subparts
contrasts the empirically based behavioral approach with the pervasive
reliance on hypothetical rationality in antitrust and, in turn, helps explain
both the delayed recognition of the behavioral approach and the intensity of
the current debate over its usefulness for the field. Subpart I(C) reviews
some illustrative behavioral antitrust applications, while subpart I(D)
explains the fundamental methodological error that permeates much of this
recent scholarship on both sides of the debate, building a foundation for the
remainder of this Article.2 6
A. The Rationality Assumption
Present-day antitrust-perhaps more than any other legal area-is
based on the traditional economic assumption that market participants are
rational decision makers.27 The producer firms whose conduct is the focus
of the field are assumed to be perfectly rational competitors that make
strictly rational judgments and whose decisions seek always and only to
maximize profits.2 8  Moreover, the microeconomic model of competition
25. Cf Salinger, supra note 7, at 65 ("The interest in behavioral economics (and some of the
resistance to it) stems from the belief that it justifies intervention that conventional economic
analysis suggests is unwarranted.").
26. Subparts I(A) and I(C) and Part III draw on and develop further this Author's analysis in
Tor, The Market, supra note 7.
27. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (7th ed. 2007) ("The task
of economics ... is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his
ends...." (footnote omitted)); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 1-2 (2004) (discussing the role of the rationality assumption in descriptive analysis and
noting that "the view taken will generally be that actors are 'rational' and "maximize their
expected utility"); Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1481-85 (discussing the conventional law and
economics assumption that market participants are strictly rational); Tor, Behavioral
Methodology, supra note 1, at 239-41 (reviewing rational-actor models in law and economics).
Note that traditional antitrust economics assumes that all market participants, including
consumers, are rational actors who obtain an optimal amount of information, evaluate that
information in an unbiased manner, and then proceed to manifest their preexisting, well-ordered
preferences in their market behavior. Cf GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) (arguing that "all human behavior can be viewed as involving
participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal
amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets").
28. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3 ("As a general proposition business firms
are (or must be assumed to be) profit maximizers. . . ."); POSNER, supra note 3, at ix ("[T]he issue
in evaluating the antitrust significance of a particular business practice should be whether it is a
means by which a rational profit maximizer can increase its profits at the expense of
efficiency. . . ."); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 134 ("The entire antitrust enterprise is
582
Understanding Behavioral Antitrust
that the law relies on further assumes that consumers are rational actors as
well.29
The rationality assumption is not merely an abstract postulate of
antitrust economics, but has concrete legal manifestations throughout the
field.30 In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,3 for
instance, the Supreme Court made the legal bar for allegations of illegal
monopolization by predatory pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
nearly insurmountable by relying on the rationality assumption.3 2  The
Court declared that conduct will not amount to predatory pricing unless the
alleged scheme involved pricing below some measure of cost and the
predator "had a reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a
dangerous probability" of recouping its losses from such below-cost
predation.33 The opinion emphasized that because "[r]ecoupment is the
ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing scheme,"34 a rational
dedicated to the proposition that business firms behave rationally."); Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at
488-90 (discussing the assumption of entrant rationality in antitrust analysis and citing additional
sources); Werden et al., supra note 7, at 126-27 ("The tools of neoclassical economics now play a
vital role in the analyses conducted by competition agencies and in the litigation of competition
cases . . . .").
29. For a typical exposition of the role of consumer rationality in economic analysis see, for
example, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES & POLICY
85-98 (12th ed. 2012). For an informal description of the role of consumers in antitrust's model
of market competition, see Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 115-17.
30. Because this author and others already have discussed the role of the rationality
assumption in antitrust doctrine at some length elsewhere, the present Article only provides a few
illustrations. For additional analysis see Leslie, supra note 3, at 267-73; Reeves & Stucke, supra
note 2, at 1549-53; Tor, Entry, supra note 2; Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2; and Tor &
Rinner, supra note 7, discussing resale price maintenance. Note that the impact of the rationality
assumption is not limited to judicial doctrine but also informs the enforcement policies of the
antitrust agencies. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf ("In evaluating how a merger will likely change a firm's
behavior, the Agencies focus primarily on how the merger affects conduct that would be most
profitable for the firm." (emphasis added)); Rosch, Managing Irrationality, supra note 10, at 9
(noting that a shift to the behavioral approach might impact merger guidelines).
31. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
32. The Court stated that to be held liable for predatory pricing under Section 2 a competitor
must have "a dangerous probability[] of recouping its investment in below-cost prices." Id. at
224. The Court continued, "For the investment to be rational, the [predator] must have a
reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the losses
suffered." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1986)); see also Leslie, supra note 3, at 263-64 ("Federal judges are more
frequently concluding that some types of anticompetitive conduct are facially irrational or
implausible and, therefore, could not have occurred as a matter of law (because it is implausible
that a business would act irrationally).").
33. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224; see also Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 55 (noting
that according to some economists the conditions for predatory pricing set out by the Supreme
Court will rarely be satisfied).
34. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224; see also Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 55, 58
n.25 (discussing the importance of the recoupment requirement for the Court).
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profit-maximizing firm will not engage in such predation unless the
monopoly profits it expects to charge in the future-once the competition is
driven out of the market-suffice to compensate for those losses inevitably
generated by its present, below-cost, predatory sales.3 s
Because it adopted the rationality assumption, the Supreme Court
concluded that predatory pricing schemes only rarely are tried and even
more rarely are successful.36 According to this view, for recoupment to be
likely the predator must have, inter alia, a very large market share that is
protected by significant entry barriers.37 However, because few alleged
predators meet the former condition, and few markets meet the latter one,
38the Court in Brooke Group concluded that price predation rarely occurs.
Consequently, the Court declared that predatory pricing allegations can be
rejected summarily in the presumably common case of unlikely
recoupment. 39
In the years since Brooke Group, the lower courts have followed the
Court's directive, routinely rejecting predatory-pricing allegations based on
the belief in their hypothetical irrationality and, hence, their assumed
implausibility. 40 The same rationale was also applied by the Court more
recently in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.41 to
reject allegations of predatory bidding because "a rational firm would not
willingly suffer definite, short-run losses" without "a reasonable
42
expectation" of recoupment. More generally, the Weyerhaeuser Court
35. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 225-26; Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 55, 58 n.26
(noting that the Court has adopted the view of some economic theorists that predatory pricing is
typically an irrational strategy). More precisely, rational predation must bear a positive, risk-
adjusted, net present value, like any other rational investment activity.
36. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 226; see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89 ("A predatory
pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative.... The foregone profits may be considered an
investment in the future. For the investment to be rational, the conspirators must have a
reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the losses
suffered."); PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3A ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1 726a (3d ed. 2008) ("No rational firm
would bear the losses, difficulties, and possible legal troubles of trying to exclude or discipline
rivals by predatory pricing unless it is reasonably confident of a payoff that exceeds the
investment .... ).
37. Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 55.
38. See id. (elaborating on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Brooke Group).
39. Id. at 55, 59 n.27.
40. See Leslie, supra note 3, at 272 ("[L]ower courts have reasoned that predatory pricing
schemes are 'unlikely to be attempted by rational businessmen."' (quoting Steams Airport Equip.
Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1999))). Leslie also points to two lower courts that
used summary judgment to dismiss hypothetically irrational allegations of predatory schemes and
were afirmed on appeal. See id. at 272 n.54 (citing Nat'l Parcel Servs., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt
Logistics, Inc., 150 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 1998) and C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 944 F.
Supp. 66 (D. Mass. 1996), affd, 137 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 1998) as examples).
41. 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
42. Id. at 319.
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noted that a "rational business will rarely make th[e] sacrifice" involved in
such predation.43
The Court's reliance on the rationality assumption to formulate
antitrust doctrine is not limited to Section 2 predation. For one, allegations
of a predatory horizontal conspiracy among competitors under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act already were summarily rejected in Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,4 a few years prior to Brooke Group,
once the Court determined that the conspiracy would have required
irrational behavior by the alleged conspirators.4 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court in Matsushita similarly noted the necessity of a
rational expectation of recoupment and explained that as unlikely as it
believed predatory pricing schemes to be for a single firm, it considered
these schemes even more irrational and unlikely for a cartel.46
Notably, the rationality assumption ostensibly was relied on by the
Matsushita Court only to establish a hurdle that plaintiffs' allegations must
clear to survive summary judgment.4 7 The more recent Brooke Group and
Weyerhaeuser opinions, on the other hand, went further in explicitly basing
a substantive legal requirement for establishing predatory pricing and
bidding on the rationality assumption.48
Beyond their impact on predation-related doctrines, moreover,
assumptions of rationality also have shaped the Court's Section 1
jurisprudence with respect to vertical restraints between manufacturers and
their distributors. 49 For instance, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc.50 replaced the longstanding per se rule against minimum resale
price maintenance (RPM)-a vertical restraint that forbids dealers from
reselling the products they purchased from a manufacturer below a
prescribed price-with a rule of reason approach.5 ' In reversing its older
precedents, the Court surveyed an antitrust economics literature "replete
43. Id. at 323.
44. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
45. Id. at 588-93.
46. See id. at 590-91.
47. Id. at 587-89; see also Leslie, supra note 3, at 339-40 (discussing Matsushita and
arguing, inter alia, that it blurred the line between procedural and substantive antitrust rules).
48. See supra notes 31-39, 41-43.
49. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW
§§ 16.01-.09 (4th ed. Supp. 2013) (surveying some of the relevant case law).
50. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
5 1. Id. at 881-82. Note that maximum RPM similarly was made subject to rule of reason
analysis instead of per se condemnation a decade earlier in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22
(1997). This was partly based on the rationality assumption. See id. at 17 ("But [setting maximum
prices too low to support essential and desired services], by driving away customers, would seem
likely to harm manufacturers as well as dealers and consumers, making it unlikely that a supplier
would set such a price as a matter of business judgment."); see also Leslie, supra note 3, at 273
(discussing the role of the rationality assumption in Khan).
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with procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer's use of resale price
maintenance"52 based on an assumption of manufacturer rationality.
Leegin adopted the Chicago School argument that it would be
irrational for manufacturers to use RPM, which has the general tendency of
raising consumer prices and, therefore, reducing profits, unless they found
the practice profitable on balance.54 According to this view, RPM must be a
procompetitive means for facilitating consumer demand and increasing
manufacturers' profits despite the higher prices it generates, unless it is
shown to support cartelization among either manufacturers or retailers. 5
Resale price maintenance may accomplish its beneficial outcome, for
example, by encouraging distributors to provide valuable services to
consumers before or after the sale, to engage in brand promotion, and so
on.56
Based on this reasoning, the Leegin Court found that RPM may be
rationally anticompetitive in some limited settings but rationally
procompetitive in many others, thereby necessitating a case-by-case rule of
reason treatment instead of an automatic, per se condemnation.
Furthermore, after noting that the practice could be anticompetitive, the
Supreme Court left lower courts the task of developing RPM's rule of
reason analysis, providing them only with "certain factors" relevant to the
inquiry,58  all based on-and therefore limited by-the rationality
assumption. 59 Leegin thus offers yet another, more recent illustration of the
key role the rationality assumption plays in the formulation of substantive
antitrust doctrines.
Besides its pervasive doctrinal impact, the rationality assumption also
plays an important role in antitrust enforcement, 60 such as when agencies
52. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889.
53. See generally Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 812 & n.45, 813-15 (reviewing the main
procompetitive accounts of RPM and noting that they are based on the rationality assumption).
54. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 896 (citing Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, The Law and
Economics ofResale Price Maintenance, 13 REV. INDUS. ORG. 57, 67 (1998), for the proposition
that a manufacturer will use minimum RPM only if increased demand from enhanced service
would more than offset the negative demand impact of a higher retail price).
55. Id. at 892-93.
56. See id. at 890.
57. Id. at 894, 898-99.
58. Id. at 897-98; see also Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 854-57 (evaluating each of the
factors enumerated by the Court in Leegin).
59. Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 854-57. For further detail see infra subpart I(C).
60. See, e.g., Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 543-45 (discussing the Federal Trade
Commission's premerger analysis and its reliance on the assumption that behavior is rational).
However, the Department of Justice does not appear to base its criminal enforcement policy on
assumptions of strict rationality that, for instance, would rule out the possibility of cartelization
where traditional economic models predict competitors cannot maintain such arrangements.
Instead, it relies on case-specific evidence, particularly the evidence generated by cartel members
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evaluate whether proposed mergers are likely substantially to lessen
competition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.61 In particular, although
the antitrust agencies seek to base their merger decisions on the best
available case-specific evidence,62 various elements of their analyses rely
on the rationality assumption. For instance, one category of the potentially
adverse effects of a merger on competition concerns the merger's potential
for generating "coordinated effects."6 3 These effects occur where a merger
diminishes "competition by enabling or encouraging post-merger
coordinated interaction among firms in the relevant market that harms
customers." When predicting the likelihood of post-merger coordination,
however, the agencies routinely rely on the traditional, rationality-based,
economic view of the conditions necessary for effective collusion to
distinguish mergers that raise coordinated-effects concerns from those that
do not.65
In addition to the important role of the assumption of rationality with
respect to producer firms, the assumption of consumer rationality also bears
on antitrust doctrine and policy, as the case of aftermarket power illustrates.
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,66 the Court
affirmed a denial of summary judgment on claims of Section 1 tying and
Section 2 monopolization.67 The majority ruled that Kodak, a manufacturer
of business copiers, could have exercised power in the aftermarket for the
sale of machine parts despite competition in the primary market for
68copiers.
Conversely, the dissent argued that a competitive market in copiers
necessarily would prevent Kodak from exercising power in parts.69 After
all, if consumers who already possessed Kodak machines were "locked in"
that partake in the leniency program. See id. at 575-80, 581 & n.324 (noting differences between
the agencies' approach to criminal cartels and other enforcement policies).
61. This Section is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
62. See, e.g., 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 2 (noting that "[tihe Agencies
consider any reasonably available and reliable evidence to address the central question of whether
a merger may substantially lessen competition" and laying out categories and sources of evidence
that agencies have found most informative).
63. Id. § 7.
64. Id.
65. See id. § 7.2; see also Interview with Alison Oldale, Deputy Dir. Antitrust, Bureau Econ.,
FTC (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/
antitrust_source/junl2oldaleintrvw626f.authcheckdam.pdf (stating that behavioral models
"aren't there yet" and that "in the meantime our existing models give us workable
approximations" but conjecturing that "the first place behavioral economic analysis might be
brought to bear on antitrust enforcement will be in areas like coordinated effects or exchange of
information[,] ... areas where our existing theories are not very helpful").
66. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
67. Id. at 456, 486.
68. Id. at 476-78.
69. Id. at 490-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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because they must use compatible parts, any exploitation of the firm's
power would raise the price of parts.70 Yet such a higher aftermarket price
effectively would make Kodak's machines more costly and less attractive to
rational consumers-who take into account the future costs of parts and
services over the copier's lifetime-in the competitive primary market for
copiers.7 1  Assuming consumer rationality, therefore, the defendant-
wishing to avoid damage to its copier sales in the primary market-could
not engage in an anticompetitive exercise of aftermarket power.7
It is thus clear that the assumption of consumer rationality played a
significant, if somewhat implicit, role in the disagreement between the
opinions of the majority and the dissent.73 While perfectly rational
consumers in the primary market would have sufficed to deter Kodak from
exploiting aftermarket power, the same does not necessarily hold for
boundedly rational consumers who may systematically underestimate or fail
to consider the future costs of parts.74
Vertical price restraints offer another example of the role of consumer
rationality in doctrinal debates. As noted above, the arguments over the
appropriate legal treatment of RPM have focused on the balance of its
harms and benefits for strictly rational firms. Interestingly, one argument
for minimum RPM that manufacturers repeatedly advanced but economists
summarily rejected was the "loss-leader" concern.76 Manufacturers argued
that retailers discount attractive products, selling them even below
wholesale prices, to attract customers and increase sales and profits from
other products at quantities that more than compensate for the retailers'
70. Id. at 496-97.
71. Id. at 494-95.
72. Id. at 495.
73. For analyses of the merits of these respective positions see, for instance, Steven C. Salop,
The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millennium, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 187 (2000) and Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense
of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (1995).
74. Cf Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 119 (arguing that "[p]assive consumers do not provide
the same type of constraints on firms as active consumers do" and, in the context of aftermarkets,
softened competition due to "myopic consumers who are unaware of their biases" manifests itself
in overall higher prices and a loss in allocative efficiency); Werden et al., supra note 7, at 136
(discussing the possible implications of consumers' hyperbolic discounting to the analysis of a
merger between producers of durable consumer goods whose customers must also purchase
proprietary complements, which are essentially aftermarket products).
75. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text; see also Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at
807.
76. Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 813; cf Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance
Controversy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 73-77 (1994) (arguing
that manufacturers might employ RPM to support inventory holdings and that they object to the
use of their products as "loss leaders" out of a fear that competing retailers will refuse to stock
products that can only be sold at a loss). But see Barak Y. Orbach, Antitrust Vertical Myopia: The
Allure of High Prices, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 261, 277-82 (2008) (arguing that consumers sometimes
value high prices in and of themselves).
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losses on the former loss leaders.n Manufacturers oppose the use of their
products as loss leaders despite the short-term wholesale profits the practice
generates because they believe that frequent discounts diminish the
reputation and value of both the specifically discounted products and the
manufacturer's brand writ large. However, even economists who favor
RPM reject the loss-leader argument, arguing that discounting would not
change rational consumer perceptions of the quality of standard goods.79
Finally, in the area of merger enforcement, both the agencies and
merging parties routinely predict the unilateral effects of mergers based on
the estimation of consumer demand.80 Much like in other aspects of merger
evaluation, however, some common merger simulation methods assume
consumer rationality regarding the choice among competing products and
81services.
77. Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price
Maintenance, 28 J.L. & ECON. 363, 375 (1985); Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 813.
78. See, e.g., AM. FAIR TRADE COUNCIL, INC., RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE BY MEANS OF
FAIR TRADE LAW IN FORCE APRIL 1, 1942, at 4-5 (1942) (stressing that frequent discounts on
products hurt manufacturers and cause consumers to believe that a discounted product is worth no
more than is charged by the price-cutting manufacturer); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 883 (2007) (noting that one of the reasons Leegin gave for
adopting its RPM policy was the "concern that discounting harmed [its] brand image and
reputation").
79. See Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 813. Economists may find the argument compelling
with respect to a narrow class of goods whose "luxury" value indeed derives in part from their
relatively high price. See, e.g., Laurie Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Effects in
a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 349 (1996); Harvey Leibenstein,
Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183
(1950); see also sources cited infra note 152 (discussing empirical evidence for a persistent
positive correlation between perceptions of price and quality).
80. E.g., 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 6; PETER DAVIS & ELIANA GARCtS,
QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS §§ 8.3-.5 (2009);
Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in
HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 44, 66-70 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).
81. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Bailey, Behavioral Economics: Implications for Antitrust
Practitioners, ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2010, art. 4, at 1, 4-5 (noting the dependence of critical
loss analysis on assumptions regarding the standard shape of the demand curve); Oliver Budzinski
& Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey, 6 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 277 (2009) (reviewing numerous shortcomings of the different classes of models used in
merger simulation, including the reliance of some on restrictive, rationality-based assumptions
regarding the shape of the demand function); Daniel Hosken et al., Demand System Estimation
and Its Application to Horizontal Merger Analysis (FTC, Working Paper No. 246, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/demand-system-estimation-
and-its-application-horizontal-merger-analysis/wp246 0.pdf (noting that one significant limitation
of logit models is their restrictive assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, one of
the axioms of rational choice); see also Oldale, supra note 7, at 141 (noting that, even where
demand is estimated based on actual aggregate data, a behaviorally informed understanding of the
factors shaping consumer demand "could highlight possible ways in which the merger might
affect the demand function itself, and so suggest reasons why demand should not be treated as a
given"). See generally ABA SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, ECONOMETRICS: LEGAL, PRACTICAL,
AND TECHNICAL ISSUES 133-37, 269-309 (2005) (offering a nontechnical introduction to merger
simulation methods and noting their many limitations, including the reliance of different models
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B. Defining Behavioral Antitrust
In clear contrast to the hypothetical rationality assumption, the
behavioral approach seeks to provide an empirically based account of the
behavior of antitrust actors, from consumers, entrepreneurs, managers, and
other business decision makers, to judges, juries, and enforcement
officials. 82  Toward this end, behavioral antitrust draws on the extensive
findings of behavioral decision research, the psychology of judgment and
decision making, and related disciplines. 83
The main findings of behavioral decision research can be classified
into the two general domains of judgment and decision making (or
"choice"), roughly paralleling what economists refer to as individuals'
beliefs and preferences, respectively. 84  Judgment research is concerned
with the intuitive formation of beliefs about the past, present, or future state
of the world. Intuitive judgments involve mental processes that are neither
completely automatic-like visual perception-nor elaborate and
controlled-as when people solve a complex problem using a mathematical
formula. The study of decision making, on the other hand, examines how
individuals choose among alternative courses of action-choices that
economists traditionally have considered a mere manifestation of
preferences 86 but psychological research proves to entail far more complex
processes. 87
on assumptions regarding the behavior of market participants and certain properties of consumer
demand).
82. See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 114-15 (discussing consumer, or "demand side,"
behavior); Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 7 (applying behavioral economics to enforcement-
agency decision making); Ginsburg & Moore, supra note 7, at 90 (examining the potential that
"judges will consult behavioral economics or literature influenced by behavioral economics with
increasing regularity in the not-too-distant future"); Leslie, supra note 3, at 342 ("As Chicago
School thinking has become entrenched, judges have dismissed and rejected antitrust claims based
on narrow and inaccurate conceptions of how businesses operate."); Tor & Rinner, supra note 7,
at 837-39 (analyzing managers' overestimation of their ability to control risks); Tor, Entry, supra
note 2, at 534-36 (examining the entry judgments and decisions of entrepreneurs in manufacturing
industries as well as those of financiers with respect to the ventures of those entrepreneurs).
83. Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 242 & n. 15.
84. E.g., Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 2
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 1, 12-22 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005) (dividing relevant
psychological findings among the domains of beliefs and preferences); Colin Camerer, Individual
Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587, 589 (John H. Kagel &
Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (dividing his analysis into separate sections on judgment and choice).
85. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 49, 50 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., rev. ed. 2003) (explaining that intuitive judgments
"occupy a position ... between the automatic parallel operations of perception and the controlled
serial operations of reasoning").
86. See, e.g., MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS 141-44 (2d ed. 1992)
(providing a short, nontechnical overview of revealed preferences theory).
87. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000) (providing evidence from multiple articles that decision making involves a variety of
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Notably, one of the main foci of judgment and decision research has
been the study of whether human behavior accords with normative
standards of rationality and-insofar as it does not-how and why it
deviates from these standards.8 8 Scholars compare intuitive judgments, for
example, with the normative standards that probability theory offers for the
formation and updating of beliefs.89  Similarly, in the decision-making
domain, researchers contrast the assumptions underlying the normative
model of rational choice with actual choice behavior.90
By now, many of the most robust findings of behavioral decision
research have been reviewed in the legal literature generally 91 and, albeit
less extensively, in antitrust scholarship specifically.92 Hence, the
following paragraphs offer only a brief overview of the overarching
approach of behavioral decision research.
When forming their beliefs about the world, antitrust actors routinely
make legally relevant judgments, mostly under conditions of uncertainty.9 3
different factors). For a useful elaboration of the distinction between judgment and decision
making, see, for example, Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in 1
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 497, 497-99, 530-33 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1998). See also Daniel Kahneman, Preface to CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra, at ix-
xi; Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the
New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1920 n.20 (2002) (elaborating
on the distinction between judgment and decision).
88. See Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 245-72 (providing a general
examination of the main psychological research and findings in the area of deviations from
rationality in judgment and decision-making outcomes); see also William M. Goldstein &
Robin M. Hogarth, Judgment and Decision Research: Some Historical Context, in RESEARCH ON
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: CURRENTS, CONNECTIONS, AND CONTROVERSIES 3, 4-6
(William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997) (discussing the advent of the influential
von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and how they "instigated a pattern of psychological
experiments in which behavioral deviations from a presumed standard of rationality are
considered the 'interesting' phenomena to be explained").
89. See, e.g., Dawes, supra note 87, at 530-33 (comparing common cognitive biases with the
Bayes Theorem of rational action).
90. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory]
(critiquing expected-utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making and presenting
evidence from experiments in which subjects exhibited pervasive tendencies inconsistent with
utility theory's basic tenets); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the
Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S251, S252 (1986) [hereinafter Tversky &
Kahneman, Rational Choice] ("[D]eviations of actual behavior from the normative model are too
widespread to be ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as random error, and too fundamental to
be accommodated by relaxing the normative system.").
91. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1.
92. See, e.g., Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7; Bennett et al., supra note 7; Reeves & Stucke,
supra note 2; Tor & Rinner, supra note 7; Tor, Behavioural Approach, supra note 2; Tor, Entry,
supra note 2; Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2.
93. The distinction between risk and uncertainty was originally made in FRANK H. KNIGHT,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20 (1921). For one definition of the distinction between
uncertainty, risk, and certainty in a classical text, see R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA,
GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 13 (1957).
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They predict the future success of a new technological platform they
consider buying or the future performance of their business venture; they
judge whether the evidence at trial proves that a defendant indeed
participated in an illegal cartel; and they determine whether the present
activities of a particular retailer violate their manufacturer's distribution
policy.
Such judgments require-at least implicitly-that individuals assess
the probability of different outcomes, a task for which people use cognitive
heuristics (mental shortcuts), immediate affective reactions, and more.94
These heuristic processes, which help real-world, "boundedly rational"
decision makers economize on their limited cognitive resources,95 also
generate some costs. Cognitive heuristics, for instance, permit decision
makers quickly to reach approximate judgments most of the time, with little
conscious effort.96  However, the same mental shortcuts also cause
sometimes predictable and systematic errors known as "judgmental
biases."97
Based on the beliefs they form through judgment,98 antitrust actors
constantly must make legally relevant decisions under uncertainty. They
have to determine what course of action to take in the market when
engaging in competitive and strategic interaction, making enforcement and
policy decisions, and more. For the hypothetical rational actor, decision
making is a straightforward matter, a mere revelation of preexisting, well-
ordered preferences 99 that always maximizes subjective expected utility
94. See, e.g., Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 245-51 (discussing various
judgment heuristics).
95. See id. at 242 & n. 16, 243 (offering a brief discussion of the development of the concept
of bounded rationality); see also Salinger, supra note 7, at 71 ("[B]ounded rationality means that
individuals (or firms) act purposefully, but not necessarily as if they are both fully informed and
perfectly rational."); Glenn Ellison, Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization 1 (Jan. 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://economics.mit.edulfiles/904 (noting that the term
"boundedly rational" has been used by different groups of economists to describe different styles
of work and discussing three different "traditions" of work that use this term).
96. See, e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 85, at 58 ("[P]eople ... are often content to
trust a plausible judgment that quickly comes to mind.").
97. See, e.g., id. at 53 (recognizing that "[m]any judgments are made by ... attribute
substitution" and that these are sometimes "given ... too much or too little weight" (emphasis
omitted)); see also Rachlinski, supra note 16, at 755-56 (noting that people, particularly judges,
typically are unaware of using heuristics); Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 245
(explaining that decision makers will often answer an easier question whose answer comes readily
to mind when they are confronted with a harder question).
98. In reality, of course, decision and choice do not always follow judgment, although
analytically they should be based on the beliefs antitrust actors hold based on judgment.
99. The notion that choices "reveal" people's preferences originated with P.A. Samuelson, A
Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA 61 (1938) and P.A.
Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior: An Addendum, 5 ECONOMICA
353 (1938), though he did not use that terminology at the time, and has received much attention
and development since. For one short and highly readable discussion of the concept and its
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(SEU). 00 When faced with risky or uncertain prospects, the rational actor
takes into account her judgments of the value and probability of these
options as well as her risk preferences.' 0 Risk-neutral decision makers
choose the option with the highest expected value, 10 2 risk-averse ones
discount the expected value of risky or uncertain prospects to account for
the risk involved, and risk-seeking actors find risky prospects more
attractive than their mere expected value indicates. 0 3
Importantly for antitrust analysis, in economic models the decision
behavior of business managers is even more narrowly circumscribed:
managers are tasked with maximizing the firm's profits and, therefore,
should exhibit risk neutrality when making decisions on behalf of the
firm.104  While they may be risk averse under limited circumstances,
rational managers would not make for their firms risk-seeking decisions-
which by definition have a negative expected value and are therefore
deemed irrational market behavior.105
However, much as in the case of belief formation through judgment, a
wealth of psychological evidence reveals that real, boundedly rational
individuals systematically and predictably deviate from the theoretical
appeal, see Amartya Sen, Behaviour and the Concept ofPreference, 40 ECONOMICA 241, 241-44
(1973).
100. E.g., BLAUG, supra note 86, at 229. In defining rationality, Blaug states:
[Slome regard .. . the most characteristic feature of neoclassical economics [as] its
insistence on methodological individualism: the attempt to derive all economic
behavior from the action of individuals seeking to maximize their utility, subject to
the constraints of technology and endowments. This is the so-called rationality
postulate, which figures as a minor premise in every neoclassical argument.
Id. The axiomatization of SEU was formalized by JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR
MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 617-28 (60th Anniversary ed.
2004) and LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954); Savage developed the
notion of personal, subjective probability and tied it to expected utility. For a discussion of
rational choice theory in law, see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1060-75.
101. See ROBIN M. HOGARTH, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION 89-
90 (2d ed. 1987) (describing how a rational person will make a decision in an uncertain situation
based on her subjective value of the possible outcomes combined with her risk attitude).
102. For example, a risk-neutral person would prefer a 50% chance of receiving $101 over the
certain receipt of $50.
103. See, e.g., VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 100, at 629 (noting specifically
that their axiomatization of expected utility does not require a specific risk attitude); see also
HOGARTH, supra note 101 (describing these different utility functions and their interpretation).
104. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3; POSNER, supra note 27, at 289; Korobkin &
Ulen, supra note 1, at 1066 ("Nearly all law-and-economics literature on business organizations,
following the neoclassical economic theory of firms, is built on the explicit or implicit assumption
that firms seek to maximize profits." (footnote omitted)).
105. See infra note 365 (collecting sources discussing the concept of net present value). But
see infra subpart III(B) (explaining that some deviations from models of strict rationality-
including certain forms of risk-seeking behavior-are in fact rational for managers individually
and, occasionally, for their firms as well).
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model of rational choice in important respects.106 The same sensitivity to
subtle contextual cues that helps people intuitively navigate complex real-
world situations also leads them predictably to violate the normative
requirements for SEU maximization by acting inconsistently at different
times, in different contexts, with respect to different subject matters, and so
on. 107
In sum, behavioral antitrust can be defined as the application of
empirical behavioral findings to antitrust law. This approach draws upon
the extensive evidence generated by researchers focusing on the processes
that shape human judgment and decision making, paying particular
attention to those systematic, predictable deviations of real, boundedly
rational behavior from the assumptions of strict rationality. 08
C. Illustrative Applications
In recent years, numerous commentators have joined the few
researchers that previously offered behavioral antitrust analyses, quickly
generating a sizable body of scholarship that addresses many areas of
antitrust law.109 Behavioral analyses of antitrust law typically draw on
evidence suggesting that real market participants deviate systematically in
some specific respect from the predictions of the rationality-based
economic models that antitrust law relies on. In some cases, scholars
further argue that these deviations warrant changes in enforcement policy or
antitrust doctrine." 0  This subpart illustrates the range of applications
commentators already offer, providing a more concrete foundation for the
critical evaluation of this scholarship in the remainder of this Article.
Where horizontal restraints among competitors are concerned, scholars
argue that behavioral forces make cartelization both more likely and more
106. See Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 245-57 (offering examples of ways
individuals tend to deviate from the theoretical model of rational choice).
107. The literature in this area is voluminous. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES, supra note 87 (collecting important articles in this area); Dawes, supra note 87, at 499-
530 (reviewing and discussing some of the basic decision-making phenomena that violate the
axioms of rational choice). For one review and legal application of some basic decision-making
findings, see Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 258-72.
108. Note that this definition also delimits the boundaries of the behavioral approach to
antitrust law, excluding, for instance, critiques of the rationality assumption that are not based on
empirical behavioral evidence. Similarly, behavioral antitrust properly understood does not
encompass those market features that traditional antitrust economics already account for,
including asymmetric information and related phenomena, network effects, and more. Contra
Stucke, Monopolization, supra note 7, at 552-53 (denoting as behavioral certain nonbehavioral
aspects of network effects and learning processes).
109. See sources cited supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, at 1532-33, 1577 (stating that "[c]onsumers
are not perfectly objective and rational Bayesians" and later suggesting that behavioral economics
should start to influence antitrust doctrine as a result of these deviations).
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stable than traditional antitrust theories suggest."' This position is
supported by the numerous examples of real-world cartels that were
exposed and prosecuted in industries and product markets where, according
to traditional economic accounts, they should not have existed and could
not have thrived for extended periods.' 12  These ubiquitous real-world
cartels, both domestic and global in scope, spanned markets with large
numbers of competitors, relatively low entry barriers, nonhomogeneous
products with complex pricing and cost structures, and other characteristics
that make cartelization unlikely for strictly rational actors." 3
Explaining this evidence, commentators argue that behavioral factors,
such as managers' social preferences for trust and cooperation, personal
relationships, social networks, and social norms all help competing firms
both establish and maintain collusive arrangements where rationality-based
models that ignore such factors expect them to fail.1 4  Other researchers
point to additional, nonsocial phenomena, such as managers' aspiration to
111. See, e.g., Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7, at 19-22 (noting that vengeful behavior or
esprit de corps can sustain collusion); Leslie, supra note 3, at 280-84, 324-34 (arguing that
seemingly irrational conduct may be a rational business decision in the context of an antitrust
conspiracy); Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, at 1563-67 (expressing skepticism about the
assumption that the presence of big buyers in a market causes rational cartel members to defect);
Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 568-69 (noting the stability of conspiracies with eleven or
more participants); Marie Goppelsroeder, Three Is Still a Party: An Experiment on Collusion and
Entry 24-26 (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-05, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1368728 (summarizing findings on entrant behavior that successfully
sustained collusion); see also Christoph Engel & Lilia Zhurakhovska, Oligopoly as a Socially
Embedded Dilemma. An Experiment 24-25 (Nov. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf dat/201101 online.pdf (discussing the behavioral effects of sanctions
and externalities on collusion).
112. See, e.g., Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7, at 22 (noting evidence of esprit de corps in
the American steel cartel and the nineteenth-century UK shipping cartel); Leslie, supra note 3, at
324-34 (analyzing alleged price-fixing conspiracies in the tobacco, citric acid, and potash
industries); Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, at 1563-66 (noting that cartels in the citric acid,
lysine, liquid crystal display panels, air transportation, Dynamic Random Access Memory, and
graphite electrodes industries all persisted despite the existence of large, sophisticated buyers);
Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 565-66 (noting that over twenty industries with moderate or
low barriers to entry have been criminally prosecuted for price fixing or bid rigging).
113. More precisely, these factors diminish the likelihood of cartelization in rationality-based
models only under some common specifications. For scholarship on the circumstances that lead
to cartelization, see Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel
Success?, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 43, 45-49 (2006) and George J. Stigler, A Theory of
Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 45-48 (1964).
114. See, e.g., Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7, at 21-22 (noting the central role of trust and
camaraderie, fostered through social events and meetings, in facilitating collusion); Bennett et al.,
supra note 7, at 124 ("[T]here is evidence that personal friendship and trust can play an important
role in sustaining collusion, with cartel members often investing a lot of time and effort in
individual relationships."); Leslie, supra note 3, at 281 (noting that facially irrational conduct,
such as declining to make profitable sales, is often employed as a "trust-building goodwill
gesture[]" in order to "maintain friendly relations among cartel participants").
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obtain merely satisfactory-rather than maximal-profitability.s1 5  Firms
whose managers exhibit such preferences find the potential for more secure
profits through cartelization more attractive than the profit-maximizing firm
does."' 6
Analysts also argue, however, that behavioral forces can destabilize,
rather than facilitate, collusion due to processes that traditional models
ignore. For example, some studies of experimental markets show that an
increase in the amount of information available to competitors about rivals'
output and profits-which would make easier oligopolistic coordination by
rational actors-can lead in fact to less collusive, more competitive market
behavior. 17  Similarly, the broader behavioral literature makes clear that
individuals' concern for relative-as opposed to absolute-outcomes is
ubiquitous,' 18 particularly common in competitive settings,"9 and evidenced
115. See, e.g., R.M. Cyert & James G. March, Organizational Factors in the Theory of
Oligopoly, 70 Q.J. ECON. 44, 63 (1956) (analyzing firms' planning and budgeting processes and
finding "adequate basis to justify the introduction of the concept of an acceptable-level profit
norm in place of the traditional profit maximizing assumption"); Huw David Dixon, Keeping up
with the Joneses: Competition and the Evolution of Collusion, 43 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 223,
224 (2000) (advancing a model in which "the aspiration level of all firms is to have at least
normal-profits" and concluding that "cooperation is not only possible, but almost inevitable" in
this economic system (emphasis omitted)); Jorg Oechssler, Cooperation as a Result of Learning
with Aspiration Levels, 49 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 405, 406 (2002) (building on Dixon's work
and showing that "imitation may result in collusion if the population average is imitated in the
form of an aspiration level"); cf HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 270-75 (3d ed. 1976)
(noting that in actual organizational practice, "no one attempts to find an optimal solution for the
whole problem," but instead "specialized members or units of the organization.... find a
'satisfactory' solution for one or more subproblems").
116. Note that a similar result may obtain in the familiar case where rational, yet risk-averse,
managers who pursue their self-interest believe the expected outcomes of cartelization to be more
stable and less risky than competition to maximize profits and, therefore, diverge from what is
optimal for the firm. See, e.g., Giancarlo Spagnolo, Managerial Incentives and Collusive
Behavior, 49 EUR. ECON. REV. 1501, 1503 (2005) (arguing that "[flirms whose pricing policy is in
the hands of managers that prefer smooth profit streams can support any collusive agreement at
lower discount factors than profit-maximizing ones" and explaining that "the preference for
smooth profit streams reduces managers' appreciation of short-run profits from unilaterally
breaking a collusive agreement and increases that of losses from the punishment phase that
follows"). See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is Corporate Law?, in
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 2-3 (2d ed. 2009) (providing a brief introduction to agency problems
in corporate law); John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1, 2-4 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (offering a general introduction to the principal-agent relationship).
117. See, e.g., Steffen Huck et al., Does Information About Competitors' Actions Increase or
Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly Markets?, 18 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 39 (2000);
Steffen Huck et al., Learning in Cournot Oligopoly: An Experiment, 109 ECON. J. C80, C87-89
(1999); Theo Offerman et al., Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment, 69 REV.
ECON. STUD. 973 (2002).
118. See, e.g., Jerry Suls & Ladd Wheeler, A Selective History of Classic and Neo-Social
Comparison Theory, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COMPARISON: THEORY AND RESEARCH 3, 3-15
(Jerry Suls & Ladd Wheeler eds., 2000) (summarizing the history of self-evaluation through social
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in managerial behavior.120  Yet the concern for relative outcomes, if
manifested by managers when making decisions on behalf of their firms,
can sometimes destabilize cartels and make markets more competitive.121
More generally, beyond showing how specific firm and market
characteristics may facilitate or inhibit collusion in ways that traditional
models neglect, the behavioral evidence also reveals that established
patterns of market behavior-whether competitive or collusive-tend to
exhibit greater stability than standard antitrust models assume. 122  Extant
rivals are slower to recognize and embark on mutually profitable
opportunities for coordinated behavior-whether legal, collaborative
arrangements or illegal cartelization-than rationality-based accounts allow
for.123  At the same time, established collaborative or collusive
arrangements are also more stable than they would have been if the parties
were strictly rational actors.124
A number of factors combine to make market behavior "sticky." In
the domain of judgment, for instance, established norms of rivalry diminish
competitors' ability to identify profitable opportunities for cooperation
while collusive norms can have the opposite effect.12 5  Managers' risk
attitudes also can lead them to overestimate the value of extant
arrangements and underestimate the benefits of alternative courses of
comparison and discussing the importance of relative comparisons). This concern is related to
social comparison, a fundamental psychological process whereby people engage in self-evaluation
and self-enhancement by comparing themselves to others-"a core aspect of human experience."
Id. at 15.
119. See generally Andrew E. Clarke et al., Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An
Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 95 (2008)
(finding that one's happiness is related to income relative to others rather than absolute income).
120. See, e.g., Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7, at 17-18 (discussing the importance of
relative performance with regard to managerial behavior); Lorenz Graf et al., Debiasing
Competitive Irrationality: How Managers Can Be Prevented from Trading Off Absolute for
Relative Profit, 30 EuR. MGMT. J. 386, 386-90 (2012) (reviewing findings for managers' frequent
preference for relative position, at times even at the expense of profit maximization). See
generally Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief
Executive Officers, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 30-S (1990) (addressing the costs and benefits of
relative performance evaluations for chief executive officers).
121. Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7, at 19. Concerns for relative position can also have the
opposite effect of reinforcing cartelization under some circumstances. See id.
122. See Aviram & Tor, supra note 2, at 247-63 (discussing the stabilizing functions of social
norms).
123. See id. (noting that uncertainty, social norms, managerial perception of risk, the illusion
of control, and status quo bias impact market participants' judgments of information sharing).
124. See id. at 251-52.
125. See, e.g., id. at 250-54 (noting that managers' aversion to seemingly uncontrolled risks
erects an additional barrier to collaboration with rivals); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout,
Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1735, 1774-75 (2001) (noting that, in experimental settings, subjects who cooperate during initial




interaction with rivals.126 Moreover, some decision phenomena-including
the status quo bias and the aversion to comparative ambiguity-may both
lead competitors consciously to forego risky opportunities for profitable
collusion and inhibit cartelists' willingness to chance potentially profitable
competitive alternatives to ongoing collusive arrangements.12 7
Beyond horizontal restraints, questions of monopolization generally,
and the likelihood of predatory behavior specifically, have received
significant attention from behavioral antitrust scholars. This author and
others identified circumstances where monopolists may engage in predatory
behavior that fails to maximize expected profits and is therefore irrational
according to the standard account.' 2 8 For example, managers of a dominant
firm that is losing market share may take excessive risks due to loss
aversion, while those of established, profitable monopolists may exhibit the
opposite pattern of excessive risk avoidance.12 9 Some scholars offer further
evidence from antitrust cases of predatory behavior that appears
irrational,130 while others show how even rational monopolists may find it
beneficial to imitate the behavior of their irrational counterparts when
market participants know that some monopolists may engage in irrational
predation. 131
At the same time, some analysts suggest that traditional models can
overstate the harm from substantial market power.132  According to this
argument, real firms sometimes avoid fully exploiting their market power,
charging prices they deem "fair" instead of maximizing profits.'3 3  For
instance, when market power is generated by recent or temporary changes
in market conditions, firms may not exercise it fully, whether to maintain a
126. Aviram & Tor, supra note 2, at 254-57.
127. See id. at 257-63.
128. See, e.g., Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 55 ("In contrast with the accepted
wisdom on the extreme rarity of predatory pricing, the behavioral evidence suggests that dominant
firms and monopolists consciously may engage in high-risk, negative net present value predation
under some circumstances."); see also Leslie, supra note 3, at 274-84 (discussing various
examples of firms engaging in behavior inconsistent with perfect rationality and profit
maximization).
129. Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 55-56.
130. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 3, at 274-84.
131. See, e.g., Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7, at 30-31 (explaining how it can be rational
for a firm to mimic a competitor that is engaging in predatory pricing); Leslie, supra note 3, at
297-301 (describing how credible threats to engage in predatory behavior can be rational); see
also Aaron Edlin, Predatory Pricing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
ANTITRUST LAW 144, 151-53 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012) (explaining that formal models show that
"[w]hether predation is a successful strategy depends very much on whether predator and prey
believe it is a successful strategy").
132. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 81, at 5-7.
133. See, e.g., id. See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 728 (1986) (analyzing how standards of
fairness can explain market anomalies).
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reputation for offering low prices or to avoid negative reactions from
consumers to prices the latter perceive as "unfair."' 34
A different behavioral antitrust inquiry concerns aftermarket power-
both within and beyond monopolization claims-as illustrated by the
divided Court in Kodak: the majority ruled that the manufacturer could have
exercised aftermarket power in parts despite competition in the primary
market for copiers. This holding would have been impossible if consumers
were all perfectly rational, incorporating the expected costs of parts over the
copier lifetime into the original purchase price of the machine. 13 5
Importantly, the majority's conclusion did not require a finding that
Kodak in fact exercised power in the parts aftermarket since the Court only
affirmed the denial of summary judgment by the court of appeals. 13 6
Kodak's actual aftermarket power depended on the proportion of myopic
consumers (who did not take future costs effectively into account) to their
more sophisticated counterparts (who did account for these costs) as well as
on the competitive conditions in the primary copier market. As the
proportion of its sophisticated consumers increased, for instance, Kodak
would have needed to dissipate more of its aftermarket profits to keep the
copiers attractive to this group in the primary market.13 7
The ultimate welfare loss from the exercise of aftermarket power in
this and similar situations therefore depends, first, on the relative
proportions of sophisticated to myopic consumers and, second, on the
intensity of primary market competition. However, in contrast to the
prediction of rationality-based analyses, such as the one promoted by the
Kodak dissent, a potentially significant loss to efficiency remains even
when the primary market is fully competitive so long as the machines sold
in the primary market are subsidized by the aftermarket, with an
overconsumption in the former and underconsumption in the latter.'38
Hence even firms facing more competitive conditions-such as Kodak did
in the copier market-may benefit from exploiting boundedly rational
consumers.139
134. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 81, at 5-7.
135. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the rationality
assumption in Kodak).
136. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 485-86 (1992).
137. See id. (recognizing that it could be the case that the primary market at issue disciplined
the aftermarket).
138. Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 135 n.25 (discussing the effects of aftermarket
exploitation).
139. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 10, §§ 1.1-.12 (finding that, in contrast to
predictions of standard economic theory, the way prices are presented to consumers-or
"framed"-affects consumer decision making and can cause consumer welfare losses); Oren Bar-
Gill, Competition and Consumer Protection: Behavioral Economics Account, in SWEDISH




In the area of vertical restraints of trade, antitrust scholars have argued
that product bundling and tying may exert more powerful effects on
consumer behavior than traditional models acknowledge.14 0  Behavioral
analysts suggest, for example, that consumer inertia, the endowment effect,
and the impact of defaults on consumer choice all indicate that consumers
may find it difficult to switch even where the objective costs of switching
from one product to another are small. 14 1 Dominant firms thus can use
bundling, tying, and similar devices more effectively to foreclose
competition than would be the case if consumers were strictly rational.14 2
In the same vein, both theoretical arguments and experimental tests suggest
that rebate schemes and other loyalty programs have stronger effects on the
behavior of real consumers than traditional antitrust models expect them to
have. 143
Notably, the potential susceptibility of consumers to behavioral
manipulation by firms will not always advantage monopolists or dominant
firms. The stickiness of consumer behavior often redounds to these
incumbents' benefit because new entrants and smaller competitors may find
it more difficult to attract consumers based only on lower price or higher
quality than standard models predict. Yet multiproduct firms with a smaller
rapport-pros andsconsconsumer-protection.pdf (noting that firms may exploit the
misperceptions of rational consumers despite the presence of competition); Bennett et al., supra
note 7, at 121 ("[B]ehavioral economics suggests that even small switching costs [due to tying and
bundling practices] can have significant effects on consumer behavior in the presence of consumer
inertia, endowment effects, and default bias.").
140. See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 121-22; Stucke, Monopolization, supra note 7,
at 564-67; Petit & Neyrinck, supra note 7, at 7-11.
141. See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 121; Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and
Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 315, 322-23 (2009) (explaining
that transaction costs can be insufficient to account for default effects); Stucke, Monopolization,
supra note 7, at 564-67 (discussing the role of default bias in recent cases); Petit & Neyrinck,
supra note 7, at 9-10 (noting that EU competition law "accommodates such scenarios of
'psychological' bundling" and discussing Microsoft's pre-installation of Windows Media Player
as an example of anticompetitive bundling without "coerc[ion] in the economic or technical
sense" (emphasis omitted)).
142. Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 121; DellaVigna, supra note 141; Stucke, Monopolization,
supra note 7, at 564-67; Petit & Neyrinck, supra note 7, at 9-10; see also Nicholas Economides
& loannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States
in the Aftermath ofthe Microsoft Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 544 (2009) (discussing efforts by
firms to coerce intermediaries into rejecting competing bundles, thereby excluding rivals and
limiting consumer choice).
143. See Martin Beckenkamp & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, An Experimental Investigation of
Article 82 Rebate Schemes, 2 COMPETITION L. REv. (SPECIAL IsSUE) 1 (2006) (presenting
experimental evidence that rebate and discount schemes "exert a significant attraction" that
enhances their potentially exclusionary effect beyond standard theoretical predictions); Alexander
Morell et al., Sticky Rebates: Target Rebates Induce Non-Rational Loyalty in Consumers 22 (Feb.
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf dat/2009_23online.pdf
(finding that "loyalty rebates induce a stickiness effect" in that they impede rational switching by
consumers); see also Economides & Lianos, supra note 142 (discussing how firms can use
practices such as rebates to influence consumer choices).
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share in one market but sufficiently deep pockets otherwise may profitably
expend resources on shaping consumer behavior and, consequently, exert
greater competitive pressure on incumbents than extant models assume. 144
In the case of vertical price restraints, both the historical evidence and
the behavioral literature reveal that some manufacturers excessively impose
RPM, when it is legal, on their retailers. 14 5 Manufacturers are prone to error
with respect to vertical price restraints due to a confluence of behavioral
phenomena. Judgmental biases-including anchoring, availability, and
representativeness-lead them to overestimate the expected harms of
retailer price cutting. 14 6 Loss aversion and fairness-driven behavior further
make manufacturers averse to price cutting,147 and they also find the direct
price control offered by RPM an excessively attractive response to price
cutting.148 Moreover, RPM makes it particularly difficult for manufacturers
to learn from experience whether it is in fact an efficient practice for their
distribution system.149 Notably, however, additional analysis reveals that
even while boundedly rational RPM is costly for manufacturers and their
retailers, the practice raises antitrust concerns only in those limited
circumstances where it also harms the competitive process, such as when it
is employed by firms with market power or is pervasive in an industry.so
Apart from this important lesson with respect to manufacturer behavior
and RPM, the behavioral evidence is also informative regarding the impact
of this practice on consumers. We have seen that economic scholars and
the Court rejected manufacturers' loss-leader concerns because even deep
discounts should not change rational perceptions of the quality of standard
consumer goods.151  However, behavioral marketing research long has
identified a persistent positive relationship between price and perceptions of
quality, in both the laboratory and the field, for a broad range of products. 15 2
Thus even while showing that manufacturers tend to use RPM excessively,
144. But see Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 119 (noting only the potential hindrance bounded
rationality of consumers poses to dynamic competition but neglecting its potentially
procompetitive effects).
145. Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 839-47.
146. Id. at 822-29. But see infra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing evidence for
the effect of loss-leader practices on perceptions of the quality of manufacturers' products).
147. Id. at 829-33.
148. See id. at 833-39.
149. Id. at 842-47.
150. See id. at 839-54 (explaining that RPM is costly and unprofitable in many
circumstances).
151. Id. at 813; cf Marvel, supra note 76.
152. See generally Donald R. Lichtenstein et al., Price Perceptions and Consumer Shopping
Behavior: A Field Study, 30 J. MARKETING REs. 234, 236 (1993) (describing "a positive
association between price and perceived quality"); Valarie A. Zeithaml, Consumer Perceptions of
Price, Quality, and Value: A Means-End Model and Synthesis of Evidence, J. MARKETING, July




the empirical behavioral evidence at least partly confirms one reason for the
longstanding resistance of these market participants to loss-leader practices,
economists' disbelief notwithstanding.
The implications of loss-leader effects on consumers for antitrust
doctrine, however, are not necessarily in line with the manufacturers'
familiar argument. For example, although discounts that diminish
perceptions of quality harm the manufacturers and reduce consumer
welfare, they may generate efficiency gains if the retail prices favored by
manufacturers send exaggerated quality signals that would not survive retail
competition absent RPM.
With respect to merger policy, commentators draw on empirical
evidence from the corporate finance literature as well as on some behavioral
findings to note that many mergers prove inefficient rather than profit
maximizing as the agencies commonly assume.'" Empirical studies found,
for one, that mergers often diminish the market value of the acquiring
firm, 154 and behavioral research long has suggested that some excess merger
activity is driven by the optimistic overconfidence of managers.155 Related,
a number of scholars contend that merger-specific efficiencies-which
parties routinely proffer in accordance with the horizontal merger
guidelines in support of transactions that raise competitive concerns' 5 -not
only are difficult to substantiate but often fail to materialize.15 7
Yet, even among those who note the prevalence of inefficient mergers,
opinions diverge as to whether this systematic deviation from standard
models matters for antitrust. Some argue that an accounting for the overall
efficiency of proposed mergers is outside antitrust law's prohibition of only
153. See Horton, supra note 7, at 493 & n.118, 497; Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, at 1561-
62; Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 573-75; Stucke, Reconsidering, supra note 7, at 155-56;
Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV.
833, 873-81 (2011); see also Roberto A. Weber & Colin F. Camerer, Cultural Conflict and
Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach, 49 MGMT. SCI. 400 (2003) (describing one
particularly overlooked potential cause of merger inefficiencies or failures: culture conflict).
154. See Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of
Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757 (2005); Dennis C. Mueller,
The Finance Literature on Mergers: A Critical Survey, in COMPETITION, MONOPOLY AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KEITH COWLING 161, 178 (Michael Waterson
ed., 2003); David J. Ravenscraft & F.M. Scherer, Life After Takeover, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 147
(1987); F.M. Scherer, Some Principles for Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 5, 17-18 (2001).
155. Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197, 197-201
(1986). The agency problems generated by rational, self-interested managerial behavior can
similarly lead to excess, inefficient merger activity.
156. See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 10 (observing that merger-generated
efficiencies can help to enhance competition and endorsing such mergers).
157. See Horton, supra note 7, at 493-94; Oldale, supra note 7, at 143; Reeves & Stucke,
supra note 2, at 1561-62; Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 573-75; Waller, supra note 153, at
875-76; Weber & Camerer, supra note 153, at 400-01.
602 [Vol. 92:573
Understanding Behavioral Antitrust
those mergers that are likely "substantially to lessen competition."'5 8  They
also aver that the agencies already are skeptical regarding claims of merger-
specific efficiencies.'" 9  Others counter that the evidence of prevalent
inefficient mergers justifies a closer scrutiny by the agencies of transactions
with potentially anticompetitive effects.1 60 After all, merger policy seeks to
balance the uncertain prospects of over- and underenforcement-that is, the
risk of blocking efficient mergers versus the risk of allowing the
consummation of anticompetitive ones. 16 1 Hence, these commentators
assert, the risks of overenforcement diminish, and a greater emphasis on
preventing anticompetitive mergers is warranted, if inefficient mergers
indeed are prevalent.' 62
The competition among new entrants into markets and the impact of
entry on incumbents' market power offer a final illustration in an area with
significant implications across antitrust law. Prospective entry plays an
important role in merger assessments because it can counteract the
anticompetitive effects of increased market power that might otherwise
follow a merger.16 3 More generally, effective entry can prevent even firms
with large market shares from exerting market power,164 an essential
158. See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
159. See Oldale, supra note 7, at 143 ("[B]ehavioral economics reinforces what competition
authorities always suspected about claims that a merger will generate efficiencies: that these
should be treated with a degree of healthy scepticism."); see also Reeves, supra note 7, at 8
(observing that agencies may scrutinize mergers in relatively minute detail to ensure that the result
will be efficient); Werden et al., supra note 7, at 130 ("[T]he U.S. enforcement agencies have
articulated a skeptical view of the power of entry to prevent anticompetitive effects from
mergers."); Farrell & Shapiro Interview, supra note 10 (discussing agency skepticism toward
party-supplied merger simulations). Parties who seek the approval of their proposed merger have
a clear, rational interest in overstating the merger's efficiency benefits, for which reason the
agencies are skeptical of such efficiency claims. Cf.Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger
Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REv. 347 (2011) (criticizing the hostile approach of antitrust agencies
to efficiency claims).
160. See, e.g., Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, at 1563; Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at
575; Waller, supra note 153, at 881; see also Horton, supra note 7, at 501-02.
161. William E. Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 129, 130 (2009).
162. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, at 1560-63; Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 573-
75, 583; Stucke, Reconsidering, supra note 7, at 155-56; Waller, supra note 153, at 881.
163. See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 9 ("The prospect of entry into the
relevant market will alleviate concerns about adverse competitive effects only if such entry will
deter or counteract any competitive effects of concern so the merger will not substantially harm
customers.").
164. See Ball Mem'1 Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting the argument that market share indicates market power even in the absence of entry
barriers and stating that "the lower the barriers to entry, and the shorter the lags of new entry, the
less power existing firms have"); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 672 n.3
(7th Cir. 1985) ("Unless barriers to entry prevent rivals from entering the market at the same cost
of production, even a very large market share does not establish market power."); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937, 950
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element of monopolization and attempted monopolization, tying, exclusive
dealing, and other illegal practices.16 1
Traditional models assume that entry will only take place when it
maximizes entrants' profits, thus requiring a positive risk-adjusted net
present value.166 The empirical evidence on entry paints a very different
picture, however, showing abundant entry that appears unjustified based on
entrants' objective prospects for survival and profitability.167  Studies
further reveal two additional puzzling entry phenomena. First, entry
appears rather insensitive to some (though not all) of the main economic
predictors of expected future profitability, including the expected intensity
of competition, certain entry barriers, and more.'6 8  Second, start-up
entrants not only fail more frequently than their diversifying counterparts-
a pattern that alone might have reflected merely the greater riskiness of their
ventures-but do so to such an extent that they obtain lower expected
payoffs and thus exhibit inferior average performance altogether.' 69
A behavioral analysis of entrants' judgments reveals, however, that
these three puzzling phenomena largely correspond to the patterns of the
psychology of optimistic overconfidence.o7 0  New entrants typically make
their personally significant judgments of entry's prospects under conditions
of extreme uncertainty.' 7' In such circumstances, overoptimism and a
number of related phenomena lead real entrants, as a group, to overestimate
their prospects upon entry.172  These processes, moreover, both reduce
entrants' sensitivity to market predictors of success 7 and exert a
(1981) (explaining the relationship between entry, market share, and market power and proposing
that a significant amount of market share does not necessarily indicate market power).
165. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., 2B ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 11 420b & n.l1 (3d ed. 2007) ("Entry conditions are
therefore relevant to assessing the market power required by most antitrust rules" because
"[m]arket power bears on the anticompetitive potential of challenged conduct").
166. Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 489 & nn.15-17, 490.
167. See, e.g., JOHN R. BALDWIN, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION: A NORTH
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 359 (1995) (stating that empirical evidence supports the life-cycle
model rather than entry only when profits are maximized); P.A. Geroski, Some Data-Driven
Reflections on the Entry Process, in ENTRY AND MARKET CONTESTABILITY: AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON 282, 295 (P.A. Geroski & J. Schwalbach eds., 1991). See generally Tor, Entry,
supra note 2, at 490-92 (discussing this puzzle).
168. Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 492-94.
169. Id. at 494-96.
170. See id. at 504 ("[A] wealth of psychological data show that in circumstances of this
kind... people tend to exhibit a significant bias.... [T]his bias results from a number of
psychological processes that affect entrants' judgments of both the probability and value of their
prospective ventures.").
171. Id. at 487, 527 n.192.
172. See id. at 505-14 (offering an in-depth analysis of the impact of these phenomena on
entrants).
173. Id. at 514-20.
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differential impact on start-ups versus diversifying entrants that makes the
former more biased when judging their entry prospects.174
The behavioral forces that shape entrants' judgments generate a
competitive landscape that differs significantly from that envisioned by
traditional antitrust models. Because all entry is not the same, more biased
and numerous start-ups fail at far greater proportions than their diversifying
competitors but still are overrepresented among those few entrants who
ultimately survive and prosper.'7 5  Furthermore, insofar as new entry is
associated with innovation, particularly for start-ups, boundedly rational
entry may be socially beneficial overall despite its costs for entrants.176
Where the impact of entry on incumbents is concerned, the behavioral
analysis of entry suggests, for example, that while entry often is not
exceptionally difficult, post-entry success and survival are unlikely for most
entrants. 7 7 Start-ups, and small entrants generally, rarely pose a short-term
competitive threat to incumbents, but some large diversifying entrants
possibly do."18 In the long run, however, the few successful, often biased,
innovative entrants are an important source of competitive pressure on
incumbents.17 9 These outcomes have important implications for antitrust
law and policy. For one, they support the law's hostility to unnecessary
restrictions on new entry, given its important procompetitive benefits.' 80
At the same time, the behavioral analysis of entry indicates that the
law should be wary of relying on low entry barriers alone to guarantee
short-run competitive pressure on incumbents.' 8' In the area of predatory
pricing, for instance, we saw that Brooke Group requires plaintiffs to show
that the alleged predator had a rational prospect of recoupment, and we also
saw that such recoupment is considered unlikely when entry barriers are
low.18 2 Our analysis suggests, however, that courts should not rely on mere
evidence of low entry barriers to conclude that recoupment is unlikely.
After all, a high rate of overconfident entry may be accompanied by very
limited market penetration that does little to prevent such recoupment.
Instead, courts should focus on the likely and actual past success of entrants
174. See infra text accompanying notes 214-17 (discussing the role of moderating variables
in shaping the competition among new entrants and its market effects).
175. Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 531-33.
176. Id. at 537-40.
177. Id. at 490-92; see also id. at 531-43, 548-49 (discussing a number of additional
significant consequences of boundedly rational entry for competition and antitrust law).
178. Id at 494-96.
179. Id. at 537-43.
180. Id. at 549-50.
181. Id. at 550-52.
182. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224-26 (1993);
Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 55.
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in penetrating the market as better indicators of the short-term competitive
constraint on incumbents' potential recoupment. 83
All in all, the preceding examples clearly show that behavioral
antitrust already provides a wide range of analyses across the field. These
analyses vary with respect to the type of evidence they draw on, how they
apply behavioral findings to antitrust-relevant market phenomena, and the
lessons they offer antitrust doctrine and policy. Regrettably, moreover,
some of the contributions to this new literature as well as many of its
critiques manifest a common, fundamental methodological error in
behavioral antitrust analysis to which we now turn.
D. The Fundamental Methodological Error
The apparent tension between antitrust law's extensive reliance on the
rationality assumption on the one hand and the behavioral focus on
deviations from strict rationality on the other may account for the heated
debate now taking place between supporters and detractors of behavioral
antitrust. 184 It may also explain, moreover, the delayed penetration of the
behavioral approach into antitrust scholarship as compared to most other
legal fields.185
Yet even as antitrust increasingly takes notice of behavioral insights, a
more subtle, but no less significant, tension lies beneath the explicit contrast
between the behavioral and traditional economic perspectives on antitrust
rationality. The extensive use of neoclassical economics has inculcated in
the antitrust community a reliance on simplifying assumptions as analytical
tools where rationality is concerned and beyond. Hypothetical assumptions
play an important role, for example, in the central antitrust concept of
market definition, which assists in determinations of market power and the
effects of potentially anticompetitive conduct throughout antitrust law. 186
183. Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 553-55. The author also notes that while courts often reject
predatory pricing allegations summarily where entry barriers appear low, they sometimes examine
factors that are associated with entrants survival and penetration rather than mere entry. Id. For
instance, Brooke Group itself relied on evidence of rapid expansion in the relevant segment that
was partly due to successful penetration, 509 U.S. at 233-34, and so did the First Circuit in R. W.
Int'l Corp. v. Welch Food, Inc., 13 F.3d 478, 488 (1st Cir. 1994), citing the Court's Brooke Group
ruling.
184. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Arnaudo, supra note 5 ("[W]hen considering the growing fortunes of
[behavioral economics], the process towards a [behavioral antitrust] could have been expected to
occur much faster. . . ." (footnote omitted)); Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 514 ("While
tossed against the rocks elsewhere, within the quiet waters of antitrust these rational choice
theories stand largely unchallenged.").
186. See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 4 (offering guidelines for defining the
relevant market and detailing the assumptions used); see also Jonathan B. Baker., Market
Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129 (2007) (discussing the significance of
the market-definition process in determining anticompetitive effect and how that process should
best be conducted); Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010)
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The market definition process helps practitioners and antitrust economists
predict and explain to clients how an enforcement agency will determine
whether a proposed merger is likely substantially to lessen competition
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.18 7  More generally, hypothetical
assumptions provide antitrust with the benefits of increased tractability,
predictability, and conceptual clarity. 88
Commentators long familiar with the powerful simplifying
assumptions of traditional antitrust law and economics quite naturally
approach behavioral antitrust in the same way.189 Whether asserting its
virtues or criticizing its shortcomings, these commentators routinely speak
of a behavioral approach that "attacks the rational profit-maximizer
assumption head on by assuming that humans have cognitive limitations
that prevent them from processing information perfectly and maximizing
their utility," 90 "replac[es] the assumption of rationality with one of
'bounded rationality," 9 ' or relies on an "irrationality hypothesis."' 92
Importantly, such statements reflect not merely casual, inaccurate
usage, but rather a fundamental methodological error that permeates the
recent behavioral antitrust discourse. When treating concrete, empirical
behavioral findings as if they were broad, hypothetical propositions in the
mold of the familiar rationality assumption, antitrust commentators
(noting the prominent role of the market-definition process in competition law cases and arguing
that it should be abandoned).
187. See Baker, supra note 186, at 130-31; Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets?
An Answer to Professor Kaplow 1, 9-14 (Feb. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Werden, An Answer to
Professor Kaplow] (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract id=2004655. And while there may be disagreements-sometimes significant
ones-among scholars or litigating parties on how to define a given product market, the concept
itself is commonly understood and so are the more technical tests associated with it (such as those
of the hypothetical monopolist and critical loss).
188. See, e.g., Salinger, supra note 7, at 67 ("The rationality assumption plays so prominently
in the literature because it is tractable . . . and yields some quite accurate predictions."); see also
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 3, at 7, 31-34 (discussing the Chicago
School's "twin propositions that markets are relatively simple and tend naturally toward
competitive outcomes"); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 925, 931 (1979) (describing the benefits of the Chicago School economics' "powerful
simplifications"); cf Werden et al., supra note 7, at 126 (concluding that "competition policy
should continue to rely on neoclassical economic analysis based on the assumption of profit
maximization").
189. A similar pattern can be found in other fields, particularly those where traditional
economic analysis plays a central role. See, e.g., H. Kent Baker & John R. Nofsinger, Behavioral
Finance: An Overview, in BEHAVIORAL FINANCE: INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND MARKETS 3,
3 (H. Kent Baker & John R. Nofsinger eds., 2010) [hereinafter BEHAVIORAL FINANCE] ("An
underlying assumption of behavioral finance is that the information structure and the
characteristics of market participants systematically influence individuals' investment decisions as
well as market outcomes." (emphasis added)).
190. Reeves, supra note 7, at 2 (emphasis added).
191. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 7, at 780.
192. Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at 1523.
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misconceive the nature of the empirically based behavioral approach. This
confusion of hypothesis for evidence is not always benign, at times leading
otherwise sophisticated scholars to make three distinct classes of mistakes,
each with its attendant erroneous applications and policy conclusions in
behavioral antitrust.
II. The First Mistake: Assuming Constant and Uniform Bounded
Rationality
Commentators make the first mistake when they erroneously equate
behavioral antitrust with an assumption of a constant and uniform set of
deviations from strict rationality. The tendency to assume constant
bounded rationality leads antitrust scholars to pay little attention to the
specific contours and boundaries of behavioral phenomena, while the
assumed uniformity results in a failure to account for the heterogeneity of
actors' behavior-both among similarly situated actors and for the same
actor in different circumstances or with respect to different behavioral
phenomena. This Part explains the significance of the limited constancy
and uniformity of behavioral patterns and illustrates the problematic
consequences of their neglect for behavioral analyses of antitrust.193
A. Variability, Not Constancy
In sharp contrast to the constancy of hypothetical strict rationality, the
bounded rationality of real antitrust actors has specific empirical contours
and boundaries. Different behavioral phenomena are manifested more
strongly in some circumstances and more weakly in other situations, at
times disappearing altogether.19 4 Moreover, all behavioral phenomena are
not created equal: some are more robust and pervasive while others exert
significant impact on behavior only under limited conditions.' 95  To
determine whether and how these phenomena are likely to impact the
behavior of antitrust actors one must therefore carefully attend to their
boundaries and limits.
Most obviously, the proper application of behavioral phenomena
requires their accurate understanding. Yet one finds within the extensive
behaviorally oriented legal literature-mostly in other areas but now in
antitrust as well-analyses that confuse different findings with one another,
193. This Part builds significantly on the more comprehensive review of the behavioral
evidence showing variability and heterogeneity and its implications across the laws in Avishalom
Tor, Law for a Behaviorally-Complex World (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
194. See Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 292-96 (explaining the significance
of boundary conditions for behavioral analyses of law).
195. See id. at 293 (recognizing that "processes of judgment and choice depend on the
environment within which people operate"); see also Rachlinski, supra note 16 (comparing the
broader set of circumstances under which overoptimism is manifested with the narrower
boundaries of ambiguity aversion).
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mix multiple phenomena together, or simply mischaracterize the empirical
evidence.' 96  Unsurprisingly, such mistakes occasionally lead legal
researchers to erroneous conclusions. 19 7  Importantly, moreover, these
confusions often follow a failure to engage the empirical behavioral
evidence directly. Analysts instead rely on second- or third-hand accounts,
primarily within the legal literature, of behavioral findings.'9 8
Beyond such basic confusions, however, scholars who accurately
understand behavioral findings may still fail to appreciate the significance
of the contours of the empirical evidence for legal analysis. For example,
one recent study of the historical effects of the decision in United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc. 199 on the business model of the film industry
argues in passing that, from a behavioral perspective, ambiguity aversion
could explain the industry's reliance on relational-instead of formal-
vertical contracting in situations characterized by extreme uncertainty.20 0
The study's author seems to suggest that in such situations ambiguity-
averse decision makers avoid formal contracting, preferring instead more
open-ended relational contracts.201 While intuitively plausible, this
argument neglects to account for the contours of ambiguity aversion, which
studies show is largely comparative rather than absolute: decision makers
prefer a well-defined risk to an ambiguous one but routinely take
ambiguous risks when the former option is unavailable.20 2 In the film
industry, however, ambiguity is so pervasive that an aversion to it is
196. See, e.g., Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at 1530 (describing heuristics as "loose
categories" and stating that Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory-which is a theory of
choice, not judgment-"grouped irrational behaviors together" within three categories of
heuristics-which are judgment rather than choice phenomena-referring to framing effects as
"biases," and more).
197. See, e.g., id. at 1552 (concluding that the flaw of behaviorally informed antitrust is the
uncertainty it introduces with regard to the predictive power of enforcement).
198. See, e.g., Roger Van den Bergh, Behavioral Antitrust: Not Ready for the Main Stage, 9 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 203, 215-16 (2013) (citing Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, to support
assertions about behavioral biases). While this tendency may have resulted in part from legal
scholars' unfamiliarity with behavioral research methods, it also reflects the common confusion
between broad hypothetical assumptions (and other logical arguments) and concrete empirical
evidence.
199. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
200. Ryan M. Riegg, Opportunism, Uncertainty, and Relational Contracting-Antitrust in the
Film Industry, 6 U. DENv. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 107, 124-25 (2009).
201. See id.
202. See Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance,
110 Q.J. ECON. 585 (1995) (proposing the comparative ignorance hypothesis and finding that
ambiguity aversion disappears when a person evaluates either a clear or vague prospect in
isolation); Craig R. Fox & Martin Weber, Ambiguity Aversion, Comparative Ignorance, and
Decision Context, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 476 (2002)
(expanding on the comparative ignorance hypothesis through four experiments). But see Clare
Chua Chow & Rakesh K. Sarin, Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg Paradox, 22 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 129, 129, 138 (2001) (showing that ambiguity aversion sometimes remains in
noncomparative settings, although it is significantly stronger in the comparative setting).
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unlikely to play a significant role in the selection of vertical contracting
practices, unlike concerns about risk, opportunistic behavior, and more that
may well favor relational contracting in this setting.203
Another, more significant, illustration of the need to account for both
the contours and boundaries of behavioral phenomena is some analysts'
argument that market participants routinely avoid making rational entry
attempts due to boundedly rational risk aversion.20 4 Initially, the argument
appears straightforward: once a profitable entry opportunity has been
identified, potential entrants must decide whether to invest resources in the
uncertain prospect of entry. Behavioral research shows that decision
makers tend to be risk averse beyond the dictates of rationality when faced
with prospects that are potentially beneficial vis-d-vis the status quo
("gains," in prospect theory parlance).20 5 Therefore, so the argument goes,
real entrants routinely avoid positive-net-present-value entry opportunities
that would have attracted their hypothetical, strictly rational-and thus less
* 206risk averse-counterparts.
Yet not only is the assertion of common risk aversion among potential
entrants at odds with extensive empirical findings from industrial-
organization research, 2 07 but a closer examination also reveals that it is not
supported by the behavioral evidence either, for a number of reasons.208
First, new entry entails not only the uncertain prospect of a gain compared
to the status quo but also a significant possibility of a loss if entry fails. In
other words, entrants face a mixed gain/loss gamble rather than one
involving gains alone. Yet decision makers' reluctance to take such mixed
gain/loss gambles primarily is a manifestation of loss aversion, not risk
203. Moreover, research shows that comparative ignorance is an important driver of this
phenomenon. Individuals are less concerned about shared ambiguity but are averse to it when
their counterparties have superior knowledge about the relevant decision. See Fox & Weber,
supra note 202, at 476-77; see also Fox & Tversky, supra note 202, at 599 (finding that an
"uncertain prospect becomes less attractive when people are made aware that the same prospect
will also be evaluated by more knowledgeable individuals"). Yet as the study's author notes,
citing a famous screenwriter, "nobody knows anything" about what makes a movie a hit or not.
Riegg, supra note 200, at 129. Hence ignorance is largely shared, and ambiguity aversion is not a
likely force with respect to the most significant factor in this contracting environment.
204. See, e.g., Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 563-72; Stucke, New Antitrust Realism,
supra note 7, at 6-11; Petit & Neyrinck, supra note 7, at 4-5. Potential entrants may be rationally
risk averse in some situations, although traditional economic analysis assumes firms to be risk-
neutral decision makers. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
205. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 90, at 268-69.
206. See, e.g., Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 569-72; Stucke, New Antitrust Realism,
supra note 7, at 6-11; Petit & Neyrinck, supra note 7 at 4-5.
207. Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 488-501.
208. Entrants may sometimes shun potentially profitable entry opportunities for a variety of
traditional economic and behavioral reasons. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism, supra note 7, at 8-
10. The present discussion only illustrates the limited explanatory power of framing and reference
points in this case.
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aversion.209 Because losses are felt more strongly than comparable gains,
individuals require an expected payoff that is significantly higher than what
is needed merely to generate positive expected value to make up for their
potential painful loss. 2 10  A reluctance to embark upon new entry that is
born in loss aversion, however, not only differs from standard risk aversion
in its psychological roots but also has different behavioral contours. 21'
Most notably, potential entrants are likely to exhibit risk seeking
instead of risk aversion because they usually do not consider the prospects
of entry in the abstract but rather contemplate a specific venture. Hence
they tend to compare the various possible outcomes of entry to the
successful outcome they hope to achieve, perceiving those outcomes that
fall short of their aspiration as undesirable ones, which generates loss
aversion. 2 12 Such loss-averse entrants, however, will embark on far riskier
ventures than their risk-averse counterparts would be willing to
undertake.2 13
The role of framing and reference points in shaping entrants' risk
preferences thus illustrates why antitrust analysts should consider the
specific contours and boundaries of the behavioral phenomena they apply.
Upon closer scrutiny, the same effects of framing that initially seem to
209. The seminal article that introduced prospect theory uses a simple mixed gamble example
to illustrate loss aversion. See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 90, at 263-64,
279; see also Sabrina M. Tom et al., The Neural Basis of Loss Aversion in Decision-Making
Under Risk, 315 SCI. 515, 515-18 (2007) (describing neural imaging evidence for loss aversion in
mixed gambles); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992) (offering evidence of loss
aversion in mixed gambles).
210. See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 90, at 285.
211. For one, loss-averse entrants will be more reluctant to enter than entrants who are merely
risk averse. Cf Matthew Rabin, Comment, Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A
Calibration Theorem, 68 ECONOMETRICA 1281, 1288 (2000) (showing that standard risk-aversion
cannot explain commonly observed, more extreme instances of risk-averse behavior, which is
driven by loss-aversion). The former entrants also will respond more to changes in the magnitude
of the potential loss they would face if their entry attempt were to fail compared to changes in its
probability instead of simply adjusting the net present value of entry to their degree of risk
aversion as merely risk-averse entrants would do. See, e.g., George Wu & Alex B. Markle, An
Empirical Test of Gain-Loss Separability in Prospect Theory, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1322, 1332 (2008)
(showing that when choosing between mixed gambles, individuals are less sensitive to differences
in the probabilities of potential outcomes).
212. See Johannes Abeler et al., Reference Points and Effort Provision, 101 AM. ECON. REV.
470, 487 (2011) (showing, experimentally, how expectations impact real effort provision and
contrasting risk-averse behaviors with loss-averse behavior); Chip Heath et al., Goals as
Reference Points, 38 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 79, 93 (1999) (presenting evidence that goals both
function as reference points and exhibit the properties of loss aversion and diminishing
sensitivity).
213. The present analysis focuses only on the risk attitudes as an illustration, while in fact
entrants are likely to be risk seeking due to the contribution ofjudgmental biases. See Tor, Entry,
supra note 2, at 503-31 (describing the relevant evidence at length).
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make potential entrants risk averse in fact may facilitate loss-averse, risk-
seeking entry.
Moreover, the case of entry highlights the importance of accounting
not only for the basic contours and boundaries of behavioral phenomena but
also for the key variables that moderate their effects on market
214participants. We saw that a behavioral analysis of entrants' judgments of
the prospects of entry helps explain a series of otherwise puzzling empirical
findings regarding patterns of new entry into markets.2 15 We further saw
that the variables that moderate optimistic overconfidence help explain the
inferior average performance of start-up entrants compared to their
diversifying counterparts.216 Two such variables in particular-the intensity
of preferences and the ambiguity of the decision environment-
systematically lead start-up entrants to exhibit more biased judgments of
their prospects than those manifested by diversifying entrants.217
While these findings bear important implications for the competition
among entrants, for entry's effects on incumbent firms in the market, and
for various antitrust rules, they also reveal the necessity for behavioral
antitrust scholars to consider the effect of moderating variables on those
market behaviors they study.2 18 Without attending to the effects of
preference intensity and ambiguity on the competition among entrants,
behaviorally informed analysts might erroneously expect excess entry to be
more effective than it is in disciplining incumbentS219 or mistakenly believe
that the cohort of ex post successful entrants resembles the pool of those
attempting entry ex ante.
B. Heterogeneity, Not Uniformity
Much like they neglect the variability of empirical behavioral
phenomena, antitrust commentators frequently fail to appreciate the
214. A moderator variable affects the direction and/or strength of the relationship between
two other variables. Reuben M. Baron & David A. Kenny, The Moderator-Mediator Variable
Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Consid-
erations, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1173, 1174 (1986).
215. See Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 503-3 1.
216. See id. at 487, 520-31.
217. See id.; see also Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances for Success,
3 J. Bus. VENTURING 97, 103 (1988) (finding that "entrepreneurs' perceptions of their own odds
for success display a noteworthy degree of optimism"); Ken G. Smith et al., Decision Making
Behavior in Smaller Entrepreneurial and Larger Professionally Managed Firms, 3 J. Bus.
VENTURING 223, 223 (1988) (finding that entrepreneurs are less likely to follow a formal rational,
decision process than established firms).
218. See Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 520-31.
219. See Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at 1541 ("[The existence of irrationally optimistic
potential entrants policing for the existence of supracompetitive profits, and even entering in their




heterogeneity of human behavior.2 20 Instead, they assume population-level
uniformity, both among different actors who are similarly situated and for
the same actor across different circumstances and different behavioral
phenomena.22 1
Yet in reality human judgment and decision behavior is highly
heterogeneous. Different antitrust actors will manifest different deviations
from strict rationality depending on factors such as cognitive ability,2 22
thinking style, 22 3 risk-taking propensity,224 personality traits,225 and more. 2 2 6
Notwithstanding this evidence for systematic individual differences in
specific behavioral phenomena, however, the correlation within individuals
among different deviations from rationality generally is small and so is the
proportion of the overall variance in behavior that systematic individual
differences account for.227 Moreover, people exhibit particular behavioral
220. But see CHRISTOPH ENGEL, GENERATING PREDICTABILITY: INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
AND DESIGN 1-10 (2005) (describing the heterogeneity of human judgment and decision behavior
as a challenge for the predictability needed for human interaction generally and policy and
institutional design more specifically).
221. See, e.g., Stucke, Reconsidering, supra note 7, at 121-22; Wright & Stone, supra note 7,
at 1537.
222. See, e.g., Edward T. Cokely & Colleen M. Kelley, Cognitive Abilities and Superior
Decision Making Under Risk: A Protocol Analysis and Process Model Evaluation, 4 JUDGMENT &
DECISION MAKING 20 (2009) (finding that individual differences in cognitive abilities and related
skills can systematically predict normatively superior and logically consistent judgments and
decision making); Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Framing and
Conjunction Effects, 4 THINKING & REASONING 289 (1998) (discussing the implications of the
finding that subjects with higher cognitive abilities were disproportionately likely to avoid
potential framing and conjunctive fallacies).
223. See, e.g., Richard F. West et al., Heuristics and Biases as Measures of Critical Thinking:
Associations with Cognitive Ability and Thinking Dispositions, 100 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 930, 930
(2008) (discovering that "[m]easures of thinking dispositions" including "actively open-minded
thinking and need for cognition" actually predicted "variance in ... classes of critical thinking
skills after general cognitive ability had been controlled").
224. See, e.g., Kevin T. Mahoney et al., Individual Differences in a Within-Subjects Risky-
Choice Framing Study, 51 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 248 (2011) (utilizing risk
style and thinking style to predict individual differences in response to framing problems).
225. See, e.g., Marco Lauriola & Irwin P. Levin, Personality Traits and Risky Decision-
Making in a Controlled Experimental Task: An Exploratory Study, 31 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 215 (2001) (exploring the "big five" personality traits and their
respective correlations to risky decision making); Irwin P. Levin et al., A New Look at Framing
Effects: Distributions of Effect Sizes, Individual Differences, and Independence of Types of
Effects, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 411, 425 (2002) (finding
personality traits "predictive of the magnitude of framing effects" and concluding that the
experimental design provided evidence that individual differences in framing effects are linked to
stable personality characteristics, such as conscientiousness and agreeableness).
226. See Ann-Ren6e Blais et al., Individual Differences in Decision Processing and
Confidence Judgments in Comparative Judgment Tasks: The Role of Cognitive Styles, 38
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1701 (2005) (finding that stable individual
differences in decision time, accuracy, and response confidence emerged across all comparative
judgment tasks, although the basis for these differences remained elusive).
227. See Kirstin C. Appelt et al., The Decision Making Individual Differences Inventory and
Guidelines for the Study ofIndividual Differences in Judgment and Decision-Making Research, 6
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phenomena to different degrees at different times in different contexts.228
Hence some antitrust actors will better approximate the assumptions of
rationality-based models, or deviate from them, on some occasions, while
other actors will do so in other situations or with respect to different
phenomena.2 29 Indeed, those robust, systematic, and predictable deviations
from rationality that are documented at the population level do not reflect
individual-level uniformity but rather are the aggregation of significant
individual-level heterogeneity in judgment and decision behavior.
Antitrust analyses that disregard the heterogeneity of market behavior
may misconstrue the reasons for and the consequences of competitive and
anticompetitive practices alike. The behavioral analysis of RPM revealed,
for example, that some manufacturers excessively impose this vertical
restraint in their distribution systems when it is legal, to their own detriment
and at a cost to some of their retailers, and may only learn of their costly
mistake after extended periods of time.230 Commentators neglecting the
heterogeneity of manufacturer behavior mistakenly suggested that this
behavioral finding reveals an additional anticompetitive harm of RPM
beyond those identified by traditional rationality-based analyses, a harm
that could support a return to the now-discarded rule of per se illegality.231
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 252, 253, 257 (2011) (noting inconsistent results for individual
difference measures in judgment and decision making and attributing them in part to the greater
impact of situational variables, "which can overwhelm any impact of individual differences");
Wim De Neys & Jean-Frangois Bonnefon, The 'Whys' and 'Whens' of Individual Differences in
Thinking Biases, 17 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCL 172, 172 (2013) (discussing different approaches to
research in this area and explaining that the "accounts we survey ... [do] not entail that different
reasoners cannot be biased for different reasons or that the same reasoner is always biased for the
same reasons. Obviously, the locus of individual differences need not be fixed and can be
contingent on specific task, context, person, or developmental factors" (emphasis added)).
228. See, e.g., N.S. Fagley & Paul M. Miller, Framing Effects and Arenas of Choice: Your
Money or Your Life?, 71 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 355, 355, 370
(1997) (noting that although "[t]here was a significant sex by frame interaction such that only
women exhibited framing effects on choice," the authors found that "[subjects] made more risky
choices when outcomes involved human lives than when they involved money, regardless of
[frame]"); Rui Mata et al., Age Differences in Risky Choice: A Meta-Analysis, 1235 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 18 (2011) (using a systematic literature review to discover that age-related differences
varied considerably based on the task at hand); cf Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'
Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 98-99 (2002) (reviewing some empirical evidence, with an
emphasis on the impact of changes in affect, and suggesting that "the propensity to act rationally
varies not only across individuals but also within individuals over time"). See generally Appelt et
al., supra note 227, at 257 (advocating a "person-by-decision-and/or-situation interaction
approach that examines how individual differences interact with other individual differences, with
decision features, and with situational factors to influence behavior in a given context").
229. Moreover, behavior that deviates further from the assumptions of rationality is not
always associated with inferior performance in the market. See infra section III(A)(1).
230. Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 839-42.
231. See, e.g., Ginsburg & Moore, supra note 7, at 98 (suggesting that the evidence of
boundedly rational RPM "is of greater relevance to a legislature considering whether to make
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Others offered to designate RPM, in light of the behavioral evidence, a
presumptively illegal practice that courts could dispose of with a "quick
look."2 32 Yet the significant heterogeneity of manufacturer behavior, where
boundedly rational uses of RPM coexist with other rationally
procompetitive and rationally anticompetitive instances of the practice,
makes per se illegality inappropriate here.233 Behavioral antitrust in fact
supports the Leegin Court's overruling of earlier precedents and embrace of
a rule of reason approach, even while it highlights the need for a structured
rule of reason for RPM that also accounts for behavioral regularities as
opposed to the alternative of an open-ended, unstructured rule of reason.234
More recently, some analysts have begun considering explicitly the
implications of systematic differences between classes of antitrust actors. 23 5
By routinely falling prey to the fundamental methodological error, however,
these commentators still tend to reach erroneous conclusions. For instance,
one behavioral antitrust scholar sought to determine how the law should
respond to the interaction among firms, consumers, and the government,
assuming that each of these different classes of actors is either uniformly
"rational" or uniformly "boundedly rational."23 6 Intersecting these two
alternative assumptions with respect to the three sets of actors, this scholar
reached a series of conclusions regarding the consequences of, say, a
"boundedly rational" government responding to "rational" firms'
exploitation of "boundedly rational" consumers237 o f another, strange,
hypothetical world in which consumers are "rational" but firms are
"boundedly rational." 2 38
Because of this assumed uniformity, many otherwise interesting and
potentially valuable observations that are made throughout this scholar's
analysis-whether with respect to consumers, firms, or the government's
role-are simultaneously too broad and too narrow. Take for instance the
argument that a "rational" government that seeks to respond to the possible
resale price maintenance illegal per se" even while noting that courts making decisions in specific
cases must determine whether a particular instance of RPM is anticompetitive).
232. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, at 1582 n.341.
233. Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 854-55.
234. See id. at 855-63 (arguing that the presence of excessive or inefficient use of RPM
should be part of the rule of reason inquiry after Leegin since market forces are slow to eliminate
such use and finding the factors enumerated in Leegin to be relevant to this inquiry); see also infra
subpart V(B).
235. See infra Part III for an examination at length of the distinction that scholars increasingly
make between firms and consumers following the intuition that firms are sophisticated
organizations that benefit from experience and expertise, with advantages consumers usually lack
that allow exploitation.
236. Stucke, Reconsidering, supra note 7, at 121-22. Strikingly, Stucke explicitly
acknowledges variability and heterogeneity even while failing to realize that treating bounded
rationality as a broad, universal assumption could lead to mistaken conclusions. See id. at 122.
237. Id. at 144-53.
238. Id. at 154-62.
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exploitation of "boundedly rational" consumers by "rational" firms must be
concerned with factors such as the identification of consumer preferences,
the impact of defaults set by the government, or the negative effects of
intervention on consumer autonomy, while balancing these against the need
to protect consumers from "corporate autocracy." 239  Some of these
concerns merit serious consideration in antitrust and regulatory policy, but
they do not always apply when "rational" firms and government face
"boundedly rational" consumers. Nor are the enumerated concerns limited
to this specific hypothetical juxtaposition of a differing but uniform
rationality of the three classes of antitrust actors. "Boundedly rational"
firms with superior resources and information sometimes may also exploit
consumers, whether or not the latter are "rational." A "boundedly rational"
government that sets defaults still can shape consumer behavior or encroach
on consumer autonomy, and so on. Instead, a clearer and more fruitful
approach would recognize the inevitable bounded rationality of all classes
of actors. It would then seek to account for the variability and
heterogeneity of behavior both among the different classes and within each
class--consumers, firms, and government actors-and develop policy
prescriptions based on the empirical evidence most relevant to the question
at hand.240
Similarly, erroneous conclusions plague some analyses that aim to
criticize the behavioral approach based on sweeping assumptions of
rationality or "irrationality." To illustrate, one pair of commentators
recently argued that the "behavioralist model myopically focuses on the
implications of irrationality on certain specific market participants, usually
incumbent firms or cartel members, while ignoring or assuming away the
broader implications of applying an identical cognitive bias to others."24 1
The criticism of some behavioral antitrust applications, which the present
Article considers at length, is appropriate. But when mistakenly asserting
that valid legal analysis must assume that all behavioral phenomena apply
identically to all market participants all the time, this commentary offers yet
another clear example of the fundamental methodological error.
Ironically, the same two authors level a further charge of naivet6 that
behavioral scholars allegedly manifest when they "impute a given cognitive
bias to only a monopolist or to only entrants, but not to both, or to other
firms at large. There is simply no basis in the behavioral economics
literature for this assumption . . . .242 By now it should be clear that this
charge itself is naive, not only failing to recognize the extensive empirical
239. See id at 139-44.
240. A full analysis of these questions would also address the significant role of institutions in
shaping the behavior of the different classes of actors, as Part III, below, illustrates at length.
241. Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at 1535.
242. Id. at 1535-36.
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evidence for the heterogeneity of judgment and decision behavior at the
individual level but also revealing a misunderstanding of the inherently
variable nature of behavioral phenomena even at the population level, when
whole classes of actors are concerned.
To use these analysts' own illustration, incumbents and entrants may
differ in important respects, both between them and within each group of
antitrust actors. We already saw, for instance, that new entrants exhibit
greater optimistic overconfidence than their diversifying competitors.24 3
Importantly, the systematic difference between the two categories of
entrants-an example of the variability of overconfidence-does not result
from an assumption that one class of entrants fails to manifest a
phenomenon that another exhibits. Instead, the factors that are empirically
shown to moderate this judgment bias-including the degree of ambiguity
and the intensity of preferences-cause a systematic divergence between
the two categories of entrants. 24 Similarly, one should expect the class of
potential new entrants itself to be heterogeneous, with entrants revealing
different degrees of optimistic overconfidence. Since the decision to
attempt entry involves self-selection, however, those more biased potential
entrants will be overrepresented among the actors who end up attempting
entry.245 Both variability and heterogeneity thus suggest that new entrants
will be particularly biased, as a group, generating a prediction that clearly
differs from either traditional antitrust models that assume perfect entrant
rationality or analyses that mistakenly assume universal and uniform
bounded rationality.
Finally, the same two authors who seek to criticize behavioral antitrust
advance their main critique by proposing a "behavioral irrelevance
theorem" that they "believe provides a more realistic account of firm-level
irrationality as it relates to antitrust policy. 2 4 6 In another illustration of the
fundamental methodological error, the proposed theorem is based on a
model that imagines incumbents and entrants, respectively, as either
"rational" or "irrational" and proceeds to outline the implications of the four
resulting combinations of entrant-incumbent interaction. Thus even
while presenting their approach as more sophisticated, these scholars
repeatedly and naIvely assume a single, uniform, all-encompassing
"irrationality," ignoring the evidence of variability and heterogeneity, with
243. Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 520-31.
244. Id.
245. Cf id. at 563-64 (examining the factors that lead to an overrepresentation of more biased
entrants when considering the variability of entry judgments).
246. Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at 1527.
247. Id. at 1536-48.
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respect to both behavioral phenomena generally and competition among
entrants and between them and incumbents more specifically.2 4 8
III. The Second Mistake: Assuming (Away) Institutional Effects
Real antitrust actors do not operate in an abstract, context-free
environment. Both consumers and producers make their judgments and
decisions in market settings, where the former seek to satisfy their wants
while the latter try to succeed as businesses by the means they believe most
effective for accomplishing their goal. Moreover, the producers antitrust
law is concerned about typically are large business associations, whose
significant actions in the market are determined by often complex
interactions among multiple individuals within the organization. The legal
decision makers who shape antitrust law and policy-from judges and
juries in antitrust courts to enforcement officials in regulatory agencies-
similarly operate within, and are affected and constrained by, institutional
frameworks.
Yet commentators frequently take one of two extreme approaches,
either ignoring the effects of antitrust institutions altogether or assuming
that these institutions perfectly align the behavior of antitrust actors with
rationality-based models. Behavioral proponents who assume away
institutional effects usually tend not to explain why these effects are
unimportant or irrelevant to the antitrust questions they examine. 24 9 Nor do
behavioral opponents, who routinely assume that antitrust institutions-
particularly markets and firms 25 0-guarantee rational behavior, tend to
pause to examine the specific conditions that determine whether and how
these institutional effects take place.251
248. See, e.g., Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 565 ("A related important lesson ... is that the
legal analyst should strive to develop an accurate understanding of those variables that determine
whether and how biased different actors are likely to be."). Notably, the analysis offered by the
two authors is flawed even based on its erroneous assumptions, arguing, for example, that rational
entrants make irrational incumbent behavior irrelevant. See Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at
1541. As explained above, "irrational" predation can be successful (and even comprise a rational
strategy).
249. See, e.g., Stucke, Monopolization, supra note 7, at 552-53 (discussing learning by firms
and consumers in the same breath, without considering the institutional differences between the
two types of market participants).
250. But see Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 7, at 782 (examining, theoretically, how the
behavior of enforcement agencies may be shaped by some behavioral forces).
251. See, e.g., Werden et al., supra note 7, at 128 (arguing that evidence of individual
decision behavior need not carry to firms and that "[m]oreover, what really matters in competition
policy is not so much the behavior of firms as the performance of markets, which need not be
significantly impaired by firm decision making subject to behavioral biases"). This common error
is puzzling given the incorporation of behavioral insights into mainstream economics in recent
decades. Behavioral antitrust opponents today echo earlier arguments made by scholars outside
antitrust. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Law, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1765, 1770 (1998) (suggesting that the effects of the heuristics and biases
offered by behavioral analyses might be weaker than generally assumed and making no distinction
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In reality, however, the effects of institutions on antitrust actors are
pervasive yet variable. Consumers behave differently in market and
nonmarket environments, while producers' incentives and competitive
pressures vary depending on the specific market settings, organizational
environments, the type of business conduct involved, and more. Judges,
juries, and regulators similarly are likely to exhibit varying degrees of
rationality depending on the tasks and institutional contexts they face.
The following subparts therefore illustrate the importance of
institutional effects in behavioral antitrust analysis by examining how
markets and firms shape the behavior of antitrust actors. These illustrations
will reveal that the neglect of either the significance of institutional effects
or their limits can lead to erroneous antitrust conclusions.
A. Markets
Markets are perhaps the most significant antitrust institution given the
primary concern of the field with protecting the competitive process-that
is, the competition among producers to supply consumer demand.252 From
a behavioral perspective, markets play an additional, complex role,
however, sometimes aligning consumer and producer behavior with the
normative standards of rationality while at other times failing to do so or
even facilitating deviations from these standards.253
1. Demand-Side Rationality.-For consumers, markets supply not
only goods and services but also the information that can help them form
more rational beliefs and make more rational decisions.254 When markets
offer better and more readily available information, consumers' judgments
and decisions may be more accurate and better aligned with their
between antitrust actors in making this suggestion). For one rare and insightful, if brief,
discussion of the important-yet-limited role of institutions in promoting rationality in legal settings
generally, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law and
Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1675, 1689-90.
252. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447-49 (2009)
(recognizing that antitrust law is limited to protecting competition in the marketplace); Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-87 (2007) (discussing both the rule
of reason and per se restrictions as mechanisms that allow courts to police the competitive
landscape); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-54 (2007) (highlighting the role of
antitrust law in facilitating competition by policing only certain types of conduct).
253. Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 310-13; cf Bar-Gill, supra note 139, at
15 (noting, with respect to the interaction between consumers and producers, that "[tihe
behavioral economics model . . . is context dependent" such that while his analysis is "often stated
in general terms, implementation must be market specific" and "[t]he severity of the behavioral
market failure, and the ability of competition to mitigate the welfare costs of the behavioral
market failure, will vary from market to market").
254. For one classical economic treatment of the role and importance of information for
consumer decisions, see George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213
(1961), in which the author discusses the costs of information search and their implications for
advertising, the role of specialized intermediaries, and more.
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preferences. 255 The available evidence on consumer behavior, however,
paints a more complex picture. For one, the products and services that
consumers must choose among will not always justify a commitment of
significant time or cognitive or financial resources to make optimal
judgments and decisions, leading consumers rationally to ignore relevant
information.256
However, producers who expect to benefit from consumers' educated
choices may respond by providing relevant information to consumers via
advertising campaigns, marketing, and similar efforts.2 57 Such responses
not only tap the superior information that producers already possess about
their products and services but also offer significant economies of scale,
given the low cost of offering the same (or similar) information to
additional consumers.25 8 Nevertheless, insofar as numerous competing
producers offer such information, extolling the superiority of their wares,
consumers still must determine which products and services best match
their preferences.
In some cases, the opportunity profitably to provide consumers with
unbiased information and advice will attract an additional set of mar-
ket participants-namely, information intermediaries-to fulfill this
255. On the conditions necessary for such improvements, see infra notes 299-303 and
accompanying text.
256. Cf Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REv. 211 (1995) (discussing rational ignorance regarding contractual terms as a form of
bounded rationality); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83
TEXAS L. REv. 1581, 1585-86 (2005) (noting that the expected benefit of a "good" form contract
to the consumer is slight and therefore is unlikely to figure in the decision whether to buy the
seller's product).
257. See, e.g., Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, On the Simple Economics ofAdvertising,
Marketing, and Product Design, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 756, 756 (2006) (recognizing that
advertising and marketing activity can shift the demand curve in a positive direction for
producers' firms if consumers respond favorably to a product); Phillip Nelson, Advertising as
Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 743-44 (1974) (highlighting the importance of the consumer
in producer advertising decisions); Stigler, supra note 254, at 220-24 (noting that advertisements
serve in part to identify the sellers and prices of goods and also suggesting that the value of
information increases as well-informed customers seek additional information more extensively).
258. See, e.g., Stigler, supra note 254, at 220 ("A small $5 advertisement in a metropolitan
newspaper reaches (in the sense of being read) perhaps 25,000 readers, or fifty readers per penny,
and, even if only a tiny fraction are potential buyers (or sellers), the economy they achieve in
search... may be overwhelming."). Recent scholarship further suggests that producers may
possess better information regarding consumers' behavior than do consumers themselves. See
Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3 ERASMUS L. REv. 93
(2010) (arguing the significance of product-use information and the need to regulate its
disclosure); Oren Bar-Gill & Oliver Board, Product-Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary
Disclosure, 14 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 235 (2012) (same). But see Emir Kamenica et al., Helping
Consumers Know Themselves, 101 Am. ECON. REv. 417 (2011) (showing that requiring firms to
inform consumers about themselves decreases consumer expenditure at given prices but can
increase equilibrium prices, offsetting the direct benefit of this information).
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function.2 59 These specialized service providers, ranging from long-
standing outlets aimed at the general public, such as Consumer Reports, to
more recent internet databases and services, to personalized consultants and
advisors, can help improve the quality of consumers' judgments and
decisions.
Yet, despite the increasing abundance of information-and
occasionally because of it-many consumers still commonly and routinely
make product and service choices that are suboptimal for them. 26 0  Even
when competition is present, producers in some markets prefer to offer only
partial or opaque information to limit the ability of consumers to evaluate
their products.2 6 1 Specifically, producers can benefit by designing products
that lead more naive consumers to make inferior, costly decisions-as in
the case of some credit card plans-that both increase producers' profits
and subsidize the superior products chosen by more sophisticated
consumers, helping attract the latter as well.262 In other instances, sellers
develop products that are more complex than necessary to satisfy consumer
259. See FRANK ROSE, THE ECONOMICS, CONCEPT, AND DESIGN OF INFORMATION
INTERMEDIARIES: A THEORETIC APPROACH 36-37 (1999) (explaining that buyers of goods
demand information to make more informed purchases and this demand has given rise to a market
for information to be purchased); DANIEL F. SPULBER, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE:
INTERMEDIARIES AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM xxiii (1999) (observing that customers can be
asymmetrically informed about product quality and that intermediaries help to fill this gap);
Thomas F. Cosimano, Intermediation, 63 ECONOMICA 131 (1996) (offering a model showing the
conditions for beneficial intermediation and the costs its presence imposes on sellers who do not
use it); Daniel F. Spulber, Market Microstructure and Intermediation, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
1996, at 135 (elucidating the role of the intermediary in the market system); see also Stigler, supra
note 254, at 216-17 (discussing the role of distributors as information intermediaries).
260. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 26-
55 (2008) (arguing that consumers make systematic mistakes in their choice and use of credit
products due to imperfect information and irrationality); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98
Nw. U. L. REv. 1373, 1395-1408 (2004) (contending that "imperfect self-control" can explain
consumers' systematic underestimation of their future borrowing); Brian Bucks & Karen Pence,
Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and Mortgage Terms? 1, 26-27 (Fed. Reserve Bd.
Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2006-03, 2006), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2006/200603/200603pap.pdf (reporting that borrowers with a
limited understanding of mortgage terms are at risk of taking out more costly mortgages than they
qualify for).
261. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAw, ECONOMICS, AND
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 80 (2012) ("Increased complexity may be attractive to
issuers, as it allows them to hide the true cost of the credit card in a multidimensional pricing
maze.").
262. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 519-20 (2006). See
generally BAR-GILL, supra note 261, at 8 (arguing that sellers must be aware of consumer biases
and perceptions in order to remain in the market).
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demand-such as where certain cellular service plans are concerned 2 63 -
making it exceedingly difficult to compare among competing offerings.26
All in all, while current-day markets typically provide consumers with
abundant information that can facilitate better judgments and decisions,
consumers still face significant challenges. Where the interests of
producers and consumers diverge substantially, the latter frequently are at a
fundamental disadvantage compared to the former-who have the
experience, opportunity, and resources needed to exploit consumers.
Nonetheless, the basic observation of consumer disadvantage that
permeates other areas of the law-most notably consumer protection and
some regulatory regimes-until recently has largely been absent from
antitrust discourse.265 The hypothetical consumer in traditional antitrust
models is not just strictly rational, but usually also immune to the
institutional constraints that impact real consumers in market settings.26 6
Yet should the evidence of consumers' bounded rationality enter the
antitrust calculus? After all, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton
Friedman argued that markets in the aggregate perform "as if' they were
comprised of rational participants because the deviations of irrational actors
263. Bar-Gill, supra note 139, at 35-41.
264. See, e.g., Bruce 1. Carlin, Strategic Price Complexity in Retail Financial Markets, 91 J.
FIN. EcON. 278 (2009) (presenting a model showing that as competition intensifies firms add
complexity to their price structures to increase market power by preventing some consumers from
becoming knowledgeable about prices); Chris M. Wilson, Ordered Search and Equilibrium
Obfuscation, 28 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 496 (2010) (demonstrating "the incentives for an oligopolist
to obfuscate by deliberately increasing the cost with which consumers can locate its product and
price"); Glenn Ellison & Alexander Wolitzky, A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15237, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
wl5237 (offering search models that show obfuscation can arise even with rational consumers
who bear search costs). But see Alexia Gaudeul & Robert Sugden, Spurious Complexity and
Common Standards in Markets for Consumer Goods, 79 ECONOMICA 209 (2012) (modeling a
countervailing force of consumer preference for simple choice, which can reduce complexity);
Eugenio J. Miravete, Competition and the Use of Foggy Pricing, 5 AM. ECON. J.
MICROECONOMICS 194 (2013) (concluding that the transition from monopoly to competition in
the early U.S. cellphone industry did not generally foster the use of tariff options aimed at
profiting from consumer mistakes and offering alternative accounts for the observed "foggy"
pricing).
265. Recently, economists considering some aspects of behavioral antitrust have begun
considering the possibility and implications of consumer manipulation for antitrust. See Bennett
et al., supra note 7, at 121; Huffman, Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 7, at
131-35; Salinger, supra note 7, at 81-82; Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Exploitation and its
Implications on Competition and Consumer Protection Policies, in THE PROS AND CONS OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 139, at 77; Petit & Neyrinck, supra note 7, at 9-11.
266. See Stucke, Reconsidering, supra note 7, at 122-23. One exception is the practice of
merger enforcement, where the antitrust agencies routinely consider case-specific evidence,
including evidence of consumer behavior with respect to the relevant products, when such data is
available. See infra notes 270-74 and accompanying text (discussing the approach of the agencies
to consumer behavior in merger investigations).
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collectively cancel each other out. 26 7  This argument, however, fails to
account for systematic deviations from rationality that bias market behavior
in predictable and consistent directions and therefore do not cancel out in
the aggregate.2 68
Gary Becker, another Nobel Prize-winning economist, made a
different argument, showing that one can derive the main implication of
traditional economic models of consumer behavior-namely, the negatively
sloping demand curve that associates higher prices with lower demand-
without assuming rational behavior.269 Becker's argument suggests that
consumers' systematic deviations from strict rationality should still
generate recognizable markets, with negatively sloping demand curves, as
we routinely observe in fact. But this insight is not particularly helpful for
antitrust law and enforcement policy, which rely on assumptions of
consumer rationality well beyond setting up negatively sloping demand
curves.
We have already seen, in fact, that consumer rationality impacts
antitrust doctrine in a number of areas, from the debate over aftermarket
power in Kodak, to the analysis of bundling and tying, RPM, and even the
efficacy of new entry. Systematic bias on the part of consumers may be
troublesome for other key aspects of merger enforcement as well. The
agencies and merging parties routinely estimate the unilateral effects of
mergers based on models in which firms price to maximize profits in the
face of aggregate consumer demand. 2 70 Hence, merger predictions that fail
to account for systematic biases in consumer demand-whereby consumers,
for instance, over- or underreact to changes in the relative prices of products
in a given market-may result in erroneous predictions of merger
outcomes.27 1
Some economists argue that there is little reason for alarm because
merger assessments already account for any systematic consumer bias by
drawing on data regarding consumers' actual choices in the relevant product
267. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3, 21-22 (1953) (emphasis omitted); see also Allan Gibbard & Hal R. Varian,
Economic Models, 75 J. PHIL. 664, 669-73 (1978) (discussing the concepts of approximation and
fit in microeconomic models that are based on false assumptions); Richard A. Posner, Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1556 (1998) (echoing
Friedman's argument in his critique of behavioral law and economics).
268. Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 563.
269. Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4-9
(1962) (showing that this basic feature of markets results not from the assumed rationality of
market participants, but more directly from the effect of a change in price on opportunities).
270. See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, §§ 6.1-3; DAVIS & GARCtS, supra note
80; Werden & Froeb, supra note 80.
271. Cf Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 119 (noting that "[p]assive" consumers can reduce
both the overall price elasticity of a product or its cross-elasticity with other products).
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market.272 This argument, however, does not apply to most merger
investigations, only to those limited situations where extensive, quantitative
scanner or similar data is readily available, such as in consumer goods
273markets. It also glosses over the role of consumer rationality even in
some of those merger simulation methods that are commonly used when
sufficiently detailed consumer-level data is available.2 74
Yet even when aggregate data from real consumer transactions enables
reasonable predictions of merger effects, it does not resolve the more
fundamental challenge of systematic consumer bias in merger assessments.
When consumer choices are partly driven by systematic errors of judgment,
choices in the market may fail to reflect consumers' true preferences.2 75 To
illustrate, when consumers underestimate the risks associated with a given
product, they demand greater quantities of that product than they would
have absent their judgment error. A somewhat different problem occurs
when consumers systematically deviate from rational choice precepts.276
Their behavior then may manifest real preferences, yet these may not
always be those "true" preferences these consumers would have exhibited
had they not been biased. 277 Hence it is clear, even without resolving these
significant questions, that the empirical behavioral evidence is potentially
relevant to merger enforcement.2 78
Indeed the law should not ignore the complex relationship between
markets, competition, and consumers' deviations from strict rationality,
272. See, e.g., Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at 1523.
273. See, e.g., DAVIS & GARCtS, supra note 80, § 9.3.2 (explaining the limited availability of
such data).
274. See sources cited supra note 81.
275. Stucke, Reconsidering, supra note 7, at 139-40; see also Werden et al., supra note 7, at
127 (implying that behavioral evidence could be used to challenge the assumption that consumers
maximize utility via choice).
276. For the distinction between errors of judgment and errors of choice and their potentially
distinct normative ramifications, see Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 244-72.
277. See id. at 318 & n.344 (explaining that "true" preferences refer to those that individuals
would have had if they had possessed an accurate estimate of the risks and benefits of products).
278. This observation raises a separate question of some importance concerning the goals of
antitrust law. Modem antitrust law promotes efficiency by protecting competition based on the
assumption that consumers maximize utility through their choices in the market. Therefore,
evidence showing that consumer choice sometimes fails to maximize utility might raise questions
regarding the validity of the competition-welfare link at the foundation of antitrust law, as
scholars supporting and criticizing behavioral antitrust already have noted. See Alexander
Morrell, Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control: Comment, 167 J. INST. THEORETICAL ECON.
143, 146-47 (2011) (criticizing the argument made by Werden et al. that the behavioral evidence
should be ignored, regardless of its validity, if it makes current practices in welfare economics
obsolete). Note, however, that the behavioral evidence does not negate the importance of
competition for consumer welfare. For one, the relevant inquiry is not whether consumer choice
always maximizes welfare but whether competition tends significantly to improve consumer
welfare compared to what prevails when competition diminishes. Yet a full consideration of this
issue is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
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given the many roles of hypothetical consumer rationality in both antitrust
doctrine and enforcement practices.
2. Supply-Side Rationality.-Beyond providing producers with
incentives and opportunities to react to the bounded rationality of
consumers-whether by seeking to correct it or trying to exploit it-
markets also help align producers' own behavior with rationality through a
number of mechanisms. 27 9  Some of these-such as the consequences of
simple aggregation or the inevitably constrained resources of market
participants-operate at the macro-level, facilitating "as if' rational
outcomes for the market as a whole, irrespective of the actual rationality of
specific market participants. Other, micro-level mechanisms-including
profit motivation and learning from experience-directly facilitate more
rational behavior on the part of individual producers. A final pair of
mechanisms-product-market competition and arbitrage-operates at the
market level yet impacts micro-level behavior by weeding out boundedly
rational producers.2 80 Importantly, though powerful and significant, the
various mechanisms of market rationality are imperfect, at times failing to
ensure producer rationality and occasionally even facilitating systematic
deviations from it. 2 8 1
Economists have long argued that markets overall may comport with
the predictions of strictly rational models even while individual firms
deviate from them. Milton Friedman explained that the aggregation of firm
behavior in the market means that random errors will cancel out in the
28aggregate.282 Nonetheless, as we saw already with respect to consumer
behavior, systematic deviations from rationality may not cancel out, instead
279. The notion that nonmarket behavioral phenomena may not appear in market settings is
common not just to opponents, but even to some proponents of the behavioral approach outside
antitrust law. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 251, at 1781-82 (suggesting that behavioral findings
from nonmarket settings may not necessarily generalize to market settings); Jolls et al., supra note
1, at 1473 (finding it necessary to state that "law is a domain where behavioral analysis would
appear to be particularly promising in light of the fact that nonmarket behavior is frequently
involved"); Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains ofBehavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L.
REv. 1747, 1748-49, 1758-60 (1998) (arguing that bounded rationality may be of limited
importance for the analysis of market behaviors because of competitive discipline).
280. To distinguish among the different mechanisms and their effects on rationality, the
present subpart treats the firm as a single decision maker, while the next subpart considers in
detail the various intra-organizational mechanisms that operate within the producer firm.
281. For the distinction between market-level rationality-namely, the compatibility of
aggregate market outcomes with models based on assumptions of strict rationality-and micro-
level, or individual, rationality that pertains to specific firms, see Becker, supra note 269, who
introduces this distinction and uses it to explain seemingly contradictory findings at the two levels.
282. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 267, at 21-23.
2014] 625
Texas Law Review
generating broader market patterns that differ from predictions based on
hypothetical rationality. 28 3
Similarly, Becker extended his argument regarding irrational consumer
behavior, ceteris paribus, to producers.284 He showed that even firms that
do not maximize profits must respond systematically and predictably to
changes in their production opportunity set: as the price of inputs or the
competitive conditions in the market change, even firms acting randomly or
those guided by inertia respond accordingly. 2 85  For instance, Becker
showed that the basic economic finding that a competitive market that
becomes monopolized (or cartelized) will tend to lower output holds when
firms are irrational.286
However, the generality of this result-which applies not just to
business firms but to all decision makers with resource constraints 287-also
spells its limited significance for antitrust purposes. Becker indeed showed
that rationality on the part of the individual decision-making unit is not
required for aggregate market responses to move in the same direction as
predicted by traditional models. Yet antitrust law treats differently market
behaviors with the same general propensity-such as an increase in price or
a reduction in output-depending on the magnitude of change. Mergers
among competitors are legal unless they are likely substantially to lessen
competition, 288 monopolization and attempted monopolization both apply
only to firms above a certain market power threshold,2 89 and exclusive
dealing, tying arrangements, and some other restraints of trade similarly are
prohibited for some firms yet permitted for others depending, inter alia, on
their degree of market power.2 90 In each of these areas of antitrust doctrine,
283. See Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 563 (discussing this caveat with respect to Friedman's
argument).
284. Becker, supra note 269, at 9-12 (showing how the argument extends to firms that use
decision rules other than profit maximization).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 11 (explaining that "a change from competition to monopoly shifts the production
opportunity set toward lower outputs, which in turn encourages irrational firms to lower their
outputs").
287. See id. at 12.
288. See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012); 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30,
passim.
289. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (recognizing that a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant possessed a certain level of "monopoly power" in
order to prevail in a monopoly claim); Ball Mem'I Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d
1325, 1334-35 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Unless the defendants possess market power, it is unnecessary to
ask whether their conduct may be beneficial to consumers. Firms without power bear no burden
ofjustification.").
290. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601-02 (1985)
(noting that the right to select customers and associates is qualified where a firm seeks to create or
maintain a monopoly); see also Avishalom Tor, Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions of
Dominance or Market Power, 76 ANTTRUST L.J. 847 (2010) (expanding upon the special
responsibilities of firms with monopoly power).
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different markets that move in the same general direction generate very
different legal results depending on the respective magnitude of change in
market power. The nature of these changes, however, depends in part on
the nature of producers' rationality in a given market setting.2 9 1
Even when it evaluates market-wide outcomes, moreover, antitrust law
ultimately is concerned with the conduct of specific firms. Yet the conduct
of a given producer and its competitive effects also may depend on the
degree to which the that firm, its competitors, suppliers, and so on adhere to
the precepts of rational profit maximization. To illustrate, the same
allegedly predatory conduct that would not occur in a world populated only
by perfectly rational firms-say, because market conditions make
recoupment of the costs invested in predation unlikely-can both take place
and generate significant competitive harm where a real monopolist is (or is
perceived to be) irrationally aggressive in the face of new entry.292
All in all, the rationality of market participants-as distinct from
aggregate market outcomes-can be material for antitrust analysis, meriting
a careful evaluation of the micro-level mechanisms of supply-side market
rationality. Perhaps the most fundamental micro-level difference between
market and nonmarket behavior is that the former primarily aims at earning
profits. Whatever other motivations may contribute to their activities,
profits are the raison d 'tre of business firms. We thus expect profit-
seeking suppliers to be more rational, avoiding errors that decision makers
exhibit in nonmarket settings.293
Traditionally in economics, the notion that monetary incentives matter
and that larger monetary incentives lead to greater effort and better
performance is near axiomatic.294 Yet the empirical evidence suggests this
is not always the case: though financial incentives can increase effort, this
greater effort generates only limited improvements in the rationality of
people's intuitive judgment and decision making.29 5 In fact, sometimes
291. Cf Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in
Competitive Markets, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 1071, 1071 (1985) (showing, in an early model, that in
the presence of systematic deviations from rationality the standard "rational" outcome at the
market level holds only under very specific conditions but not as a general case).
292. Leslie, supra note 3, at 298-300; Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2, at 55-57.
293. Or that consumers exhibit, even in market settings, given their very different incentives.
294. See, e.g., Uri Gneezy et al., When and Why Incentives (Don't) Work to Modify Behavior,
J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2011, at 191 (discussing the conditions under which extrinsic-particularly
monetary-incentives work and do not work).
295. Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in
Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
7, 7 (1999); Ondrej Rydval & Andreas Ortmann, How Financial Incentives and Cognitive
Abilities Affect Task Performance in Laboratory Settings: An Illustration, 85 ECON. LETTERS 315
(2004) (showing that cognitive abilities are at least twice as important as financial incentives for
performance). This is not to say that financial incentives do not matter. See, e.g., Vernon L.
Smith, Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality, 5 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 91, 101-02 (2002)
(highlighting the efficacy of financial incentives); Vernon L. Smith & James M. Walker,
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increased monetary incentives even diminish the rationality of
performance.296 Furthermore, producers' increased competitive efforts at
times may be directed at goals such as increased market share or relative
297
position in the market rather than pure profit maximization.
For profit motivation to improve the performance of boundedly
rational producers they must learn to correct their deviations from
rationality. Effective learning requires market participants to identify their
judgment and decision errors, to associate these errors with specific
negative consequences, and, finally, to replace their deviations with more
298rational judgments and decisions. However, in the typical antitrust
settings, such learning can be exceedingly difficult. Most judgments and
decisions in product markets are made under uncertainty: outcomes are
multiply determined and delayed; feedback is limited and noisy; and there
is no reliable information about the counterfactual outcomes that would
have occurred had a different choice been made.299
Over time and with experience producers nevertheless can improve
their performance even without "true" learning. They may imitate
Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 245, 259-
60 (1993) (concluding, based on a review of experimental economics studies, that increased
financial incentives reduce the variances in participants' performance and also tend to improve its
quality).
296. See, e.g., Dan Ariely et al., Large Stakes and Big Mistakes, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 451,
451-52 (2009) (comparing performance on identical tasks with varying monetary incentives); Uri
Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All, 115 Q.J. ECON. 791, 791 (2000)
(providing evidence that low financial incentives lead to worse performance than no incentives by
crowding out alternative motivations but that high incentives improve performance); Dan N. Stone
& David A. Ziebart, A Model of Financial Incentive Effects in Decision Making, 61
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 250, 258 (1995) (providing evidence
that financial incentives can improve performance via increased motivation and diminish it by
generating negative affect).
297. See Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7, at 13-17 (discussing how firms will sometimes
choose to imitate similar firms rather than attempt to calculate their own optimal strategies);
Stephen N. Garcia, Avishalom Tor & Richard Gonzalez, Ranks and Rivals: A Theory of
Competition, 32 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 970 (2006); Gneezy et al., supra note 294;
Goppelsroeder, supra note 111.
298. See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision
Making, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN CHOICE AND DECISION BEHAVIOR I (Thomas S. Wallsten
ed., 1980) (emphasizing the importance of unambiguous feedback for learning); Richard E.
Nisbett et al., Improving Inductive Inference, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 445, 445-46 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (noting that decision makers need
to know that an error has occurred, how it has occurred, and how to improve the decision process);
Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 90, at S274-75 (explaining that effective
learning only takes place when "accurate and immediate feedback about the relation between the
situational conditions and the appropriate response" is available).
299. On the importance of effective feedback, see Nigel Harvey & Ilan Fischer, Development
of Experience-Based Judgment and Decision Making: The Role of Outcome Feedback, in THE
ROUTINES OF DECISION MAKING 119, 119 (Tilmann Betsch & Susanne Haberstroh eds., 2005)
(noting that "when feedback is present . . . significant improvements are likely to occur.... [But]
when people perform the task repeatedly without finding out anything about the results of their
efforts, improvements are usually negligible").
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successful competitors, follow established industry norms,300 or seek the
advice of service providers with expertise in improving business
outcomes.301 Sometimes such efforts will align the producers' conduct with
strict rationality, but at other times they will fail to do so. Imitation may be
directed at the wrong elements of competitors' conduct, industry norms
may be neither rational nor efficient, and to seek and invest in outside
advice-not to mention follow it successfully-one must first recognize the
suboptimal behavior.
If the challenges involved in learning from experience in product
markets were not enough, many particularly significant antitrust-relevant
judgments and decisions are infrequent, sometimes unique. Entry into new
markets, mergers and acquisitions, the development of new business
strategies and vertical arrangements, and so on all offer producers
exceedingly limited learning opportunities.
At the micro level, then, though limited in their efficacy, both profit
seeking and learning can improve the rationality of individual producers.
But should the competitive process itself not suffice to align producer
behavior with rationality-based models simply by weeding out those less
capable competitors who fail to learn? Alchian's familiar argument states
that underperforming producers in competitive markets will be less
profitable than their competitors and ultimately will not survive.30 2 Based
on this logic, commentators frequently assume that competition will weed
out boundedly rational decision makers who must deplete their resources by
making inefficient decisions while their rational competitors enjoy higher
profits.303
A more careful consideration shows, however, that rationality-
inducing competition is limited in antitrust-relevant environments for two
sets of reasons, one relating to the nature of behavioral deviations from
rationality in markets, the other having to do with the subject matter of
300. See Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7, at 13-18 (discussing findings suggesting that
"imitation enables firms to make use of other firms' private information and optimizing behavior,
and to enjoy the benefits of conformity (as imitating firms are likely to do as well as the average
of their peers)"); see also Goppelsroeder, supra note I11, at 26 (noting that firms entering mature,
cartelized industries might "simply join[] the cartel, [emulating successful competitors by]
internalizing the collusive agreement so that tacit collusion can be sustained").
301. See Bailey, supra note 81, at 6 (discussing arguments for continuing to treat firms as
rational, profit-maximizing entities, one of which is that "firms may have access to a wide array of
consultants and advisors who can assist in information processing and making optimal pricing
decisions").
302. Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211,
213 (1950); see also Becker, supra note 269, at 9-12 (noting that Alchian's argument is a specific
iteration of the broader argument that markets behave rationally irrespective of the rationality of
participants when resources are constrained).
303. Cf Ernst Fehr & Jean-Robert Tyran, Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes, J.
EcON. PERSP., Fall 2005, at 43, 44 (describing the common argument "that rational agents will
drive the irrational agents from the market because the former make higher profits").
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antitrust law: first, while competition may weed out those who consistently
304
underperform, deviations from rationality are variable and heterogeneous.
When decision makers exhibit different biases to different degrees at
different times, however, even those who ultimately outperform their
competitors may still differ significantly from the hypothetical rational
actor.305
Furthermore, even effective competitive discipline penalizes only
behaviors that reduce profitability. Deviations from strict rationality that
benefit market participants, on the other hand, are facilitated rather than
hindered by competition. For example, competitive selection rewards with
higher returns some biased decision makers who take risks that their
rational competitors avoid, so these particular competitors will outperform
their rational peers even while the majority of their boundedly rational
counterparts fail.306 Similarly, producers who trust their peers, adhere to
social norms, or exhibit other nonstandard social preferences may obtain
higher profits through oligopolistic coordination or cartelization in market
conditions that would prevent strictly rational competitors from doing so.3o1
Second, antitrust law largely focuses on those least competitive
markets, which inevitably exert more limited disciplinary pressure on
market participants. For instance, a monopolist or oligopolists in markets
with significant entry barriers may dissipate some of their supracompetitive
profits by operating less efficiently. 308 Hence, systematic deviations from
rationality, even when unprofitable, may survive in noncompetitive markets
much like other inefficiencies.
Another disciplinary force besides product market competition is
arbitrage by rational actors who identify, exploit, and, thus, erode the profit
opportunities generated by the errors of boundedly rational decision
makers.309 For this to happen, however, there must exist a sufficiently large
304. See supra Part 11.
305. Cf Fehr & Tyran, supra note 303, at 54 (showing how individual irrationality-even
assuming its constancy-may translate to different aggregate market performance depending on
whether deviations from rationality are strategic substitutes or strategic complements).
306. See Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 504-11 (describing this type of competitive selection
process in the competition between more and less biased entrants into manufacturing industries);
cf J. Bradford De Long et al., The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets, 64 J. BUS. 1
(1991) (showing how overoptimistic traders in financial markets-as a group-may in fact earn
higher returns on average and thus exhibit long-run survival). For related intra-firm processes that
sometimes select for managerial deviations from strict rationality, see infra subpart III(B).
307. See, e.g., Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7, at 21-24; Leslie, supra note 3, at 280-83.
308. See generally HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: A NEW FOUNDATION
FOR MICROECONOMICS (1976) (discussing the theory of and evidence for "x-inefficiency"-that
is, a nonallocative efficiency loss-where firms enjoy some degree of sheltering from competitive
pressures).
309. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 35
(1997) (noting that a function of arbitrage "is to bring prices to fundamental values and to keep
markets efficient"). See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION
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group of arbitrageurs who can both identify the opportunity and bear the
risk and costs involved with selling to or buying from the boundedly
rational actors; it also requires the ready availability of substitutes for the
products overpriced or underpriced by boundedly rational actors.3 10
Yet these conditions are uncommon even in sophisticated financial
markets, 3 11 not to mention real product markets. For example, rational
arbitrageurs would find it difficult to engage in product market activities
that profitably exploit a given manufacturer's excessive use of RPM that
causes the ultimate overpricing of some products at retail. In fact,
significant arbitrage is impractical in most product markets even where
products are underpriced rather than overpriced so that no short selling is
required. To illustrate, a monopolist engaging in below-cost predatory
pricing would have offered arbitrageurs a profit opportunity, had they been
able to purchase very large quantities of the heavily discounted product and
then resell the product at higher prices on a later date. In reality, however,
arbitrage is impractical here given the risks involved, the costs of buying
sufficient quantities, stocking and reselling, and so on.
All in all, the myriad mechanisms of market rationality clearly
constrain deviations from strict rationality, partly confirming the common
intuition that producers are more likely to behave rationally than
consumers. At the same time, however, the rationality-inducing effects of
aggregation and resource constraints, of profit seeking and learning, and of
competitive discipline and arbitrage are more limited than many analysts
recognize, particularly in those market settings that antitrust law and policy
are most concerned with.
B. Managers and Firms
While markets-particularly when they are competitive--can promote
rationality, producers' judgment and decision behavior is also shaped by
intra-firm institutions. Because producers are business organizations rather
than mere individuals, they can: recruit experienced, highly capable agents
to manage them; draw on organizational routines to guide managers'
behavior; use contractual arrangements to align these agents' motivation
TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000) [hereinafter SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS] (providing a
readable and comprehensive review of the early behavioral finance literature).
310. See SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS, supra note 309, at 4 (noting that arbitrage is most
effective when "substitute securities are readily available"); Barberis & Thaler, supra note 84, at
5-7 (noting the importance of a close substitute for the mispriced security in minimizing risk for
the arbitrageur); Denis Gromb & Dimitri Vayanos, Limits ofArbitrage, 2 ANN. REv. FIN. ECON.
251 (2010) (surveying the theoretical literature and offering a simple model that incorporates costs
and constraints of arbitrage including risk; short-selling costs; leverage and margin constraints;
and constraints on equity capital).
311. This observation is illustrated by the famous collapse of a multi-billion-dollar hedge fund
whose trading strategy was based on arbitrage. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FARED:
THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000).
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with the interests of the firm; and make group decisions by corporate boards
of directors that can direct, monitor, and discipline managers.312
As in the case of markets, however, the empirical evidence on
managerial and firm behavior-both generally and with respect to antitrust-
relevant tasks in particular-reveals a complex picture. Managers are
sophisticated and experienced professional actors, but still human. Notably,
managers are selected and shaped by institutional forces to manifest greater
rationality in some respects but systematic bias in other respects, as amply
illustrated by the empirical and theoretical literature in behavioral corporate
finance.' In the same vein, corporate governance research demonstrates
the limited ability of key intra-firm mechanisms-from contractual
arrangements to boards-to guarantee desirable behavior by corporate
decision makers.314
1. Managers.-Business managers may be more rational in their
judgment and decision behavior than other individuals because of their
experience and expertise. Research shows that experts in some fields
outperform individuals who do not have domain-specific expertise.3 15
However, the evidence also reveals that where the rationality of judgment
312. Cf Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 442 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell
eds., 2012) (discussing some basic challenges of the behavioral analysis of legal questions
pertaining to firms and managers in the context of corporate governance and the securities laws).
313. See infra section III(B)(1).
314. This literature is vast; some recent findings are reviewed. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Michael S. Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance Research, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 939
(2010). See generally KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 116 (providing basic insights into corporate
governance structure); Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 497 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (offering a clear
analysis of the key issues concerning the various constraints and institutions employed within
firms to incentivize and monitor managerial behavior).
315. Much of this research developed under "Naturalistic Decision Making" (or NDM)-an
approach that focuses on how people make decisions in real-world settings-and while
significant, its scope is limited compared to the broader judgment and decision-making literature.
NDM defines experts based on the subjective perceptions of people in the field. See James
Shanteau, Competence in Experts: The Role of Task Characteristics, 53 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 252, 255 (1992) (defining experts as "those who have been
recognized within their profession as having the necessary skills and abilities to perform at the
highest level"). See generally Gary Klein, Naturalistic Decision Making, 50 HUM. FACTORS 456,
457 (2008) (noting that NDM "shifted our conception of human decision making from a domain-
independent general approach to a knowledge-based approach exemplified by decision makers
who had substantial experience" (emphasis added)); Rebecca Pliske & Gary Klein, The
Naturalistic Decision-Making Perspective, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND
DECISION RESEARCH 559, 559 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 2003) (citing a
definition of NDM as the study of "how people use their experience to make decisions in field
settings"). But see id. at 577-80 (discussing common criticism of the weakness of the methods
used by NDM researchers and questioning the inferences they make about the efficacy of expert
decision making in the fields they study).
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and decision behavior specifically is concerned, experts often make
mistakes that resemble those of other individuals.3 16
The main factors that determine experts' performance-besides the
extent of their experience and subject matter expertise, of course-are the
nature of the task and the decision environment.3 17 Apparently, the learning
processes that help experts develop more rational behavior resemble those
that individuals use for learning more generally. In domains where
feedback is clear and readily available-such as in the area of weather
forecasting--experts can perform well even in the face of uncertainty, and
they continuously improve their performance.318 Yet in many other
domains-particularly where feedback is limited and ambiguous-experts
often fail to exhibit more rational behavior. As Kahneman and Klein
recently noted, there are two preconditions for "the process of skill
acquisition that supports the intuitive judgments and preferences of genuine
experts," namely, "high-validity environments and an adequate opportunity
to learn [in] them."3 19
Skilled intuition can only develop in environments that offer valid-
causal and statistical-cues to the nature of the situation with sufficient
regularity.32 0 Importantly, validity should not be confused with certainty;
some uncertain environments provide decision makers with significant
statistical cues that can assist in acquiring domain-specific expertise. In
games of chance like bridge or poker, for instance, experts can identify
superior bets that improve their overall performance without guaranteeing
the success of every given choice.32 1
316. Colin F. Camerer & Eric J. Johnson, The Process-Performance Paradox in Expert
Judgment: How Can Experts Know So Much and Predict So Badly?, in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT
AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 88, at 342, 342-43 (noting that behavioral studies "suggest
that a wide range of experts ... are not much better predictors than [those with lesser expertise]"
and seeking to reconcile this with the view of cognitive scientists, who argue that "expertise is a
rare skill that develops only after much instruction, practice, and experience"); see also Daniel
Kahneman & Gary Klein, Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to Disagree, 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 515, 515 (2009) (mentioning "the commonplace that expert intuition is sometimes
remarkably accurate and sometimes off the mark").
317. See Kahneman & Klein, supra note 316, at 520-23.
318. Allan H. Murphy & Robert L. Winkler, Probability Forecasting in Meteorology, 79 J.
AM. STATISTICAL ASS'N 489, 493 fig.1, 494 fig.2 (1984) (reviewing evidence for good calibration
of weather forecasters probability judgments and their improvements over time in real-world and
experimental settings alike).
319. Kahneman & Klein, supra note 316, at 519; see also ROBIN M. HOGARTH, EDUCATING
INTUITION 90 (2001) (arguing that because "[i]ntuitions are acquired through experience" and
"the validity of a person's intuition depends on the kind of learning structure in which that
intuition was acquired," the concept of learning structure not only provides a framework for
assessing the validity of intuition but also suggests the kinds of environments that would develop
good intuitions).




In the same vein, individuals may fail to develop reliable skilled
intuitions even in environments that in principle offer high-validity cues.
For one, where the decision task involved is uncommon, there may not be
sufficient opportunities to learn its rules. In other cases, people may hold
subjectively compelling intuitions that lead them to overemphasize some
environmental cues or ignore others despite ample opportunities to acquire
skill in judgment.32 2
Unsurprisingly, therefore, numerous studies reveal experts making
some systematic judgment and decision errors, even while these more
experienced, sophisticated actors outperform nonexperts in some settings.
In fact, some of the earliest studies of intuitive judgment biases used experts
in statistics as participants.32 3 Other experimental studies and field evidence
show biases in the clinical judgments of doctors, psychiatrists, and other
health professionals.324
The evidence also reveals systematic errors by professionals with
expertise in tasks that require complex judgments and decisions in business
and finance.3 25 For instance, studies found anchoring effects among veteran
accountants and real estate brokers,326 desirability bias among investment
322. Id. at 521-22 (discussing these limitations and providing some illustrations).
323. This was the case, for example, with some of the famous early studies of heuristics and
biases that Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman conducted. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, On the Psychology ofPrediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REv. 237, 238 (1973) (describing studies
showing judgment errors using, inter alia, a large sample of graduate students in psychology at
three major U.S. universities); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small
Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105, 105 (1971) (using as experimental subjects the experts
participating in meetings of the Mathematical Psychology Group and the American Psychological
Association).
324. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes et al., Hindsight Bias Among Physicians Weighing the Likelihood
of Diagnoses, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 252 (1981) (physicians exhibiting the hindsight bias);
Loren J. Chapman & Jean P. Chapman, Illusory Correlation as an Obstacle to the Use of Valid
Psychodiagnostic Signs, 74 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 271 (1969) (erroneous intuitive beliefs in
psychotherapists); Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative
Therapies, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1261-62 (1982) (physicians showing framing effects);
Roy M. Poses & Michele Anthony, Availability, Wishful Thinking, and Physicians' Diagnostic
Judgments for Patients with Suspected Bacteremia, 11 MED. DECISION MAKING 159, 159 (1991)
(physicians influenced by "the availability heuristic and by wishful thinking, a form of the value
bias"). See generally Katherine H. Hall, Reviewing Intuitive Decision-Making and Uncertainty:
The Implications for Medical Education, 36 MED. EDUC. 216 (2002) (providing a detailed
description of associated heuristics and biases in clinical decision making); Natalia Karelaia &
Robin M. Hogarth, Determinants of Linear Judgment: A Meta-Analysis of Lens Model Studies,
134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 404 (2008).
325. Cf Derek J. Koehler et al., The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases
Beyond the Laboratory, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 85, at 686, 710 (concluding that
expert judgment was miscalibrated in line with the qualitative predictions of the heuristics and
biases approach in all of the five domains surveyed but that the magnitude of bias was greater in
areas such as medical, business, and sports judgments, where experts had less training and
technical assistance in statistical modeling).
326. See Edward J. Joyce & Gary C. Biddle, Anchoring and Adjustment in Probabilistic
Inference in Auditing, 19 J. ACCT. RES. 120 (1981) (accountants); Gregory B. Northcraft &
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managers, 3 27 subadditive judgments by options traders, 32 8 and framing
effects among financial planners. 329
Still, one might hope for a better alignment with rational models on the
part of top corporate managers due to selection effects. 330 The managers
whose behavior is most relevant for antitrust purposes are not only expert,
experienced business decision makers; they also belong to a smaller, more
select group that reaches elevated positions on the corporate ladder. These
managers may differ from other professionals both in their stronger drive to
succeed in the business world and in consistently outperforming their
competitors in the intra-firm tournament for top management positions.
Hence these more accomplished, better-performing managers might also be
more rational than their typical competitors.
Although selection effects can promote more rational behavior among
senior corporate managers, however, both theory and evidence suggest
these processes are of limited efficacy. In some respects, the limited
efficacy of intra-firm competitive selection echoes the limits of marketplace
competition discussed above at length.332 Yet certain mechanisms of
market rationality are even more constrained or altogether irrelevant where
managerial rationality is concerned: managerial behavior, by definition, is a
matter of individual, not aggregate, macro-level rationality. And
managerial rationality is an even less likely target for arbitrage than firm-
level conduct in product markets.333
Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment
Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 84 (1987) (real estate brokers).
327. See Robert A. Olsen, Desirability Bias Among Professional Investment Managers: Some
Evidence from Experts, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 65, 66-70 (1997).
328. See Craig R. Fox, Brett A. Rogers & Amos Tversky, Options Traders Exhibit
Subadditive Decision Weights, 13 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 16 (1996).
329. Michael J. Roszkowski & Glenn E. Snelbecker, Effects of "Framing" on Measures of
Risk Tolerance: Financial Planners Are Not Immune, 19 J. BEHAv. ECON. 237 (1990).
330. See Werden et al., supra note 7, at 134 ("[F]irms do not randomly select individuals from
the general population to make their important decisions, but rather hire and promote employees
on the basis of their skills."); cf Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at 1525 ("[T]he firm is not merely
a heterogeneous hodgepodge of individuals, but an institution constructed to lower transaction
costs relative to making use of the price system . . . .").
331. Cf Werden et al., supra note 7, at 134 ("Even if most individuals make badly biased
decisions in the face of risk and uncertainty, Wall Street analysts do not because they are selected
for their understanding of probability theory."); Langevoort, supra note 312, at 442-45 (making a
similar observation in the corporate govemance context).
332. See supra subpart III(A).
333. See Baker & Nofsinger, supra note 189, at 8 (suggesting that intra-firm behavior will be
further removed from strict rationality than market behavior given the greater limits of arbitrage in
this setting and the concentration of decision-making power in a few hands).
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Moreover, managerial tournaments at best reward those performance
elements that most closely correlate with the firm's long-run profitability.33 4
Because rationality only partly correlates with the firm's success, even
effective competitive selection within the firm will promote managers who
exhibit some systematic deviations from rationality. For instance,
successful managers may benefit from a reputation for consistency and
commitment, which can lead them to take into account sunk costs that
rational actors are supposed disregard.
Similarly, managerial tournaments may promote overconfidence-a
term denoting a cluster of loosely related deviations from rational
judgment 36 that has received much scholarly attention in recent years. 3 37
334. In reality, intra-firm promotions also depend on additional factors that may be only
tenuously related to the firm's long-run profitability, from the manager's ability to avoid
association with failure through various social and cultural factors. Insofar as they exert
significant influence on the outcome of managerial tournaments, therefore, these factors further
attenuate the rationality-promoting potential of intra-firm competition.
335. See Dawes, supra note 87, at 500-02 (describing the attention to sunk costs as an
ambiguous anomaly on this and related grounds); Langevoort, supra note 312, at 444 (noting that
attention to sunk costs may be beneficial for managers); see also Barry M. Staw, The Escalation
of Commitment: An Update and Appraisal, in ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 191, 210
(Zur Shapira ed., 1997) (asserting that the debate over the rationality of escalation decisions in
organizational settings should be replaced with an effort to account for the behavioral evidence in
this domain).
336. As a term of art, overconfidence refers both to the miscalibration of probability
estimates-when decision makers are too confident in the accuracy of their judgments-as well as
optimistic overconfidence in one's relative or absolute performance, outcomes, and so on. See
Markus Glaser & Martin Weber, Overconfidence, in BEHAVIORAL FINANCE, supra note 189, at
241, 242 (stating, albeit with some imprecision, that "[tihe two main facets of overconfidence are
miscalibration and the better-than-average effect"). For an introduction to research on
miscalibration, see Dale Griffin & Lyle Brenner, Perspectives on Probability Judgment
Calibration, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 177 (Derek J.
Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004), which reviews some key findings and approaches in this
area, and Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Probabilities: The State of the Art to 1980, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 298, at 306, which provides an earlier, paradigm-
setting contribution. For a summary of key findings on optimistic overconfidence, see Tor, Entry,
supra note 2, at 504-14. See also HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 85, at 230-378 (reviewing
and discussing phenomena relating to both types of overconfidence).
337. See, e.g., Itzhak Ben-David et al., Managerial Miscalibration, 128 Q.J. ECON. 1547,
1547 (2013) (finding that "executives are severely miscalibrated" and that "realized market returns
are within the executives' 80% confidence intervals only 36% of the time"); Wen-I Chuang &
Bong-Soo Lee, An Empirical Evaluation ofthe Overconfidence Hypothesis, 30 J. BANKING & FIN.
2489 (2006) (finding empirical evidence that overconfident investors overreact to private
information and underreact to public information and that market gains increase investors'
overconfidence so they trade more aggressively in subsequent periods); Stephen P. Ferris et al.,
CEO Overconfidence and International Merger and Acquisition Activity, 48 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 137, 137 (2013) (finding that "[o]verconfidence helps to explain the
number of offers made by a CEO, the frequencies of nondiversify'ing and diversifying
acquisitions, and the use of cash to finance a merger deal"); Simon Gervais et al., Overconfidence,
Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting, 66 J. FIN. 1735, 1761 (2011) [hereinafter
Gervais et al., Capital Budgeting] (studying "the interaction of managerial overconfidence and
compensation in the context of a firm's investment policy"); Anand M. Goel & Anjan V. Thakor,
Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance, 63 J. FIN. 2737 (2008) (showing that
636 [Vol. 92:573
Understanding Behavioral Antitrust
For example, overconfident managers may persevere in difficult situations,
exhibit greater ambition and confidence in their performance, and
disproportionately attribute their successes to their own prowess over luck,
all of which may make them more attractive to the firm than their unbiased
peers and, consequently, more likely to be selected for top positions.
Of course, overconfidence is not all-around beneficial for either the
managers or their firms. On the one hand, a recent empirical study shows
that firms in innovative industries with overconfident CEOs invest more in
innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater
innovative success for given research and development expenditures (but
also have more volatile returns).339 Some models further show that
an overconfident manager "has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately
promoted to CEO under value-maximizing corporate governance" (emphasis omitted)); Dirk
Hackbarth, Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 843, 843 (2008) ("Optimistic and/or overconfident managers choose higher debt levels
and issue new debt more often.. . ."); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence
and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661, 2661 (2005) [hereinafter Malmendier & Tate, CEO
Overconfidence] ("Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects
and view external funds as unduly costly."); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Does
Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment? CEO Overconfidence Measures Revisited, 11 EUR.
FIN. MGMT. 649 (2005) [hereinafter Malmendier & Tate, Corporate Investment] (linking CEO
overconfidence with firm investment decisions); Jijun Niu, The Effect of CEO Overconfidence on
Bank Risk Taking, 30 ECON. BULL. 3288 (2010) (finding that banks managed by overconfident
CEOs take more risks than their peer institutions); Alexander Puetz & Stefan Ruenzi,
Overconfidence Among Professional Investors: Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers, 38 J. BUS.
FIN. & AcCT. 684 (2011) (finding that equity mutual fund managers trade more after good
personal performance and that market performance has no significant impact); Catherine M.
Schrand & Sarah L.C. Zechman, Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial
Misreporting, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 311, 311 (2012) (concluding that "[o]verconfident executives
are more likely to exhibit an optimistic bias and thus are more likely to start down a slippery slope
of growing intentional misstatements"); Anwer S. Ahmed & Scott Duellman, Managerial
Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism (Mays Bus. Sch., Tex. A&M Univ., Research
Paper No. 2012-77, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=
2097895 (finding a negative correlation between CEO overconfidence and accounting
conservatism and noting that external monitoring does not appear to mitigate this effect); Alberto
Galasso & Timothy S. Simcoe, CEO Overconfidence and Innovation (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 16041, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl604l.pdf
(reporting that overly optimistic and overconfident CEOs are more likely to pursue innovation);
Ulrike Malmendier et al., Corporate Financial Policies with Overconfident Managers (Nat'1
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13570, 2007) [hereinafter Malmendier et al.,
Overconfident Managers], available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3570 (linking individual
managerial characteristics, particularly overconfidence, to firm financing decisions).
338. See Goel & Thakor, supra note 337 (showing that overconfident managers are more
likely to win intra-firm promotions); Langevoort, supra note 312, at 444 (noting that
overconfidence can be a useful and highly adaptive trait in a business environment).
339. See David Hirshleifer et al., Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators? 67 J. FIN. 1457
(2012); see also Galasso & Simcoe, supra note 337 (finding a robust positive association between
CEO overconfidence and citation-weighted patent counts, with a larger effect in more competitive
industries, in a sample of large public firms from 1980 to 1994).
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overconfidence or mild optimism can better align managerial behavior with
shareholder interests. 340
On the other hand, behavioral corporate finance research also reveals
that banks with overconfident CEOs take greater risks than their peer
institutions, 34 1 and top-performing mutual fund managers tend to trade more
following their success-to a degree not explained by other factors-and
exhibit worse performance when they do so. 34 2 Studies further show that
managerial overconfidence distorts both investment and financing decisions
at the firm level; 34 3 helps explain the volume, type, and financing of
mergers and acquisitions activity; 344 and is even linked to aggressive
accounting and an increased likelihood of financial misreporting.34 5
All in all, the evidence makes clear that managerial overconfidence
and certain other deviations from strict rationality can survive-sometimes
even thrive on-intra-firm selection processes. Most importantly, both
theory and the rapidly accumulating evidence also show that behavioral
phenomena like managerial overconfidence indeed exert significant,
measurable effects on firm-level conduct in the market.
2. Firms.-Beyond their potentially superior individual rationality,
managers also operate within large, complex business organizations that
should be capable of generating better outcomes than individuals do, for a
number of reasons. First, when firms have the time and means to learn
from experience and repeated feedback, they can develop "organizational
repairs"-that is, internal procedures and rules that aim to overcome
346
systematic individual shortcomings. The management literature provides
anecdotal illustrations, for example, of organizations using maxims
intended to remind employees not to make biased attributions; utilizing
strategies aimed at collecting sufficient, relevant information; and
developing methods for evaluating their information and hypotheses more
objectively.34 7
340. See, e.g., Gervais et al., Capital Budgeting, supra note 337.
341. See Niu, supra note 337.
342. See Puetz & Ruenzi, supra note 337.
343. See, e.g., Malmendier & Tate, CEO Overconfidence, supra note 337; Malmendier &
Tate, Corporate Investment, supra note 337; Malmendier et al., Overconfident Managers, supra
note 337.
344. See Ferris et al., supra note 337.
345. See Schrand & Zechman, supra note 337.
346. See generally Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can
Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 4-12 (1998)
(discussing various common judgment and decision errors and suggesting ways organizations may




Nevertheless, organizational repairs have limited success and largely
are unpredictable, tending to be most efficacious when based on bottom-up
learning within the firm in a specific domain.348 These characteristics,
however, do not apply to most of the significant antitrust-related tasks
managers face, which concern judgments and decisions regarding the firm's
overall pricing or distribution strategy, strategic alliances with actual or
potential competitors, mergers and acquisitions, and so on. The judgments
and choices required in such cases are made infrequently, at the highest
management levels, and usually offer only limited and noisy feedback, all
of which make systemic organizational repairs unlikely. 349
Second, managers may better approximate rational action simply
because they function as agents of the firm.3 50 There is some evidence that
agents-who operate on behalf of others-act more rationally than
individuals acting on their own behalf. For example, the endowment
effect-wherein individuals value entitlements they possess more highly
than identical ones they do not hold 35 '-was not manifested by
experimental participants taking the role of agents and transacting on behalf
of their principals.352 In the same vein, the behavioral evidence suggests
348. Cf id. at 12-16 (discussing various classifications of repairs along different dimensions
and their likely efficacy).
349. See id. at 12-15 (discussing methods of social feedback). See generally supra notes
298-99 and accompanying text (discussing factors that make learning difficult in many
situations).
350. The agency relationship between managers and firms also generates some disadvantages,
most notably due to the potential divergence of the parties' self-interest, which is of lesser concern
here. For further background on managerial incentives and agency costs, see generally FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90-108
(1991); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); and Oliver E. Williamson,
Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032 (1963). For a review of
more recent corporate governance research, see Bebchuk & Weisbach, supra note 314.
351. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 194-97; Richard Thaler, Toward a
Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 43-47 (1980) (describing
the endowment effect and providing examples of its application in business strategies and
everyday life); see also Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1227 (2003) (applying the endowment effect to several areas of law).
352. Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 31-32 (2002) (finding that experimental participants acting as agents did not
exhibit a significant endowment effect because they framed entitlements in terms of exchange
value). Another study found a significant decrease in fairness concerns when participants in a
bargaining transaction acted as agents owing a duty-such as that of corporate managers-to
maximize the return to the principal. See Kent Greenfield & Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental
Test ofFairness Under Agency and Profit-Maximization Constraints (With Notes on Implications
for Corporate Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983, 1000, 1003-04 (2003).
2014] 639
Texas Law Review
that egocentric biases are less likely to impact judgments made on behalf of
others insofar as the agent has not adopted the principal's perspective.35 3
The better alignment of agent judgment and choice with rational
action, however, would be of limited assistance to managers in overcoming
those judgment and decision errors they manifest with respect to major
corporate decisions. For one, even the limited evidence of agents'
increased rationality pertains only to a few of those behavioral phenomena
that can impact antitrust-relevant behavior. Furthermore, agents' rationality
advantages over principals do not apply to most antitrust-relevant
managerial tasks. The experimental elimination of agents' endowment
effect, for example, was driven by participants' framing of the entitlements
they traded based on the exchange value of those entitlements. 35 4  The
impact of loss aversion on key antitrust-relevant decisions, on the other
hand, concerns the managers' own strategic decisions about the overall
course of the firm rather than about entitlements such as goods held by the
firm for routine transactions. 35 5  Agents' advantage regarding egocentric
biases similarly is unlikely to pertain to judgments of their own managerial
ability and expertise. More generally, the greater rationality of agents is
less applicable to managers' judgments and decisions concerning their own
abilities, plans, and performance.
353. For instance, much of the evidence of optimistic bias comes from studies that compare
participants' beliefs about their own prospects with their beliefs about the prospects of others.
Hence the evidence that shows a systematic bias with respect to beliefs about oneself implies an
unbiased (or at least a less optimistic) view of the prospects of third parties. See, e.g., Tor, Entry,
supra note 2, at 505-08 (citing some of the key studies showing overoptimistic judgments).
Similarly, the evidence regarding the moderating role of preference intensity on the processes of
optimistic overconfidence, id. at 520-22 (discussing this evidence), also implies that agents may
be less biased when making judgments on behalf of their principals.
354. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1325 (1990) (finding no endowment effect when using
induced-value tokens); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1055 (1991) ("[R]eluctance to sell is surely
absent in routine commercial transactions, in which goods held for sale have the status of tokens
for money."). But see Ian Bateman et al., A Test of the Theory of Reference-Dependent
Preferences, 112 Q.J. ECON. 479 (1997) (finding some loss aversion for monetary payoffs); Ian
Bateman et al., Testing Competing Models of Loss Aversion: An Adversarial Collaboration, 89 J.
PUB. ECON. 1561, 1576-77 (2005) (same). See generally Nathan Novemsky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Boundaries of Loss Aversion, 42 J. MARKETING RES. 119 (2005) (exploring the
boundary conditions of loss aversion).
355. Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 829-30 (applying this distinction to managers' decisions
to employ RPM in their distribution systems); see also Eric van Dijk & Daan van Knippenberg,
Buying and Selling Exchange Goods: Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect, 17 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 517, 517 (1996) (finding that experimental market participants exhibited loss aversion
for exchange goods when traders were uncertain about future exchange prices).
356. Cf Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 535-36 (arguing that the advantage of financiers over
new entrants in making decisions regarding new ventures diminishes when they adopt the
entrants' perspective). See generally MAX H. BAZERMAN & DON A. MOORE, JUDGMENT IN
MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (7th ed. 2009) (reviewing and applying individual-level
phenomena to managerial decision making); LEE ROY BEACH & TERRY CONNOLLY, THE
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Third, corporate managers nonetheless may exhibit superior per-
formance because they often do not make significant judgments and
decisions alone but in a small group of top managers or the corporate board
of directors, with the benefits of multiple viewpoints, cumulative
experience, and deliberation.
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, the empirical evidence does not
support the claim that boards (or top management groups) will reliably
avoid those systematic decision errors that plague individual managers.
Instead, the evidence shows small groups outperform individual rationality
in some cases but at other times exhibit similar or even more extreme
judgmental biases and decision errors, with their ultimate performance
largely dependent on case-specific variables.35 s
PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION MAKING: PEOPLE IN ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2005) (same); Leigh
Thompson & Jo-Ellen Pozner, Organizational Behavior, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF
BASIC PRINCIPLES 913, 914 (Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins eds., 2d ed. 2007) (reviewing
research on individual decision making in organizations and stating that "[t]he fundamental theme
is that organizational decision makers . .. are hopelessly victimized by their own nonrational
thought processes").
357. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19-31 (2002) (arguing that boundedly rational managers
function optimally on a board with diverse viewpoints); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments:
Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 978-79 (2005)
(discussing the intuitive appeal of reliance on deliberating groups to make better judgments and
decisions than individuals and their extensive use in various domains, including corporate boards).
But see Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 800 (2001)
(asserting that for a board to function optimally, some board members may need to function as
mediators to mitigate the group's inevitable polarization); Donald C. Langevoort, Essay, Resetting
the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception,
Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 315-16 (2004)
(advocating enhanced internal-reporting controls that increase as the risk of self-serving
managerial behavior increases).
358. See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgments,
121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149 (1997) (reviewing the literature and concluding that groups excel as
judges only under limited conditions and tend to perform at the level of their average members
when performing tasks whose solutions are not easily demonstrable); Gayle W. Hill, Group
Versus Individual Performance: Are N + I Heads Better Than One?, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 517,
535 (1982) (providing an extensive literature review finding across a variety of tasks that "group
performance was generally qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the performance of the
average individual" but that it was "often inferior to that of the best individual in a statistical
aggregate and often inferior to the potential suggested in a statistical pooling model"); Norbert L.
Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 687
(1996) (reviewing the empirical literature on the relative susceptibility of individuals and groups
to systematic judgmental biases and finding that there is no clear or general pattern); Norbert L.
Kerr & R. Scott Tindale, Group Performance and Decision Making, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 623
(2004) (reviewing some of the main findings in this area); John M. Levine & Richard L.
Moreland, Small Groups, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 87, at 415,
438-39 (same). But see R. Scott Tindale et al., Group Decision Making, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 381 (Michael A. Hogg & Joel Cooper eds., 2003)
(reviewing a number of research strands in group research and arguing that they show the general
superiority of groups, despite some unique biases and problems in their decision making). For
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Moreover, beyond their limited capacity to ameliorate individuals'
errors, some common characteristics of group decision making-most
notably deliberation-can generate additional, group-level biases. 359
Groups, for instance, may exhibit "groupthink," promoting an erroneous
consensus that does not reflect the information held by individual group
members. 3 60 Their deliberations, instead of leading to a superior integration
examples of specific studies comparing individuals and groups, see Linda Argote et al., The Base-
Rate Fallacy: Contrasting Processes and Outcomes of Group and Individual Judgment, 46
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296 (1990), finding that group
discussion amplifies judgment by representativeness when individuating information is
informative but also increases the normatively appropriate impact of base rates when information
is not representative; Roger Buehler et al., Collaborative Planning and Prediction: Does Group
Discussion Affect Optimistic Biases in Time Estimation?, 97 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 47 (2005), detailing studies showing an optimistic bias for both individual
and group predictions, with the latter being more optimistic than those generated individually;
Chip Heath & Rich Gonzalez, Interaction with Others Increases Decision Confidence But Not
Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection Views ofInteractive Decision Making,
61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 305 (1995), arguing that interaction
with others in the decision-making process increases the decider's confidence but not his decision
quality; L. Robin Keller et al., An Examination ofAmbiguity Aversion: Are Two Heads Better than
One?, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 390 (2007), finding that a majority of dyads exhibited
greater ambiguity aversion than two individual subjects' average; Richard F. Martell & Mae R.
Borg, A Comparison of the Behavioral Rating Accuracy of Groups and Individuals, 78 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 43 (1993), finding that groups' delayed ratings of the behavior of others were more
accurate than those of individuals but demonstrated greater response bias; Paul W. Paese et al.,
Framing Effects and Choice Shifts in Group Decision Making, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 149, 160-63 (1993), finding, inter alia, that groups can increase or
decrease individual framing effects depending on how decisions are presented; and Glen Whyte,
Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making: A Prospect Theory Approach,
54 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 430 (1993), finding that groups
exhibit more extreme escalation of commitment.
359. See Joyce Berg et al., The Individual Versus the Aggregate, in JUDGMENT AND
DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 102 (Robert H. Ashton & Alison
Hubbard Ashton eds., 1995) (developing a framework for comparing individual performance to
group settings and providing evidence of, among other things, group-level biases and individual
biases that extend to groups, concluding that the impact of aggregation on individual-level biases
varies widely); Sunstein, supra note 357, at 984-86 (discussing the role of information and social
influence in contributing to the failure of deliberation in groups to consistently produce rational
outcomes). See generally BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES
(Michael A. Hogg & R. Scott Tindale eds., 2001) (providing a collection of articles reviewing
group processes that introduce additional complexity and phenomena beyond those found in
individuals).
360. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed., rev. 1983) (providing the original
development of the concept and its applications); Robert S. Baron, So Right It's Wrong:
Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group Decision Making, 37 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 219 (2005) (reviewing thirty years of research and debate over
Janis's groupthink model and concluding, inter alia, that groupthink-like phenomena are common
in mundane, temporary, and even minimal groups, though not universally part of group decision
making); James K. Esser, Alive and Well After 25 Years: A Review of Groupthink Research, 73
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 116 (1998) (providing a summary of
empirical research on groupthink theory). See generally Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Micro
and Macro Rationality, in JUDGMENTS, DECISIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 116, 121-26 (Rajeev
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of group members' information and perspectives, can cause group
polarization so that the resulting collective view of the group is more
extreme than the individual members' predeliberation tendencies.36  Hence,
while senior management's collective judgment and decision making can
and will sometimes generate superior performance, there is little reason to
believe they will approximate the predictions of rational models across the
board.
Finally, corporate governance scholarship suggests that in reality
corporate boards possess limited efficacy and often are dominated by CEOs
and senior management.362 Even with the gradual shift in recent years
towards increased board power at the expense of management, corporate
boards are unlikely to shape most senior management's significant,
antitrust-relevant judgments and decisions.36 3
In sum, while the market behavior of firms and of the mangers who
make judgments and decisions on their behalf may approximate rational
models in some cases, the empirical behavioral evidence reveals a more
complex reality. Behavioral antitrust scholars who assume that firms
replicate all (and only) individual-level deviations from strict rationality
often will be wrong and so will those analysts who make the mirroring
assumption that intra-firm processes guarantee strictly rational conduct.
Gowda & Jeffrey C. Fox eds., 2002) (reviewing variables that sometimes cause groups to exhibit
less accurate judgments than individuals).
361. See, e.g., Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis,
50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1141 (1986) (examining polarization studies focusing on
the two central accounts for this effect: social comparison and persuasive argumentation
processes); see also Sunstein, supra note 357, at 984-1006 (reviewing biases that may be
generated by group deliberation and dividing their underlying mechanisms into informational
influences and social pressures).
362. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF ExEcuTIvE COMPENSATION (2004) (exploring the ways in which
managerial power and influence have shaped the executive-compensation landscape); Iman
Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J.
1557, 1574-79 (2005) (analyzing the relationship between managerial power and boards' not
entering into efficient contracts with managers); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-
Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231,
263 (2002) (reporting data suggesting that greater board independence does not lead to greater
firm performance). See generally Renbe B. Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in
Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58
(2010) (reviewing theoretical models and empirical findings concerning the behavior and
effectiveness of corporate boards of directors); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach,
Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic
Literature, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REv., Apr. 2003, at 7 (providing an earlier and an
updated review of the relevant economic literature on board composition and actions and their
effects on firm performance).
363. See, e.g., Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 851-52 (discussing the limited efficacy of
boards in the RPM context).
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IV. The Third Mistake: Confusing Bounded Rationality with
Anticompetitiveness
Unlike the first two categories of mistakes-which primarily cause
errors in scholars' understanding of antitrust actors' behavior-the third and
last category of mistakes leads to errors in the normative evaluation of
deviations from standard assumptions of rationality. Many commentators
mistakenly equate deviations from these assumptions with privately or
socially suboptimal behavior and even with anticompetitive outcomes that
necessarily would justify antitrust scrutiny.364 This mistaken chain of
inference leads analysts to embrace or reject the behavioral approach based
on their respective antitrust policy predispositions rather than the merits of
the evidence. In reality, however, many systematic deviations from strict
rationality are of no antitrust concern: some are purely procompetitive or at
least procompetitive on balance, and even some socially undesirable
consequences of bounded rationality do not generate sufficient competitive
harm to merit antitrust intervention.
A. Procompetitive Deviations
Some deviations from the assumptions of rationality clearly are
procompetitive. Standard models in antitrust law and economics assume,
for instance, that producers determine their behavior in the market based
solely on the expected value of the different options available to them.3 6 5
Such producers, for instance, form and maintain cartels whenever the
expected economic benefits of cartelization outweigh its expected economic
costs. 366 Cartels can be extremely profitable, and the probability of their
detection still is quite low, although the advent of successful leniency
364. See, e.g., Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 7 at 800 (noting that "[m]uch work in the
nascent field of behavioral antitrust prescribes expanded use of competition law to correct
consumer harm that arises from biased firm behavior"); Ginsburg & Moore, supra note 7, at 96-
98 (arguing that "BE could serve only to broaden, rather than to narrow[,] the meaning of the term
'unfair'); Huffman, Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 7, at 106 (expressing the
view that while "[1]ike foregoing antitrust economics movements, Behavioral Antitrust is on its
face result-neutral, . . . as it has been discussed to date, it has a political slant. Until very recently,
all of the writing advocating Behavioral Antitrust favored increased antitrust enforcement.).
365. More precisely, although it is not material for the purposes of the present example,
standard models assume that firms behave as to maximize risk-adjusted net present value. See,
e.g., Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 489-90 (discussing the net present value concept and its
application to antitrust economics). For other general applications, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 3; RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 23, 101-05,
127-45, 801-05 (10th ed. 2011); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 34-
35 (1988).
366. See generally John M. Connor, Global Cartels Redux: The Lysine Antitrust Litigation, in
THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 300, 305-06 (John E.
Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 5th ed. 2009) (discussing the economics and law of cartels).
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programs has increased it dramatically.3 67 So, with strictly rational
managers, cartels would have been not only common-as they appear to
be 36 8-but ubiquitous.
Yet if some real managers are law abiding, or at least attribute some
value to legal compliance beyond accounting for expected sanctions alone,
the real incidence of cartelization is lower than it would have been in a
world populated with strictly rational actors. Whether they are more law-
abiding because of moral considerations, due to social norms, or for fear of
the extralegal costs associated with criminal conviction, real-world,
boundedly rational managers thus may act more procompetitively than
standard antitrust models assume.
In principle, a similar outcome-of procompetitive deviations from the
assumption of rationality-should occur whenever managers place some
positive value on compliance with the antitrust laws beyond what the
expected legal sanction merits. Such monopolists, for example, may avoid
some profitable predatory actions toward weaker competitors. But the
forces that contribute to legal compliance beyond that predicted by standard
models are weaker in most areas of antitrust law beyond simple horizontal
collusion, given the current dearth of bright-line rules that would make clear
what conduct is illegal.369 When very little conduct clearly is illegal,
neither moral intuitions nor social norms of legal compliance are likely to
367. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEXAS L. REv. 515,
642-43 (2004) (discussing the success of the Department of Justice's leniency program); Nathan
H. Miller, Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement, 99 AM. ECON. REv. 750 (2009)
(developing a model of cartel behavior that helps overcome the difficulty that active cartels are
never observed in the data, testing it empirically, and finding evidence consistent with enhanced
detection and deterrence following the introduction of the Department of Justice leniency
program); Gordon J. Klein, Cartel Destabilization and Leniency Programs: Empirical Evidence
(Ctr. for European Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 10-107, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1854426## (offering econometric estimations
based on OECD data for 23 countries and a period of 20 years that show positive and significant
effects of leniency programs on the competition intensity as measured by price-cost margins).
368. See Stucke, At the Gate, supra note 2, at 565-68 (noting the susceptibility of certain
industries, even those with low entry barriers, to price fixing).
369. The lack of bright line rules is apparent, for instance, in monopolization law. See, e.g.,
Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 49,
66 (2007) ("Monopolization law has always been more flexible and fact-sensitive.... Section 2
[of the Sherman Act] . . . contains no clear target [for adjudication] because all of a firm's
amorphous conduct may be relevant to answering the question whether it unlawfully
monopolized."); Tor, supra note 290, at 859 (explaining that "the common-law, open-ended
monopolization standard of Section 2 incorporates no explicit rule-like elements"); see also
William F. Adkinson, Jr. et al., Enforcement ofSection 2 ofthe Sherman Act: Theory and Practice
16 (FTC & Dep't of Justice Working Paper on Section 2 Hearings, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/section2overview.pdf ("Section 2's brief language
offers little guidance in identifying prohibited conduct. Rather than defining its central concept-
'monopolize'-the statute leaves that task to the courts." (footnote omitted)).
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exert a pro-compliance influence. 3 70 Similarly, the lack of criminal liability
in practice for most categories of antitrust violations removes managerial
concerns about those extralegal sanctions that follow criminal
convictions.
Other nonstandard managerial preferences beyond valuing legal
compliance can also generate procompetitive behavior. Oligopolistic
coordination, for instance, is a common practice that causes significant
competitive harm-much like the effect of explicit cartels-but is not
prohibited by the antitrust laws.372  Both theoretical models and
experimental evidence suggest, however, that oligopolists that seek to
protect and advance their market share, rather than simply to maximize
profits, may find it harder to coordinate their behavior. Hence the
common preference for a superior relative position sometimes will generate
more competitive markets.374
More commonly, however, even while not purely procompetitive,
deviations from the assumptions of rationality can still be procompetitive
on balance. Managerial overconfidence is a case in point: we saw that firms
may select overconfident managers for a variety of reasons, and these
managers impact firm-level behavior. 3 75  At times, managerial
overconfidence leads to inefficient firm-level outcomes, as when it distorts
investment or financing decisions.376 Other effects appear more positive,
such as where firms with overconfident managers generate more innovative
activity. Insofar as this increased innovative activity facilitates dynamic
competition in the market more broadly, its procompetitive benefits may
well outweigh the static efficiency losses generated by overconfidence-
370. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of
Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 81
(2008) (offering experimental evidence that social norms of noncompliance, but not those of
compliance, exert a significant effect on the level of compliance when more ambiguous legal
standards (rather than bright-line rules) are concerned).
371. Cf V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1492 (1996) (arguing that corporate criminal liability has "more severe and,
arguably, unique sanctions (such as stigma)[] and a greater message-sending role than corporate
civil liability"); Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First
Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 19-22 (1998) (discussing evidence for the link between formal and
informal criminal sanctions and referring to stigmatization as "the foundation of the deterrent
effect"). See generally Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Incentives, Punishment, and Behavior, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 572 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004).
372. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 136-69; Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal
Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 683 (2011).
373. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 334-38, 372 and accompanying text.
376. See Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7, at 26; Leslie, supra note 3, at 275-77; Tor, Entry,
supra note 2, at 505-08.
377. Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 540.
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driven behavior.378  Moreover, although overconfidence can lead to
excessive managerial risk taking, it may in fact bring managers' behavior
closer to-rather than farther away from-rationality when managers are
too risk averse for other reasons. 379
Optimistic overconfidence may also have procompetitive-on-balance
consequences in other market settings. The phenomenon of excess entry
into manufacturing industries, for instance, is partly driven by the
psychology of overconfidence. 380 New entry is inefficient for those entrants
who are making boundedly rational entry attempts with a negative net
381
present value. Moreover, excess entry typically is not procompetitive in
the sense of exerting greater pressure on incumbents, notwithstanding the
intuitive appeal of this proposition.382 In the short term, overconfident
entrants diminish the likelihood that other entrants will survive and prosper,
with limited impact on incumbents.383 But even while generating static
efficiency losses, overconfident entry may be beneficial on balance: From a
dynamic perspective, entrants' efforts can help other market participants,
including future entrants, to identify and develop new products and services
or to exploit potential efficiencies.3 84 And while the ultimate balance of
benefits and costs is not easily quantified, the beneficial, dynamic spillover
effects of excess entry could well outweigh its static costs. 385
378. Id. at 542.
379. See, e.g., Gervais et al., Capital Budgeting, supra note 337, at 1749-50 (arguing that
overconfidence can balance out managers' risk aversion); Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting
Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183, 200-01 (1999) (detailing managers' propensity to
suffer from "myopic loss aversion"); Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 523 (discussing the incentives
for managers to be overconfident but also pointing out that managers suffer professional and
reputational effects if they fail); see also Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and
Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SC. 17 (1993) (discussing
factors that contribute to managers' overly cautious conduct yet overly optimistic attitudes).
380. See Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 490-91, 504-08 (describing the high rate of negative net
present value entry in the manufacturing industry and the phenomenon of overconfidence); Colin
Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach, 89 AM.
ECON. REv. 306 (1999) (presenting experimental evidence of overconfident entry).
381. See Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 489-90.
382. See Werden et al., supra note 7, at 130 (noting that evidence of non-profit-maximizing
entry "could suggest that entry is a more potent competitive force than the profit-maximization
assumption suggests, but proponents of behavioral antitrust argue that non-profit-maximizing
entry almost certainly is unsuccessful," thus finding this behavioral research to be of no direct
relevance); Wright & Stone, supra note 7, at 385.
383. Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 491-92, 522-24 (finding that most new entrants simply
replace preceding entrants, while larger, diversifying entrants tend to be less overconfident and to
exert more significant pressure on incumbents).
384. See id. at 540-43 (describing the consequences of innovative entry for the market).




B. Inefficient, Competitively Neutral Deviations
Some deviations from strict rationality generate clear efficiency losses
but do not raise antitrust concern. For instance, when RPM is legal, some
manufacturers use it excessively, even for significant periods of time.386
Boundedly rational RPM is inefficient and harmful for both the
manufacturers exercising it and some of their retailers.3 87 Nevertheless, the
behavioral analysis of the practice also shows it is unlikely to generate
competitive harm unless it is pervasive in the market or exercised by firms
with substantial market power.3 88
The impact of considerations of fairness offers another example of
inefficient, yet not anticompetitive, deviations from the assumptions of
rationality. Standard economic theory expects producers fully to exploit
their market power, raising product prices or limiting the quantities they
produce, to maximize profits. 389  Yet both anecdotal evidence and
controlled experimental tests suggest that firms do not always fully exploit
their market power when it would have been rational to do so in a world
populated solely by rational actors.3 90 For example, firms enjoying short-
term market power due to some external shock-such as when hurricane
damage causes a dramatic increase in the demand for certain products-
often avoid raising prices to market-clearing levels.39 1 Producers may not
exploit their power fully because they believe that charging higher prices is
unfair or due to concerns about long-term reputational harm when fairness-
minded consumers react negatively to these price hikes.392 Either way, such
faimess-minded behavior not only deviates from the standard prediction in
386. See generally Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 819-39 (describing why boundedly rational
manufacturers have tended to rely upon RPM).
387. See id. at 839-42 (describing studies showing that RPM is inefficient and has become
less popular).
388. See id. at 857 (suggesting that firms lacking market power are less capable of causing
competitive harm).
389. THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 366, at 8-10. On occasion, rational firms will
not exploit their market power fully, such as when they want to make potential new entry less
attractive or wish to avoid scrutiny by the enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & John
Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50
ECONOMETRICA 443 (1982) (reviewing the early literature on limit pricing and providing a model
showing that the practice is credible when potential entrants have incomplete information about
incumbents' cost); see also PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT,
AND CASES 488 (6th ed. 2004) (discussing unexploited market power).
390. See Kahneman et al., supra note 133 (offering a series of experimental demonstrations of
how fairness impacts market choices, including the avoidance of fully exploiting short-term
market power); see also Raymond F. Gorman & James B. Kehr, Fairness as a Constraint on
Profit Seeking: Comment, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 355 (1992) (offering follow-up evidence with
respect to business managers).
391. See Kahneman et al., supra note 133, at 738.
392. Bailey, supra note 81, at 6-7; see also Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, at 1579-80




antitrust economics but also causes a misallocation of social resources. In
the face of a shortage, the market serves to match the limited available
products or services with those consumers who place the highest value on
them, as manifested by the prices they are willing to pay.39 3 When
producers avoid raising prices, however, they effectively allocate their
goods through an inefficient queue system, on a first-come basis.
The illustrations offered here thus suffice to show how boundedly
rational decision behavior by producers and consumers can generate
efficiency losses that still fall short of raising antitrust concerns.
C. Normative Bias?
In principle, the behavioral approach is normatively neutral, an
empirically driven effort to offer antitrust law a better understanding of
market behavior. 39 4 Yet in practice, behavioral antitrust analyses currently
more often promote a greater role for antitrust law, rather than a more
limited one, due to the combined effects of the fundamental methodological
error and the current, consistently prodefendant use of rationality
assumptions in antitrust doctrine due to the Court's concerns regarding the
costs and effects of antitrust litigation.395 This state of affairs is not
inevitable, however, and a well-developed behavioral approach could offer
an important set of tools for antitrust scholars irrespective of their policy
predispositions.9
The fundamental methodological error contributes both directly and
indirectly to the tendency of behavioral antitrust to support a more active
role for antitrust law. Directly, because proponents who treat behavioral
phenomena as broad assumptions instead of concrete evidence tend to
overstate the anticompetitive harm of deviations from assumptions of
rationality. In fact, however, we saw that boundedly rational behavior can
be purely procompetitive or procompetitive on balance, and not even all of
its inefficient manifestations call for antitrust intervention.397  Indirectly,
since proponents who neglect the behavioral analysis of antitrust
393. This is true, of course, only under the common, if oft-criticized, economic approach that
equates willingness to pay with utility, an approach that still underpins antitrust law's focus on
protecting the competitive process.
394. Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 314.
395. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993) (holding that a "reasonable expectation of recover(y]" must be present to sustain antitrust
liability for predatory pricing because otherwise the investment would be irrational).
396. Cf Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 314-17 (explaining that the
normatively neutral behavioral toolbox can serve different normative goals from efficiency to
justice or fairness).
397. See supra subparts IV(A)-{B).
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institutions naturally tend to focus on market participants' limitations,398
implicitly assuming that the enforcement agencies or the courts can and
should respond to these limitations. 3 99 This is not to say, of course, that the
agencies or the courts can never offer effective responses to
anticompetitive, boundedly rational behavior, only that the limits of these
institutions also require consideration, as already explained. 4 00
Nevertheless, the current tendency of much behavioral antitrust
scholarship towards supporting more assertive doctrines is also a testament
to the present state of antitrust law. The courts rely on assumptions of
rationality to constrain antitrust claims in many areas, including
monopolization, horizontal conspiracies, vertical price restraints, and
more.401 Against this backdrop, the exposure by the behavioral approach of
situations where rationality assumptions miss the mark naturally tends to
challenge those rationality-based doctrines that limit the reach of the
antitrust laws.
The empirical behavioral evidence, however, should also be used to
caution against antitrust intervention in appropriate cases. For one, Part III
already noted that closer attention to the complex relationship between
antitrust institutions and rationality exposes, inter alia, some limits of
courts and enforcement agents that might otherwise go unnoticed.4 02
Furthermore, while behavioral findings generally will not immunize
specific defendants against antitrust liability, because they do not guarantee
that a given firm necessarily will act in a particular way, they can be
marshaled by defendants as well as by plaintiffs. This can be illustrated by
the Court's ruling that Kodak could have exercised power in the aftermarket
for the sale of copier parts despite competition in the primary market for
copiers.40 3 The behavioral approach recognizes the possibility of a
sufficient proportion of boundedly rational consumers that would have
provided Kodak with aftermarket power and justified the denial of
summary judgment.404 At trial, however, Kodak could have argued that its
aftermarket tying was procompetitive on balance. Kodak might have
398. See supra Part III (noting also that behavioral opponents often make a mirror-image
mistake: assuming that behavioral phenomena are of no antitrust concern because of the
institutional corrections provided by markets and firms).
399. See, e.g., Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, at 1577-81 (surveying areas of antitrust policy
that could be more strongly enforced using behavioral antitrust).
400. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text (briefly discussing the limits of antitrust
enforcement institutions); see also Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 546-47 (noting the insurmountable
challenges that would face regulators who wished to identify and prevent overconfident entry).
401. See supra subpart I(A).
402. See Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 7 (examining the implications of some potential
behavioral factors for agency decision making); Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 546-47 (illustrating
the limits enforcers face when regulating negative-expected-value entry).
403. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 471 (1992).
404. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text (discussing the case in more detail).
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needed to preserve its brand reputation with real-world, boundedly rational
consumers who-unlike their hypothetical, rational counterparts-might
have misattributed to the manufacturer problems with copiers that were
serviced with non-Kodak parts.405 Assuming such evidence were available,
combined with the finding of a competitive primary market for copiers, a
behaviorally informed evaluation of Kodak might have favored the
defendant rather than the plaintiffs.
V. Two Essential Lessons
The fundamental methodological error often leads astray scholars who
try their hands at behavioral antitrust. Proponents and opponents who
mistakenly treat concrete behavioral phenomena as broad hypothetical
assumptions can fail to recognize the impact of variability and
heterogeneity on market behavior or the complex effects of institutions on
rationality in antitrust settings. They also tend to equate bounded
rationality with anticompetitiveness although that frequently is not the case.
Yet the alternative-namely a more careful, empirically driven behavioral
analysis of antitrust law-is fraught with significant challenges. Some of
these challenges are outside the scope of the present analysis because they
are common to applications of behavioral findings to the law more
generally, 406 but this Part charts the essential lessons behavioral antitrust
already can offer for both doctrine and enforcement policy.
A. Lesson One: The Value of Case-Specific Evidence in Antitrust
Adjudication and Enforcement
Behavioral antitrust highlights the essential role of case-specific
evidence in antitrust adjudication, in merger enforcement actions, and more
generally in helping the courts and agencies account for boundedly rational
market behavior that is systematic and predictable overall, yet variable,
heterogeneous, and differently shaped by antitrust institutions in specific
cases.
1. Antitrust Adjudication.-Plaintiffs should not be barred from
introducing case-specific evidence in appropriate cases in areas such as
conspiracy or monopolization.4 07 Courts rely on the rationality assumption
405. I thank Steve Salop for making this observation at our 60th ABA Section of Antitrust
Law Spring Meeting panel on behavioral antitrust.
406. See generally Tor, Behavioral Methodology, supra note 1, at 291-314 (discussing gaps
between the focus of behavioral decision researchers and the needs of legal scholarship).
407. See Leslie, supra note 3, at 341 (highlighting the need for a more fact-specific inquiry in
antitrust cases); see also Reeves, supra note 7, at 8-9 (encouraging the agencies to delve into
behavioral findings before the federal courts do so); Hal Singer & Andrew Card, Lessons from
Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow: Does Behavioral Economics Have a Role in Antitrust
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to grant summary judgment for defendants unless plaintiffs can show that
the alleged conduct could be rational given market conditions. Matsushita
summarily rejected allegations of a predatory horizontal conspiracy under
Section I once the Court determined that a conspiracy would have required
irrational behavior by the alleged conspirators.4 08 Later on, Brooke Group
applied similar reasoning to allegations of predatory pricing under Sec-
tion 2, instituting the recoupment requirement.4 09 More recently, the same
rationale was applied in Weyerhaeuser to reject predatory bidding
allegations.410
Yet the empirical evidence shows that horizontal conspiracies
routinely take place where they could not have been sustained if market
participants were strictly rational.4 11 Behavioral and experimental findings
similarly show that dominant firms or monopolists may act in a predatory
manner even when doing so would appear irrational under standard
assumptions.412 Such conduct, in fact, can even be rational from the
predator's perspective when actual and potential competitors know that
market participants may be boundedly rational.4 13
Horizontal conspiracies that are sustained by boundedly rational
behavior are no less anticompetitive than strictly rational conspiracies,
however. Boundedly rational predatory pricing similarly may harm
competition even while benefiting consumers in the short term by offering
them lower prices.4 14 But the Court's approach dismisses cases of both
horizontal conspiracy and predation at the summary judgment stage, before
plaintiffs have the opportunity to present actual, case-specific evidence of
the alleged anticompetitive conduct.4 15
Importantly, the evidence showing that boundedly rational conduct not
only exists in the market but sometimes generates anticompetitive effects
does not imply that all theories of conspiracy or predation should suffice for
Analysis?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2012, art. 5 at 1, 8 (book review) (discussing the agencies'
recent applications of behavioral economics to antitrust issues).
408. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-90, 595-97
(1986).
409. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224-25 (1993).
410. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 318-20,
325-26 (2007).
411. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
413. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
414. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 36, 1 723a; Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 266-67 (1981) (explaining that
predatory pricing benefits consumers in the short term and may be difficult to distinguish from
desirable, aggressive competition).
415. Notably, by lowering the expected sanction for boundedly rational conduct, the Court's
restrictive approach also makes such collusive or predatory conduct more attractive to its
perpetrators compared to "rational" collusion or predation.
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antitrust plaintiffs routinely to proceed beyond summary judgment. Courts
and scholars have rightly emphasized the significant social costs of antitrust
litigation,416 which is not only costly but in some cases also risks chilling
the same aggressive competition in the marketplace that the antitrust laws
seek to foster.417
Instead, the behavioral lesson is that the law should ignore neither the
potentially significant costs of boundedly rational and rationally
anticompetitive conduct nor the costs of baseless antitrust litigation or
erroneous judicial decisions. Behavioral antitrust militates for balancing
those risks and costs of over- and underenforcement, sometimes referred to
as type I versus type II errors in antitrust law.418 However, unlike familiar
calls for curbing antitrust complaints to avoid risking overenforcement,4 19
behavioral antitrust also recognizes the risks and costs of underenforcement
in some real-world markets, where such a risk would not have existed in
a hypothetical world populated solely by perfectly rational market
participants.
Future behavioral antitrust research will need to flesh out in greater
detail and precision the balance of over- and underenforcement costs in key
antitrust areas. Besides evaluating the familiar effects of the antitrust laws,
such analyses will have to factor in the likelihood of both procompetitive
416. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-58 (2007) (citing Asahi Glass Co. v.
Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J., sitting by
designation)) (describing the costly nature of discovery in antitrust suits as a justification for
increased scrutiny at the motion to dismiss stage); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) ("[C]utting prices in order to increase business often is the very
essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly,
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect."); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) ("Antitrust is costly. The
judges act with imperfect information about the effects of the practices at stake. The costs of
action and information are the limits of antitrust.").
417. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (emphasizing the slight benefit of antitrust enforcement as compared with the social cost of
a "false positivef"); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594 (stating that the mistaken enforcement of
antitrust laws can reduce the very competition they are designed to foster); Easterbrook, supra
note 416, at 4-5 (contending that strict antitrust enforcement has proven very costly by reducing
the strategies available to firms).
418. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies,
18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 97-100 (2002) (discussing the balancing of type I and type II errors in
antitrust analysis). See generally Bruce D. Abramson, Analyzing Antitrust Analysis: The Roles of
Fact and Economic Theory in Summary Judgment Adjudication, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 303 (2001)
(drawing on this framework to consider the relationship between case-specific evidence and
economic theory at the summary judgment stage).
419. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 416, at 34-39 (arguing that certain types of antitrust
actions either should not be brought at all or are inherently suspect); Joshua D. Wright, Overshot
the Mark? A Simple Explanation ofthe Chicago School's Influence on Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION
POL'Y INT'L 1, 11-12 (2009) (arguing that error costs are an important component of the Chicago
School's approach to antitrust and explaining that the overenforcement concern "begins with the
presumption that the costs of false convictions in the antitrust context are likely to be significantly
larger than the costs of false acquittals").
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and anticompetitive conduct that behavioral forces may enable or even fuel,
at least where such conduct is capable of generating substantial benefit or
harm to competition.
2. Merger Enforcement Practices.-Even the antitrust agencies, which
already seek and rely on case-specific evidence in enforcement actions,
should reevaluate and adjust some of their merger practices in light of
behavioral antitrust. Specifically, the behavioral approach at times can help
identify and assess case-specific merger evidence. 4 20  The outcomes of
merger investigations depend significantly on both the type of evidence the
agencies choose to examine and their interpretation of the evidence they
collect. At present, however, the process of evidence generation and
interpretation is based in part-both implicitly and explicitly-on
assumptions of rationality that occasionally may lead to erroneous merger
enforcement outcomes.
Merger investigations frequently use a "hypothetical monopolist" test
to delineate the boundaries of the relevant product market, which determine
both the merging parties' market shares and other concentration measures
that help predict the likely effects of the merger.4 2 1 As the 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines explain, "[m]arket definition focuses solely on demand
substitution factors, i.e., on customers' ability and willingness to substitute
away from one product to another in response to a price increase or a
corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in product quality or
service."422 The hypothetical monopolist test focuses on demand
substitution, asking how consumers of the product in question would react
to a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price (or, a
420. See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 124-25 (noting that while deviations from
rationality might not significantly affect merger analysis, "there may still be some subtle
implications of supply-side biases for mergers which merit further consideration"); Werden et al.,
supra note 7, at 137 (arguing that assessments of mergers should continue to rely solely on
neoclassical economics but that these analyses might sometimes be enriched by integrating
behavioral insights into demand models).
421. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 4.1. Note that although the structure of
these recent guidelines and their emphasis on direct evidence of competitive effects indicates that
market definition, and therefore the hypothetical monopolist test, are less central to merger
investigations than they previously were, they still play an important role in practice. See
Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affairs Competition Comm., OECD, Roundtable on Market
Definition, at 11-14, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP(2012)19 (Oct. 11, 2012), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Marketdefinition2012.pdf (discussing the central role of
market definition in competition analysis but noting that in reaction to its specific drawbacks,
jurisdictions are implementing new tools and approaches to overcome its limitations in particular
cases); see also Baker, supra note 186, at 129-31 (surveying the reasons for defining markets in
antitrust law). For opposing viewpoints regarding the appropriate role of market definition, see
generally Kaplow, supra note 186, criticizing, severely, the dominant market definition/market
share paradigm, and Werden, An Answer to Professor Kaplow, supra note 187, arguing that
market definition still fulfills a central role in merger enforcement.
422. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 4.
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SSNIP). 4 23  The test "requires that a product market contain enough
substitute products so that it could be subject to post-merger exercise of
market power significantly exceeding that existing absent the merger."424
Customer surveys are one common method of data collection for
purposes of predicting consumer demand substitution away from the
hypothetical monopolist.42 5  Yet scholars have noted that the surveys
designed by the agencies may not take into account the possible impact of
framing effects on consumers426: consumers exhibiting framing effects
would react more strongly to price increases for the focal product they are
surveyed about than to price reductions in substitute products,
notwithstanding the analytical equivalence of the two possibilities.427 In the
presence of framing effects, therefore, the survey might overestimate
consumers' willingness to switch away from the focal product, suggesting
overbroad product markets that underestimate the market share and
potentially the power of the focal product.4 28  A behaviorally informed
approach to customer surveys would consider instead the possible effects of
framing on survey outcomes in order to reduce the likelihood of bias in
determinations of product market boundaries.
The potential impact of new entry again illustrates how behavioral
antitrust directs merger evaluation to pay particular attention to case-
specific evidence. Entry plays a role in the Guidelines' merger analysis at
two distinct stages: First, "rapid entrants"-"[fjirms that are not current
producers in a relevant market, but that would very likely provide rapid
supply responses with direct competitive impact in the event of a SSNIP,
without incurring significant sunk costs"-are included as current market
participants. 42 9 The behavioral approach supports the Guidelines' inclusion
of rapid entrants in the market since firms that can enter without incurring
423. Id. § 4.1.1.
424. Id.
425. See Stephen Hurley, The Use of Surveys in Merger and Competition Analysis, 7 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 45 (2011) (discussing the potential and limitations of surveys in merger
enforcement); Graeme Reynolds & Chris Walters, The Use of Customer Surveys for Market
Definition and the Competitive Assessment ofHorizontal Mergers, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
411 (2008) (discussing the prevalent use of customer surveys in the U.K.'s merger enforcement
process); Darren S. Tucker et al., The Customer is Sometimes Right: The Role of Customer Views
in Merger Investigations, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 551, 576 (2007) (arguing that customers
can provide important information regarding several merger issues including, inter alia, demand
substitution). Note that the reliance on surveys would be more likely where more direct evidence
of consumer behavior, such as point-of-sale scanner data for consumer goods, is not available.
426. This is apart from other shortcomings of surveys relying on consumers' predictions of
their likely reactions to hypothetical changes in the market.
427. See Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, at 1533-35 (discussing framing as an explanation for
this phenomenon).
428. See Baker, supra note 186, at 148-66 (explaining how broadly defined markets
underestimate participants' market shares and vice versa when markets are defined too narrowly).
429. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 5.1.
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significant sunk costs typically already are operating in related markets, and
their identification necessarily will be based on case-specific evidence.
Moreover, the behavioral analysis of entry also shows why such entrants
tend to be more successful and to provide more effective competitive
discipline of incumbents.430
At the second stage, on the other hand, the Guidelines consider
potential future entry into the market as a factor that may alleviate concerns
regarding the adverse competitive effects of an otherwise harmful
merger.43 1 In this respect, merger evaluations ask whether "entry would be
timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude, character, and scope to deter
or counteract the competitive effects of concern."432 The behavioral
approach reveals, however, that rationality-based models understate the
likelihood of entry and sometimes overstate its competitive effects. 433 Start-
up entry, in particular, is more likely in many markets than traditional
models predict but fails at very high rates, while diversifying entry is less
common but tends to fare somewhat better over time.434 When seeking to
predict the occurrence and impact of potential future entry on the adverse
competitive effects of mergers, however, the Guidelines do not distinguish
explicitly between entry per se and successful entry more specifically.435
In principle, the Guidelines leave the agencies room to focus on entry
that is more likely to be effective, through the requirement that the
prospective entry also be "sufficient."4 36 The sufficiency requirement,
however, focuses on specific circumstances that limit the efficacy of
successful entry-such as greater product differentiation, entrants' limited
capabilities, or reputational barriers to expansion-rather than those making
entry less likely to succeed altogether.437 Yet the Guidelines also mention
in passing the possibility that entry will not be sufficient if it occurs at such
a smaller scale, compared to the merging parties, so that the potential
430. See Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 494-96 (reviewing evidence for the superior
performance of diversifying entrants compared to start-ups); id. at 520-31 (explaining the
behavioral factors that make diversifying entrants less biased regarding their entry prospects than
start-ups are).
431. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 9.
432. Id.
433. See Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 548-49.
434. See supra notes 166-83 and accompanying text.
435. The Guidelines allow for circumstances in which "[e]ntry may ... be insufficient due to
constraints that limit entrants' competitive effectiveness, such as limitations on the capabilities of
the firms best placed to enter or reputational barriers to rapid expansion by new entrants." 2010
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 9.3. But this allowance applies only in limited
circumstances.
436. Id. § 9.
437. Id. § 9.3.
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entrants will be at a significant competitive disadvantage.4 38 Without
speaking directly to it, this aspect of sufficiency could help account for the
systematically different impact of start-up entrants and diversifying
entrants, which tend to enter at a smaller versus larger scale, respectively.4 39
The Guidelines also offer a potential role for case-specific evidence
here, noting that "[t]he Agencies consider the actual history of entry into the
relevant market and give substantial weight to this evidence.' " The
Guidelines even explain that the "[f]ack of successful and effective entry in
the face of non-transitory increases in the margins earned on products in the
relevant market tends to suggest that successful entry is slow or
difficult.""' Nonetheless, the Guidelines do fall short of explaining how
market-specific evidence could be used to determine whether entry that is
otherwise potentially timely, likely, and sufficient will also be successful
and effective. This seeming shortcoming may prove problematic only in a
limited number of cases, however, since the agencies in practice are quite
skeptical of entry as a counterweight to the adverse competitive effects of
mergers.4 2
Finally, besides pointing to the essential role of case-specific evidence
in achieving more accurate market definitions or assessments of entry
effects, behavioral antitrust also highlights some otherwise unrecognized
difficulties in the agencies' interpretation of quantitative market data in
merger analysis.443 Some commentators argue that merger enforcement
438. Id. ("Entry by a single firm that will replicate at least the scale and strength of one of the
merging firms is sufficient. Entry by one or more firms operating at a smaller scale may be
sufficient if such firms are not at a significant competitive disadvantage.").
439. Tor, Entry, supra note 2, at 495-96 (noting that start-up entrants start out well behind
diversifying entrants and their market share only decreases over time).
440. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 9.
441. Id.; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES 38 (2006) [hereinafter COMMENTARY], available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm (noting, in a published commentary on
the preceding merger guidelines, that "[i]f a merger does attract entry, that entry still may be
insufficient to deter or fully counteract the merger's anticompetitive effect, or the entrant may take
so long to achieve market significance that the merger nevertheless produces sustained
anticompetitive effects").
442. See Werden et al., supra note 7, at 130 (discussing COMMENTARY, supra note 441, as
well as a theoretical model that suggests the limited efficacy of entry in disciplining post-merger
unilateral effects).
443. In practice the more sophisticated empirical methods that are an increasingly important
component of the agencies' merger review process play a much smaller role in the courts. E.g.,
Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Why Can't We All Just Get Along? Structural Modeling
and Natural Experiments in Merger Analysis, 8 EUR. COMPETITION J. 41, 53-70 (2012)
(reviewing these advanced methods and noting their limited role in litigated merger cases). On
the other hand, the agencies' greater acceptance of these approaches is manifested by the greater
emphasis in Section 2 of the 2010 Guidelines on direct and quantitative evidence of merger effects
compared to the centrality of indirect inferences from market definition, market share, and
concentration measures in the preceding 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Compare 2010
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need not be concerned with behavioral findings because it is based on real-
world data on demand in the market.444 This argument seems to refer in
particular to simulation models that predict merger outcomes using an
economic model of demand, supply, and competition in the market,44 5
though it is relevant to other empirical methods that predict merger effects
based in part on demand estimation.446 As explained earlier, simulation and
other structural models primarily are relevant for merger categories in
which sufficient quantitative data is available-typically from point-of-sale
scanners or similar sources-such as those taking place between suppliers
of consumer goods.447 Yet in addition to the limitations of this
methodology that economists already have noted," behavioral antitrust
suggests a further need for caution in interpreting the outcomes of
simulation models to guide merger evaluations. Even where a model
correctly predicts price effects, for instance, it does not resolve the more
fundamental challenge of systematic consumer bias. Consumer demand
that is shaped in part by systematic bias, however, may not reflect
consumers' true preferences accurately and therefore may offer a biased
estimate of merger welfare effects.449
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 2, with U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 1 (1992), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
hmg.pdf.
444. See, e.g., Werden et al., supra note 7, at 136 (arguing that "[i]n estimating the parameters
of the demand system from data on actual choices, merger assessment accounts for the actual
decisions made in the marketplace, normally with high-frequency aggregate data collected at the
point of sale" even while conceding that behavioral deviation can complicate demand estimation);
supra section III(A)(1) (examining this argument when considering whether and when market
institutions promote demand-side rationality).
445. For a discussion of the main approaches to merger simulation and some of their
limitations see, for example, Budzinski & Ruhmer, supra note 81; Coate & Fischer, supra note
443; Aviv Nevo & Michael D. Whinston, Taking the Dogma out of Econometrics: Structural
Modeling and Credible Inference, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2010, at 69; and Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Current Issues in Antitrust Analysis, in COMPETITION POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC APPROACH:
FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 81, 88-91 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2011).
446. DAVIS & GARCtS, supra note 80, § 9.4.
447. See Coate & Fischer, supra note 443, at 61-62 (noting the limited usefulness of
structural models when empirical support is lacking).
448. See Budzinski & Ruhmer, supra note 81, at 304-14 (reviewing "problems that have
occurred in [merger analysis] in the literature as well as in the actual case proceedings"); Coate &
Fischer, supra note 443, at 61-62; Nevo & Whinston, supra note 445, at 72-77 (analyzing the
criticisms levied against merger simulations such as how to define "similar" mergers and the
hazards of failing to account for changes in industry circumstances over time); Rubinfeld, supra
note 445 (discussing trade-offs involved in several merger simulation methods); see also Craig
Peters, Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline
Industry, 49 J.L. & ECON. 627, 647 (2006) (finding, in a set of airline mergers, that standard,
unilateral-effects simulations did not accurately forecast price effects); sources cited supra note 81
(explaining the limits of some common methods of demand estimation that rely on the assumption
of consumer rationality).
449. See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text, which also discuss the broader
challenge consumer bias poses for antitrust policy.
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3. Accounting for Behavioral Irregularities in Specific Cases.
Behavioral variability, heterogeneity, and institutional effects indicate that
courts and agencies also need to avoid the fundamental methodological
error when evaluating allegations of anticompetitive effects in specific
cases. 4 5 0 Specifically, courts and agencies cannot automatically assume-
without adducing evidence for the conduct or effects that constitute the
relevant violation of the antitrust laws-that market participants will exhibit
any particular deviation from rationality in a given instance.45 ' They cannot
assume defendants' conduct had an anticompetitive effect for behavioral
reasons, nor can they assume that bounded rationality prevented
competitive harm, without accounting for behavioral irregularities.
Unlike those scholars who fall prey to the fundamental methodological
error, however, attention to behavioral irregularities should come naturally
to courts and agencies that primarily evaluate specific instances of
potentially anticompetitive behavior.452 After all, when evaluating the
merits of antitrust cases, these decision makers must determine whether the
particular conduct of a particular defendant violated the antitrust laws, not
how market participants generally behave.453
The risk of failing to account for behavioral irregularities is small
where the antitrust laws do not require an evaluation of the competitive
effects of the alleged conduct. Criminal prosecutions of cartels are a
primary example here since these horizontal restraints are per se illegal.4 54
When courts face evidence of cartelization they need not examine whether
market behavior and outcomes comport with rationality or bounded
rationality.455
In most areas of antitrust law, however, defendants' conduct is judged
under a rule of reason, which requires the courts, in principle, to evaluate its
450. See supra subpart I(D).
451. See Christopher R. Leslie, Can Antitrust Law Incorporate Insights from Behavioral
Economics?, 92 TEXAS L. REv. SEE ALSO (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 7) (on file with the
Texas Law Review) ("Theory deals in aggregates; litigation deals with individual episodes of
anticompetitive behavior.").
452. Insofar as the Court is tasked with formulating broader antitrust doctrines and the
agencies need to offer guidance, both sets of institutions must consider the effects of behavioral
regularities as well. See infra subpart V(B).
453. Leslie, supra note 451 (manuscript at 9-10).
454. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (noting that "horizontal price-
fixing agreements[] fall into the category of arrangements that are per se unlawful"); see also
Verizon Comnc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)
(referring to collusion as the "supreme evil of antitrust"); Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46,
49-50 (1990) (per curiam) (applying per se illegality to the division of markets between
competitors).
455. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF




competitive effects.456 Yet in practice, the dramatic majority of rule of
reason cases are disposed of due to the plaintiffs failure to make the case
that the defendant's conduct generated the requisite anticompetitive
effects.4 57 Since the rule of reason requires courts to consider
anticompetitive effects, however, they should be able to avoid the
fundamental methodological error.
The Court's recent adoption of a rule of reason approach to RPM458 is
a case in point. The behavioral approach revealed that manufacturers
excessively rely on RPM to control the resale prices of their products.459
Yet further analysis supported Leegin's discarding of the long-standing but
outdated per se rule and offered behaviorally informed foundations for a
structured rule of reason in this area.4 60  Behavioral antitrust did not
suggest, however, that courts rely on the behavioral evidence to assume that
RPM is always anticompetitive, or even just inefficient-a move that would
have led courts falsely to declare the practice illegal in some cases where its
effects are benign or even procompetitive.461 Instead, the behavioral
approach sought to account for behavioral irregularities, fashioning a
structured rule for markets inhabited by rationally anticompetitive and
procompetitive, as well as by boundedly rational, inefficient, and
sometimes anticompetitive, instances of RPM.462 Under this approach,
courts would seek case-specific evidence that sheds light on the nature of
defendants' RPM and its competitive effects, assigning liability only to
cases in which the practice-rational or boundedly rational-is
anticompetitive.463
Monopolization by predatory pricing offers another familiar example
of how courts can account for behavioral irregularities. Behavioral findings
456. See, e.g., Dagher, 547 U.S. at 5 (applying the rule of reason presumptively). The various
rule of reason approaches still require the courts to determine the effects of the conduct in
question. See generally Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The
Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 733 (2012) (providing a survey of the
current rule of reason doctrine).
457. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU
L. REv. 1265, 1267-68 [hereinafter Carrier, The Real Rule ofReason] (finding that in 96% of rule
of reason cases courts do not conduct the balancing test contemplated by the rule); Michael A.
Carrier, The Rule ofReason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV.
827, 828 (2009) [hereinafter Carrier, An Empirical Update] (finding that 97% of reported cases
are disposed of based on the plaintiffs failure to prove anticompetitive effects).
458. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
459. Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 834.
460. Id. at 854-55.
461. See id. at 855 ("At times, [RPM] generates significant consumer harm, while in other
instances RPM may be used excessively but cause only limited consumer harm. Yet on other
occasions, the practice reflects those rational pro- or anticompetitive calculations assumed by its
past analyses.").





suggest that some monopolists may engage in predation that would not have
been rational in a world populated only by strictly rational actors.4 64 But
courts must account for behavioral irregularity-namely, the possibility that
some monopolists engage, successfully or unsuccessfully, in boundedly
rational predation while at other times monopolists act rationally. Hence
courts should neither assume that predatory pricing allegations are never
credible when recoupment would have been unlikely in a strictly rational
world nor that such predation is always credible or likely, taking care
instead to evaluate the evidence in the specific case.465
In the merger area, due to the parties' strong incentives to overstate
future efficiencies, as well as their tendency otherwise to overestimate
them, and given the evidence of the high frequency of unsuccessful
mergers, the agencies should not simply assume that proffered merger
efficiencies will materialize in fact.466 At the same time, however, because
some mergers do generate meaningful efficiencies, a blanket assumption
that the parties' arguments are overstated would be unwarranted as well.
Arguably, the agencies' traditional skepticism towards efficiency claims is
appropriate, though currently it is based on considerations other than the
contribution of behavioral forces to biased predictions.46 7 To determine
how behavioral factors should be accounted for when they evaluate
efficiency claims, the agencies would need further to identify specific
market and firm factors that facilitate or inhibit biases in managerial
predictions of future efficiencies.
Similarly, some empirical evidence indicates that, in contrast to the
standard, rationality-based assumption, fixed and sunk costs may affect
firms' pricing decisions.46 8 Firms that take into account fixed costs,
however, are more likely than traditional models predict to reduce product
prices following a merger that achieves such cost reductions.469 Some
commentators point to this evidence as favoring a less critical approach
464. See Leslie, supra note 3, at 284-85, 319-24 (attacking the use of the rationality
assumption in predatory pricing cases). See generally Tor, Predatory Pricing, supra note 2
(arguing that more predatory pricing occurs than neoclassical economics would predict).
465. Further research could be helpful in identifying circumstances that make boundedly
rational predation more or less likely and for fashioning appropriate hurdles for plaintiffs to
overcome to reach trial. See infra subpart V(B).
466. See, e.g., Stucke, Reconsidering, supra note 7, at 155 & n.210 (discussing
overconfidence in the merger context and noting the high frequency of failed mergers).
467. See, e.g., Reeves & Stucke, supra note 2, at 1560-63 (challenging the assumption that
mergers are consummated to generate significant efficiencies); Werden et al., supra note 7, at 130
(noting that agency skepticism is consistent with analysis showing that mergers "rarely create a
significant profit incentive for entry").
468. Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 124-25; Werden et al., supra note 7, at 130-31.
469. Cf Bennett et al., supra note 7, at 125 (questioning the assumption that sunk costs would
not affect pricing decisions in mergers).
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towards claims of merger efficiencies.4 70 Yet this argument again manifests
the fundamental attribution error: some merging parties will indeed take
into account fixed-cost reductions in their post-merger prices, reducing
some of the merger's anticompetitive effects, while other firms will ignore
these costs in the short term, as traditional models assume. Consequently,
in this case as well, a blanket approach that always assumes or ignores
fixed-cost effects is likely to miss the mark. Instead, case-specific evidence
about the parties' track record with respect to fixed-cost changes, customer
expectations, and so on would be more informative for agency predictions
of whether such cost savings will be passed on.
B. Lesson Two: Accounting for Behavioral Regularities in Antitrust Law
Beyond highlighting the need to account for behavioral irregularities in
antitrust adjudication and merger-enforcement practices, the behavioral
approach also offers important lessons for the design of the antitrust laws.
For some commentators, the complex reality of market behavior seems
sufficiently overwhelming to justify a conscious reliance on radically
simplified assumptions of rationality throughout antitrust law without
exception. 4 7 1 But willful ignorance of systematic, predictable deviations
from strict rationality can produce antitrust doctrines and policies that harm,
rather than benefit, competition. At the same time, care also must be taken
to avoid the fundamental methodological error when formulating
behaviorally informed antitrust doctrine. Instead, the regularities identified
by the behavioral approach can advance antitrust law in a number of distinct
ways: First, behavioral regularities can help guide the choice among
competing antitrust rules in different areas.472 Second, a better
understanding of such regularities can assist in structuring these rules to
promote rather than retard competition. And, finally, behavioral regularities
sometimes may be carefully and usefully generalized as stylized
observations, which economic models can incorporate when seeking to
predict and explain market outcomes.
For those manifesting the fundamental methodological error,
behavioral antitrust may appear to provide clear, general policy
implications. After all, if one assumes that all market participants-or at
least all actors of a given class of participants-are always and equally
biased, the necessary modifications of antitrust doctrine seem
470. See, e.g., Werden et al., supra note 7, at 130-31 (citing commentators who suggest that
merger efficiencies should be given more weight in light of behavioral-research findings).
471. See, e.g., Ginsburg & Moore, supra note 7, at 96-98 (concluding that judges are unlikely
to rely on behavioral research because "the central theme of the discipline[,] . . . rather than
foreclosing possibilities, opens them up and thereby increases the degrees of freedom with which
a court may pursue personal, idiosyncratic goals").
472. Importantly, the rules advocated by the behavioral approach can be either simple or
complex, irrespective of the complexity of the market behavior they address.
662 [Vol. 92:573
Understanding Behavioral Antitrust
straightforward. For example, if one were to assume that manufacturers
always impose RPM excessively on their retailers when the practice is
legal, the law would be justified in reverting to the rule of per se illegality
that Leegin discarded.4 73 Universally excessive RPM would be either
anticompetitive-for traditional or behavioral reasons-or a competitively
neutral yet socially costly, systematic mistake on the part of manufacturers
that harms them and some of their retailers. If this were the case, per se
illegality would have benefited competition, risking no chilling of efficient
vertical arrangements-which are absent in this case by assumption-and
providing the great benefits and cost savings to business and the legal
system that flow from clear and simple, bright-line antitrust rules.474
In reality, of course, the behavioral evidence on RPM revealed only a
strong tendency of some manufacturers to employ this practice
excessively.4 75 Yet excessive, boundedly rational uses of this vertical
arrangement can coexist with rational, anticompetitive ones as well as with
beneficial, procompetitive arrangements that promote the provision of
output-increasing dealer services.476 Once the heterogeneity and variability
of market behavior are taken into account, behavioral regularities advocate
for a different rule from the one supported by assumed universal bias,
justifying a rule of reason approach to RPM.4 77 Per se illegality, which
initially appeared attractive, turns out to be inappropriate in the face of a
behavioral regularity that falls short of universality.4 78
Besides tipping the scales in favor of one candidate rule over another,
the behavioral approach can assist in a more nuanced structuring of the
chosen rule. This contribution is particularly important since current-day
antitrust applies a rule of reason analysis in areas ranging from many
horizontal restraints through nearly all vertical ones, to monopolization, and
473. See supra notes 145, 229 and accompanying text (describing the tendency of some
manufacturers to excessively impose RPM).
474. See generally Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990) ("The
per se rule is a presumption of unreasonableness based on 'business certainty and litigation
efficiency."' (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)));
Maricopa Cnty., 457 U.S. at 343-44 ("The costs of judging business practices under the rule of
reason, however, have been reduced by the recognition of per se rules."); AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 455, 1510a ("The root meaning of 'per se illegality' is that courts
refuse to consider one or more factors that would ordinarily bear on the reasonableness of
challenged conduct."); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1981) (advocating for the benefits of per se
legality in vertical restraints).
475. See Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 839-47 (finding that some manufacturers will overuse
RPM for extensive periods of time when there are no legal constraints).
476. See id. at 859-62 (arguing that behavioral antitrust supports the view that neither the
proplaintiff nor the prodefendant visions of RPM are entirely correct).
477. See id. at 860-62 (arguing for an improved rule of reason approach to RPM).
478. The behavioral account also makes clear that the per se legality that some advocate for




more.179 In each of these areas, antitrust courts are required to determine
whether a particular form of market conduct is on balance pro- or
anticompetitive in every case.
Because open-ended inquiries under the rule of reason are notoriously
difficult to implement, courts have long sought to structure them.
Frequently they require plaintiffs to make some initial showing-most
notably a clearly defined market where the allegedly anticompetitive
conduct took place-without which the case will not proceed beyond
summary judgment.4 80  In other cases, courts have established elaborate
structures that require plaintiffs and defendants in turn to bear the burden of
proving different elements of the case. 481 The specific structure of the rule
of reason significantly impacts antitrust plaintiffs' likelihood of success.
Private plaintiffs routinely flounder, for instance, when required by courts
to offer a market definition before proceeding with other evidence of
anticompetitive effects, as the case has been with allegations of vertical
nonprice restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman Act since Sylvania.482
Behavioral antitrust sometimes can guide the all-important structuring
of the rule of reason to insure that plaintiffs' antitrust actions will face
appropriate hurdles-neither insufficient nor excessive-based on a better
understanding of market behavior. To continue with the RPM illustration,
479. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899, 907
(2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) and
holding that minimum RPM should be evaluated under the rule of reason); State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), and holding that
maximum RPM should be evaluated under the rule of reason); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1967), and holding that vertical nonprice restraints should be evaluated under the rule of
reason); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-66 (1911) (adopting and
announcing the rule of reason).
480. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885-86 ("Whether the businesses involved have market power is
a further, significant consideration."); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459
(1993) (holding that a plaintiff must prove a dangerous probability that the defendant would
monopolize a particular market to prevail in a Section 2 attempted monopolization claim). The
Court even uses market power as a screening mechanism in cases judged under a per se rule. See
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984) ("[W]e have condemned
tying arrangements when the seller has some special ability-usually called 'market power'-to
force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market.").
481. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35-39 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(upholding the FTC's order in the "Three Tenors" case and applying a burden-shifting framework
to a horizontal-restraint claim); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (applying a burden-shifting structure in a rule of reason inquiry for alleged monopolization
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
482. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see also Carrier, An
Empirical Update, supra note 457, at 834-36 (describing the challenges of burden-shifting tests
applied by each circuit); Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason, supra note 457, at 1268 (summarizing
the burden-shifting exercise and its demands on plaintiffs); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical
Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 71 (1991)
(showing very low percentages of success for plaintiffs under the Sylvania rule).
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the Leegin Court explicitly acknowledged the need for structuring its new
rule of reason for the practice, suggesting that lower courts may "devise
rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to
make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive
restraints and to promote procompetitive ones."483 Following Leegin's call,
and occasionally even prior to it, courts, enforcement agencies, and scholars
offered a variety of structured rule of reason approaches to RPM. 4 84
Notwithstanding their many fundamental differences, these approaches all
sought to distinguish rationally procompetitive instances of the practice
485from its rationally anticompetitive uses. None of the proposed structures,
however, accounted for the behavioral regularity of boundedly rational
manufacturers excessively employing RPM that is neither pro- nor
anticompetitive, as traditionally understood.4 86
In contrast, when structuring the rule of reason, behavioral antitrust
takes into account the incidence and market effects of boundedly rational
RPM as well as the possibility of rationally pro- and anticompetitive uses of
the practice. These factors suggest that plaintiffs should be required first to
make their prima facie case in one of two ways: They could directly show
that the defendant's output decreased following the employment of RPM,
which indicates that the practice was anticompetitive or boundedly rational
and excessive.487 Alternatively, they could offer indirect evidence of the
dangers of the practice in the specific case by establishing the presence of
factors like those cited by the Leegin Court, especially the prevalence of
RPM in the industry, concentration, or market power at either manufacture
or retail.488 Thus, where a plaintiff makes either prima facie case:
[T]he defendant should be allowed to rebut .... show[ing] not only
that the practice sought to address a real business problem-such as
free riding-but also that the problem generated measurable harm to
the manufacturer. Defendants would also have to show, moreover,
that less restrictive means for addressing this problem were
significantly more costly or less effective. Otherwise ...
manufacturers could routinely proclaim the various theoretical harms
of price-cutting ... without [offering specific evidence].489
Last, beyond assisting in choosing and fashioning more effective
antitrust rules, behavioral regularities can be used as stylized facts, allowing
economists to develop more accurate models and predictions of market
483. 551 U.S. at 898-99.
484. See Tor & Rinner, supra note 7, at 858 & nn.309-11, 859 & n.312 (providing examples
for rule of reason structures in judicial and agency decisions as well in academic commentary).
485. See id. at 859.
486. See id.
487. Id. at 862.
488. Id
489. Id. (footnote omitted).
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behavior.4 90  Although such models must ignore some behavioral
irregularities and should therefore be used with care, they can complement
more nuanced analyses. The potential contribution of such models is
illustrated by the extensive research already employing them in other fields
that study market behavior, like behavioral finance. Economists drawing
on behaviorally informed models have offered both theoretical and
empirical insights into firms' dividend policies, IPOs, mergers and
acquisitions activity, and financing and investment decisions, to name but a
few key areas. 4 9' In antitrust, empirical studies similarly could compare the
predictive power of behaviorally informed models to that of traditional,
rationality-based ones. In cases where they are shown to offer better
predictions, specific stylized behavioral models also could be used by the
agencies and the parties before them when assessing the competitive effects
of mergers as well. Although promising within their inherent constraints,
however, formal models based on stylized behavioral facts are only
beginning to develop in industrial organization-the economic field most
directly relevant for antitrust-and to date this new literature primarily
focuses on the reactions of rational firms to consumer limitations and
b-492bias.
Conclusion
This Article finds that behavioral antitrust can advance the law by
offering a better understanding of the behavior of antitrust actors, though
the approach still is nascent. The recent outpour of interest from the
antitrust community-with scholars, practitioners, enforcement officials,
and judges joining the behavioral antitrust fray-is a clear indication of
both the significance of this new approach and the concerns over its future
impact on the field. The Article showed that the behavioral approach is
490. Cf Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1475 (making a similar point with respect to behavioral
law and economics more generally).
491. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL FINANCE, supra note 189 (offering a series of reviews in these
and other areas of behavioral finance that discuss both theoretical and empirical findings in the
field, many of which rely on stylized models); see also Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler,
Behavioral Corporate Finance: An Updated Survey, in 2A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF
FINANCE: CORPORATE FINANCE 357 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2013) (providing a
more recent general survey ofthe field).
492. See, e.g., STEFFEN HUCK ET AL., OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, CONSUMER BEHAVIORAL
BIASES IN COMPETMON: A SURVEY (2011) (U.K.), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/
sharedoft/research/OFTI324.pdf (reviewing both empirical and theoretical literature on
behavioral economics and examining the influence of consumer behavioral biases on firm
decisions); RAN SPIEGLER, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2011)
(summarizing and synthesizing recent theoretical developments in models that incorporate some
behaviorally informed stylized facts with respect to consumer behavior and rational firms'
strategic responses to it); Armstrong & Huck, supra note 7 (discussing some research of this
nature); Ellison, supra note 95 (reviewing much of the new industrial organizational literature that
draws on stylized behaviorally informed models).
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poised to advance antitrust law and policy in myriad ways but can and
should only supplement, not substitute for, the apparatus of standard
antitrust law and economics.
As behavioral antitrust continues to develop, proponents and critics
alike must beware the common pitfalls associated with the fundamental
methodological error. Without a better appreciation of the empirically
driven nature of the behavioral approach, analysts will continue to confuse
concrete behavioral phenomena with broad hypothetical assumptions,
repeatedly making the three classes of mistakes examined in this Article.
Some will fail to appreciate that human judgment and decision behavior is
variable and heterogeneous, neither constant nor uniform. Others will
ignore the various ways in which antitrust institutions facilitate behavior
that resembles the assumptions of rationality to greater or lesser degrees.
And many commentators will continue to conflate bounded rationality with
an automatic license for more assertive antitrust policies.
Scholars should recognize instead that both the unique contribution of
behavioral antitrust and its inherent limitations manifest the fundamentally
empirical character of this approach. A greater attention to the specific
contours of the behavioral evidence generally and its likely manifestation in
antitrust settings in particular, combined with a continued effort to generate
further antitrust-relevant findings, will go a long way towards helping the
antitrust community overcome the fundamental methodological error in
behavioral antitrust.
Finally, beyond providing a better understanding of the nature of
behavioral antitrust, this Article discussed two essential sets of lessons this
new approach offers for doctrine and policy even now. One concerned the
important function of case-specific evidence in both antitrust adjudication
in the courts and agency enforcement actions. The other showed how
antitrust doctrine can incorporate the evidence of systematic and predictable
behavioral regularities in the market that still fall short of universal
propositions. If followed, these essential lessons already can promote
significantly the antitrust laws' mission of protecting competition.
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